Essays on monetary integration and the political economy of international trade, 1860-1913 by Timini, Jacopo
  
 
 
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
 
Essays on Monetary Integration and the 
Political Economy of International 
Trade, 1860-1913 
 
 
Autor: 
Jacopo Timini 
 
 
Directores: 
Stefano Battilossi 
Pilar Nogues-Marco 
 
Tutor: 
Stefano Battilossi 
 
DOCTORADO EN HISTORIA ECONOMICA 
 
Getafe, mes y año 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
  
  
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL 
 
 
ESSAYS ON MONETARY INTEGRATION AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1860-1913 
 
 
 
Autor: Jacopo Timini 
 
 
 
Directores: Stefano Battilossi and Pilar Nogues-Marco 
 
 
Tutor: Stefano Battilossi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firma del Tribunal Calificador: 
 
Firma 
 
 
Presidente: NOMBRE APELLIDOS 
 
 
 
Vocal: NOMBRE APELLIDOS 
 
 
 
Secretario: NOMBRE APELLIDOS 
 
 
 
Getafe, DIA MES AÑO 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
  
  
 
_______________________________________________ 
Acknowledgments 
_______________________________________________ 
 
This dissertation, a challenging and extremely fulfilling experience, would not have 
been possible without the support and the advice of numerous people, to whom I 
am indebted. 
First and foremost, my supervisors Prof. Stefano Battilossi and Prof. Pilar Nogues-
Marco. Their enthusiasm and patience, as well as their careful suggestions and 
constant encouragement, have been inestimable sources of inspiration and 
guidance.  
I am also grateful to Prof. Markus Lampe, for his precious activities of mentoring 
and counselling during his stay at Carlos III; and to the MACROHIST network (Marie 
Curie Initial Training Network in Macroeconomics and Financial History), particularly 
to Professors Rui Esteves, Marc Flandreau, Kim Oosterlinck, Albrecht Ritschl and 
Nikolaus Wolf for their valuable comments on parts of this thesis, during the time of 
my Marie-Curie Fellowship. 
I would like to thank Prof. Gianni Toniolo and the LUISS School of European Political 
Economy, and Prof. Fabrizio Marrella, Prof. Monica Billio and Ca’ Foscari University 
of Venice for hosting me as an international Visiting Fellow for two periods between 
2015 and 2018, as well as the Economic History Department of the Bank of Italy, 
and in particular Federico Barbiellini Amidei and Matteo Gomellini for their useful 
observations. 
I would also like to thank all the components of the Directorate General of 
Economics and Statistics of the Bank of Spain, and particularly Juan Carlos 
Berganza, Pedro Del Rio, Ángel Estrada, and Ignacio Hernando for having always 
been supportive with my research agenda. 
I express my gratitude to the members of the Department of Social Sciences at 
Carlos III, and in particular to Juan Carmona, Jordi Domenech, Stefan Houpt, Pablo 
Martinelli and Antonio Tena-Junguito for their commitment and encouragement 
throughout the years. I also thank my fellow doctoral students of room 18.2.C.02 
for providing an enabling working environment. 
I wish to acknowledge funding from the People Programme (Marie-Curie Actions) 
of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 under 
REA grant agreement no. 608129, and to thank the European Union, as without its 
generous funding this research would not have taken place. 
Concludendo, vorrei ringraziare mia sorella, i miei genitori e i miei nonni per aver 
sempre saputo trovare il tempo di ascoltarmi, appoggiarmi e consigliarmi, non solo 
a parole ma anche tramite il loro esempio, per me grande e continua fonte di 
ispirazione, y Ana, por su alegria y brillante forma de ser. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank 
  
  
 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION p. 1 
  
  
  
CHAPTER 1: Currency Unions and Heterogeneous Trade 
Effects: The Case of the Latin Monetary Union  
 
p. 3 
  
1.1 Introduction p. 4 
  
1.2 Literature review p. 5 
  
1.3 Historical context p. 8 
  
1.4 Methodology and data p. 11 
  
1.5 Results p. 17 
  
1.6 Conclusions p. 26 
  
Appendix A p. 28 
  
A.1 Luigi Luzzatti in the Italian political arena p. 28 
  
A.2 LMU membership p. 30 
  
A.3 LMU agreements – a chronology p. 32 
  
A.4 Gold standard – a chronology p. 34 
  
Addendum to Chapter 1 p. 35 
  
References p. 49 
  
  
  
CHAPTER 2: The Margins of Trade: Market Entry and Sector 
Spillovers, the Case of Italy (1862-1913) 
 
p. 57 
  
2.1 Introduction p. 58 
  
2.2 Literature review p. 59 
  
2.3 Historical context p. 63 
  
2.3.1 Italy: the structure of trade and the (debated) effects on 
economic growth 
 
p. 63 
  
2.3.2 The estimation of imports and export margins p. 70 
  
2.4 Methodology and data p. 73 
  
2.4.1 Empirical strategy p. 73 
  
2.4.2 Data p. 76 
  
2.5 Results p. 78 
  
2.5.1 Market entry p. 78 
  
2.5.2 Robustness tests p. 80  
  
2.6 Conclusions p. 87 
  
Appendix B p. 89 
  
B.1 p. 89 
  
B.2 p. 92 
  
 
Addendum to Chapter 2 p. 93 
  
References p. 102 
  
  
  
CHAPTER 3: Staying dry on Spanish wine: the rejection of 
the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement 
 
p. 109 
  
3.1 Introduction p. 110 
  
3.2 Literature review p. 111 
  
3.3 Historical context p. 113 
  
3.4 Methodology and data p. 117 
  
3.4.1 Empirical strategy p. 117 
  
3.4.2 Data p. 120 
  
3.5 Results p. 121 
  
3.6 Conclusions p. 126 
  
References p. 127 
  
  
  
CONCLUSIONS p. 134 
  
References p. 137 
  
  
  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
1.1 Summary statistics for the main variables p. 12 
  
1.2 Bilateral trade flows and monetary agreements, 1861-1913 p. 19 
  
1.3 Robustness tests p. 21 
  
1.4 Structural break tests, LMU country-pairs trade flows p. 22 
  
1.5 Structural break tests, LMU-Britain trade flows p. 23 
  
1.6 Beggar-thy-neighbor trade and monetary agreements p. 25 
  
A.2.1 LMU (membership and shadowing) chronology p. 30 
  
A.3.1 LMU conferences brief chronology and main achievements p. 32 
  
A.4.1 Classical Gold Standard adherence chronology p. 34 
  
ADD.1.1 Sources of power, the “IEMP” model explained p. 39 
  
ADD.1.2 Trade relations of LMU members (1860-1865) p. 41 
  
ADD.1.3 Baldwin’s hub-ness measure (1860-1865) p. 41 
  
ADD 1.4 Hub and spokes categorization p. 48 
  
2.1 Explanatory example of calculating export sector spillovers p. 74 
  
2.2 Example of a SITC Categorization p. 77 
  
2.3 Main regressions. Spillovers at SITC-3 p. 79 
  
2.4 Robustness tests (part 1) p. 82 
  
2.5 Robustness tests (part 2) p. 83 
  
2.6 Robustness tests (part 3) p. 84 
  
2.7 Robustness tests (part 4) p. 85 
  
B.1.1 Abbreviations (Countries/Sectors) p. 89 
  
B.1.2 Summary statistics for the main variables p. 90 
  
3.1 Summary statistics for the main variables p. 119  
  
3.2 Main results p. 122 
  
3.3 Robustness tests p. 124 
  
3.4 Further robustness – placebo regressions p. 125 
  
  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
ADD.1.1 Economic Power within the LMU (1861-1865) p. 42 
  
ADD.1.2 Military and Political power within the LMU (1861-1865) p. 44 
  
2.1 Imports, Exports and GDP, Italy 1862-1913 p. 64 
  
2.2 Italian exports, by country of destination, share of total exports, 
1862-1913 
 
p.65 
  
2.3 Italian exports, by sector (SITC 1-digit category), share of total 
exports, 1862-1913 
 
p. 65 
  
2.4 Italian exports, by country of destination and sector (SITC 1-
digit category), 1862-1913 
 
p. 66 
  
2.5 Italian imports, by country of origin, share of total imports, 1862-
1913 
 
p. 67 
  
2.6 Italian imports, by sector (SITC 1-digit category), share of total 
imports, 1862-1913 
 
p. 67 
  
2.7 Italian exports, by country of origin and sector (SITC 1-digit 
category), 1862-1913 
 
p. 68 
  
2.8 Extensive and intensive margins of exports p. 70 
  
2.9 Extensive and intensive margins of imports p. 70 
  
2.10 Extensive and intensive margins of exports by country of 
destination 
 
p. 71 
  
2.11 Extensive and intensive margins of exports by country of origin p. 72 
  
B.1.1 Share of total Italian exports in the sample  p. 89 
  
B.2.1 Gruppo Montecatini, production structure by sector and 
product 
p. 92 
  
ADD.2.1 Italian trade intermediaries and wholesalers’ joint stock 
companies, by sector (number of companies at Istat code “group” 
level), 1913 
 
 
p. 95 
  
ADD.2.2 Gruppo Italgas, company structure by firm controlled  p. 99 
  
ADD.2.3 Società Generale Italiana Edison di Elettricità, company 
structure by sector of operation and firm controlled 
 
p. 100 
  
ADD.2.4 Gruppo internazionale seta artificiale – A.K.U., company 
structure by firm controlled and city of operation 
 
p. 101 
  
  
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent times, the benefits of globalization have increasingly been called into 
question. In particular, the support for the economic globalization, i.e. the 
experimented surge of market integration (including monetary integration) and trade, 
has been waning. 
However, for long time, trade has been regarded as one of the dynamic forces 
of economic growth. Trade would not only provide growth opportunities directly, 
but also indirectly, through the channels of innovation and productivity. Even if most 
of the empirical studies on these issues backed this positive view, recent works 
found evidence for a series of backlashes related to trade, pointing at the increasing 
competition deriving from trade as the driver of increases in unemployment (Autor 
et al., 2013), lower wages (Ashournia et al., 2014), the developments in within-
countries inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnick, 2016; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; 
Milanovic and Squire, 2007) or as the responsible for extremist political and electoral 
patterns (see Colantone and Stanig, forthcoming (a); Colantone and Stanig, 
forthcoming (b); Che et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016). In addition, Rodrik (2017) 
highlights the “poor management” of globalization as the possible main transmission 
channel. 
To understand how international agreements – being these free trade 
agreements, currency unions or treaties of other characteristics – shape the course 
of trade, how trade per se evolves and expands over time, and how these 
agreements are formed, accepted or rejected are therefore fundamental questions 
to be asked. 
Consequently, in this thesis, Chapter 1 deals with currency unions and their 
potential heterogeneous effects on trade, using the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) as 
a case study. The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) agreement signed in December 1865 
by France, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland standardised gold and silver coinage in 
member countries and allowed free circulation of national coins in the Union. In his 
seminal study, Flandreau found no evidence of an overall positive effect of the LMU 
on trade. In this chapter, I estimate the effects of this currency agreement on trade. 
In my gravity model I explicitly take into account the changing conditions in the 
international environment that affected the LMU underlying economic foundations 
(i.e., the limits on silver coinage agreed upon in 1874) and its rules (i.e., the 
“liquidation clause” of 1885). I also test the existence of heterogeneous effects on 
bilateral trade within the LMU. In line with Flandreau, I find no significant “overall” 
LMU trade effects. However, I find support for the hypothesis that the LMU had 
significant trade effects for the period 1865–1874. These effects were nonetheless 
concentrated in trade flows between France and the rest of LMU members, 
following a hub-and-spokes structure. Moreover, I find evidence for the existence 
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of a 1874 “LMU-wide” structural break, which affected the course of trade flows 
within the Union. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the margins of trade, market entry and sector spillovers, 
using Italy (1862-1913) during the first wave of globalization as a case study. Indeed, 
between its Unification and WWI, Italy faced a period of increasing participation in 
the international economy. The growth of Italian exports was gradual, and alternately 
promoted by its intensive and extensive margins. In this chapter, using a 
disaggregated database at country-product level, I first construct the intensive and 
extensive margins of trade (for Italian imports and exports) and, second, within a 
quasi-gravity model framework, I estimate the drivers of market entry for Italian 
exports, with particular attention to the presence of eventual sector spillover effects. 
I find that the presence of “similar” exported products increased the probability of 
entry in the destination market (export spillovers), even if with diminishing marginal 
effects, potentially linked to a “saturation”/“congestion” of the market. Equally, I find 
that the higher the imports’ growth rate for a specific product, the more likely it was 
to be internationalised by Italian exporters (import spillovers). 
Finally, Chapter 3 concentrates on the vote determinants of trade agreements, 
using the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade treaty as a case study. On 17 
December 1905 the Italian Parliament rejected to ratify the Spanish-Italian trade 
agreement signed by the Italian government one month earlier, on a diatribe related 
to the lowering of wine import tariffs. This decision left the two countries without a 
bilateral treaty for an entire decade. In the literature, broader political issues and 
local interests are alternatively indicated as the main drivers of treaty rejection. 
Based on a manually assembled database which collect economic and political 
variables, including MPs personal features, and using a probit model, the chapter 
provides a quantitative analysis of the vote. Results show that it is not possible to 
discard that local interest, proxied by wine production, had a role in the rejection of 
the bilateral trade agreement. 
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CHAPTER 1 
This chapter has been published as “Timini J. (2018), “Currency Unions and Heterogeneous 
Trade Effects: The Case of the Latin Monetary Union”, European Review of Economic 
History, 22:322-348.” 
_______________________________________________ 
Currency Unions and Heterogeneous Trade Effects:  
The Case of the Latin Monetary Union 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Jacopo Timini* 
Abstract 
The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) agreement signed in December 1865 
by France, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland standardised gold and silver 
coinage in member countries and allowed free circulation of national 
coins in the Union. In his seminal study, Flandreau found no evidence 
of an overall positive effect of the LMU on trade. In this article, I estimate 
the effects of this currency agreement on trade. In my gravity model I 
explicitly take into account the changing conditions in the international 
environment that affected the LMU underlying economic foundations 
(i.e., the limits on silver coinage agreed upon in 1874) and its rules (i.e., 
the “liquidation clause” of 1885). I also test the existence of 
heterogeneous effects on bilateral trade within the LMU. In line with 
Flandreau, I find no significant LMU trade effects. However, I find 
support for the hypothesis that the LMU had significant trade effects for 
the period 1865–1874. These effects were nonetheless concentrated 
in trade flows between France and the rest of LMU members, following 
a hub-and-spokes structure. Moreover, I find evidence for the existence 
of a 1874 “LMU-wide” structural break, which affected the course of 
trade flows within the Union. 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of 
Banco de España or the Eurosystem. I would like to express my gratitude to Stefano Battilossi, Pilar Nogues-
Marco, and Markus Lampe for their extensive and insightful comments and many discussions on early versions 
of this article. I am also grateful to Antonio Tena for sharing his international trade database. I wish to thank the 
editors and participants of the EREH Fast Track Meeting for their detailed comments, particularly Dan Bogart, 
Joan Roses, Nikolaus Wolf and Neil Cummins. I also would like to thank Marc Flandreau, Gianni Toniolo, Rui 
Esteves, Kim Oosterlinck, Claude Diebolt, Oskar Broberg, Thomas Sattler, Galo Nuño Barrau, Gianluigi 
Mengarelli, Jordi Domenech, Pablo Martinelli, Peter Bent, the Director of the Luzzatti Archive—Carlo Urbani—
and its archivists, the participants at the SEP LUISS School of Political Economy internal seminar, and the Bank 
of Italy researchers in economic history, in particular Federico Barbiellini Amidei, Matteo Gomellini, and Carlo 
Ciccarelli, and the participants at the November 2014 MacroHist workshop at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, 
the October 2015 ESTER RDC at Goteborg University, the December 2015 Banque de France-Sciences Po-
MacroHist conference at the Banque de France in Paris, May 2016 IMPRESS meeting at Carlos III University in 
Madrid, and June 2016 FRESH Meeting held by the Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History. I also wish to 
acknowledge funding from the People Programme (Marie-Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Framework 
Programme FP7/2007-2013 under REA grant agreement no. 608129 (MACROHIST). All remaining errors are 
mine. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Did the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) generate significant effects on trade? And, 
were these effects, if any, homogenously or heterogeneously distributed across 
members? 
Despite the LMU lasted more than 6 decades (1865-1927), between the 19th 
and the 20th century, only few contemporary economic historians put this 
international agreement at the centre of their research (Flandreau, 2000; Flandreau 
and Mauriel, 2005; Einaudi, 1997, 2000 and 2001). 
This monetary convention signed in 1865 by Belgium, France, Italy and 
Switzerland (later joined by Greece in 1868), aimed to introduce a harmonised 
framework – agreed by intergovernmental procedures – for the coinage and 
exchange of specie, i.e. to create a common currency standard. The agreement 
was parsimonious, devising a basic set of rules associated with very light 
enforcement. In the absence of a supranational structure, the delegated powers, 
the practical implementation, and the ordinary functioning of the Union were 
delegated to national institutions. The latter, subjected to legal arrangements whose 
loopholes left them ample room of manoeuvre, could favour or hinder the process 
of both monetary and trade integration. For example, they could restrict de facto 
the acceptance and convertibility of foreign coins in the domestic banking system, 
and possibly use different standards depending on the country of origin, thus 
generating heterogeneous effects. 
Following recent methodological updates (i.e. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, 
Glick and Rose, 2016), and adapting them to a reality of “comprehensive 
importance” such as the LMU,1   I use a recently published database (RICardo) on 
international trade in historical perspective, and an innovative approach (Gowa and 
Hicks, 2013) to identify “within”-Union trade effects. This allows for the existence of 
heterogeneous effects on trade flows, which may have occurred for a number of 
reason, ranging from the structure of trade itself to finance and politics. 
Using, first, a gravity model and, second, structural break analysis, on one hand 
I confirm the results of the pioneering work of Flandreau (2000), who found an 
insignificant effect of the LMU on overall within-Union trade. On the other hand, I 
explicitly consider factors related to the changing conditions in the international 
environment affecting the LMU underlying economic foundations (i.e. the limits on 
silver coinage established in 1874) and the rules of the Union (i.e. the new terms for 
                                                          
1 In his encyclopaedic work “A History of Banking in all the leading nations”, Sumner (1896) decides 
to devote an entire chapter to the LMU despite framing its analysis within national boundaries 
otherwise. This is due to the belief of the author that “the Monetary Union which since 1865 has 
bound France to Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece is of […] comprehensive importance in its 
bearings upon the coin and auxiliary circulations of the allied countries” (Sumner, 1896, Vol.3, p.345). 
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coin redemption agreed in the “liquidation clause” of 1885). In these cases, the data 
support the hypothesis that the LMU had significant trade effects for the period 
1865-1874. These effects were nonetheless concentrated in the flows between 
France and the rest of LMU members. Finally, I confirm that only in 1874 (and not 
in 1885) there was a “LMU-wide” structural break, which affected the course of 
trade flows within the Union. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 provides a brief literature 
review, trying to build bridges between monetary unions and trade within a hub-
and-spokes perspective. Section 1.3 details a short history of the LMU, with 
particular attention to the decline of bimetallism and the “liquidation clause”. Section 
1.4 discusses the methodological approach, mainly dealing with issues inherent to 
gravity models, and describes the RICardo database.2 Section 1.5 discusses the 
results, and provides a new interpretation of the Union’s trade effects within a hub-
and-spokes framework. Section 1.6 summarises and concludes. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
 
Theoretical contributions on regional monetary integration date back to 
Mundell’s (1961) seminal paper on optimum currency areas. However it was only in 
the wake of the EMU, that the debate gained definitely momentum. The European 
Commission (1990) released a comprehensive report in support of the process of 
integration, providing an in-depth cost-benefit analysis on the consequences of a 
currency union.3 Recently, De Grauwe (2014) and Krugman (2013) offered clear 
updates on the advantages and disadvantages associated to a currency union.4 On 
the other side, the empirical literature reached its height at the dawn of the Euro,5 
when Rose (2000) obtained impressively large positive effects of the use of a 
common currency on bilateral trade flows (+>200%).6  Rose’s paper prepared the 
ground for the debate on the possible effects of the Euro, and served as a catalyst 
for fostering research in this domain. Successive studies critically looked to the 
                                                          
2 In a previous version of this chapter I also used a reduced version of the Tena DB (Tena, 
forthcoming), with three year average trade flows.  
3 Despite the 2008 crisis unveiled a degree of “wishful thinking” (Krugman, 2013) – the piece in itself 
constitute an unprecedented effort assembling together contributions (347 pages in total) from 
eminent scholars and economists both from inside and outside the Commission. While 
acknowledging its limitations, we are convinced that it remains a valid reference. 
4 However, in the 19th century the state of knowledge and the level of sophistication regarding the 
economic consequences of currency union were extremely different, as exhaustively documented 
by Einaudi (2001) and Flandreau (2000, 2003), who adapted the debate to that historical reality.    
5 Rose decided to refer directly to the European Commission study (1990, op. cit.) in the title of his 
paper: “One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade”. 
6 Even being completely aware of its criticism and further methodological improvements in the 
literature, Rose’s paper (2000) remains “the most influential international economics paper” of its 
decade (Frankel, 2006, p.76). 
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exceptional magnitude of Rose’s initial estimations.7 Baldwin (2006) and Baldwin 
and Taglioni (2006) provide extensive and lively literature reviews of this debate, 
highlighting some errors that may affect not only Rose’s results, but a large part of 
the following works  based on gravity models: omitted variable bias; model mis-
specification; and endongeneity8 (see also Persson, 2001). Indeed, the consensus 
among scholars is that these issues should be fully taken into account in gravity 
models of bilateral trade to avoid biases in estimations (Flam and Nordström, 2006; 
Barro and Tenreyro, 2007; Baier and Bergstrand; 2007). In the literature, this is 
implemented mainly through the use (of different combinations) of country-pair and 
time effects, and favouring poisson or semi-poisson estimations (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006) instead of OLS regressions. 
Quantitative economic historians also looked with particular interest at trade 
related effects of different exchange rate regimes, being the gold standard the focus 
of the literature (Lampe and Sharp, 2014). Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2003) 
investigated empirically the influence of the gold standard on bilateral trade flows. 
Their findings support the hypothesis that being on gold fostered commercial 
relations significantly, and up to +30%. The gold standard era is also of interest for 
monetary and financial historians, as scholars aim to understand the political 
economy behind the decision of adhering or not. Bordo and Rockoff (1996), 
Flandreau et al. (1998), and Meissner (2005) are seminal contributions in this areas. 
However, this strand of literature will not be at the core of this study.9 Flandreau 
(2000) represents a solid work on the effects of currency unions on trade with both 
a historical and an empirical approach, focussing on the Latin Monetary Union 
(LMU). Being published the same year of Rose’s seminal paper, at that time the 
author could not be aware of the decade of fierce debates that would have followed. 
Flandreau’s results derive from a standard gravity model, and uses OLS regressions 
for cross-sectional data, repeated for three benchmark periods (1860s, 1870s, 
1880s).10 The author identifies the LMU using a dummy variable “which takes the 
value one when both countries in a pair belong to the 1865 Convention and zero 
when otherwise” (Flandreau, 2000, p.29), concluding that the LMU did not introduce 
any considerable bias to bilateral trade, as its coefficient is not statistically 
significantly different from zero in any of the three regressions. Flandreau and 
Mauriel (2005) look more extensively to trade relations and business cycles 
correlations during the 19th century, taking as references the LMU, the Scandinavian 
                                                          
7 See Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Glick and Rose, 2002; Micco et al., 2003; Rose and Stanley, 
2004; Berger and Nitsch, 2005. 
8 Baldwin (2006), Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baldwin et al. (2008) classified the errors following 
Olympics terminology, such as “Gold, Silver, and Bronze medal” mistakes, dealing with omitted 
variable bias, mis-specification, and time-related biases (i.e. the common use of the US price 
deflator). 
9 For a brief summary see Martin-Aceña, Martinez-Ruiz and Nogues-Marco (2011); for a 
comprehensive literature review see Morys (2011).  
10 A maximum of 30 observations per period. 
 7 
 
Currency Union (SCU)11 and the Austro-Hungarian currency union. As in Flandreau 
(2000), the LMU is found having no influence on its members’ bilateral trade. 
However, the literature inspired by Rose’s study does not investigate how 
further economic integration on a regional basis, such as in the LMU case, may 
influence “within” and “external” trade flows. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2013) are an 
exception. Their empirical work aimed at identifying differences across intra-EU 
trade related to the process of European integration, separating countries on the 
basis of the duration of their membership, but neglected political and economic 
factors. In this respect, Baldwin (1994, 2006, 2008) advances the hypothesis of 
“hub-and-spoke” integration, where few leading nations (the “hubs”) are better 
placed to generate interconnections with the other members (the “spokes”). 
Following Baldwin’s arguments, these developments may be due either to the 
construction of a bilateral preferential agreements network creating “artificial” 
relative advantages for the “hub(s)”, or to the natural consequences of an underlying 
Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade involving exchanges of differentiate goods between 
hub and spokes. In addition to Baldwin’s theory, Flandreau (2000) suggests a role 
for the indirect effects of “investing abroad” within an area that envisaged a degree 
of monetary integration.12 From a theoretical perspective, Albertin (2008) builds a 
framework where gains – in terms of trade effects – are not equally distributed 
among members of the currency union and depend on some (economic) 
“dissimilarities” among countries. Those “dissimilarities” can constrain the size of 
the gains. From a completely different perspective – walking on a bridge between 
Marxism and more traditional theories of international relations – dependency theory 
can also provide theoretical grounds for differences between hub and spokes, due 
to economic and socio-political constraints and distortions. These issues however 
are not explored in this chapter.13 
The LMU institutional framework may have constituted a trade-enhancing 
environment through closer institutional relationships and an attempt of monetary 
harmonization. However, as suggested by recent trade theories, the LMU may not 
be a homogeneous construction that symmetrically shares benefits and costs 
among its partners, but a sum of entities diversely affected by the Union and its 
intergovernmental framework. For this reason, proxying the LMU with a single 
dummy could hide heterogeneous dynamics caused by a variety of reasons, from 
the institutional framework to the structure of trade. 
The increasing availability of data, in parallel with several improvements in their 
treatment and estimations methods, constitute pivotal steps for the empirical 
                                                          
11 In his previous paper, Flandreau (2000) uses the SCU as a control variable. 
12 For further discussion on the incentives related to economic integration sensu lato and particularly 
related to the EU dimension, see Pelkmans and Brenton (1997). For a comprehensive discussion 
see Flandreau (2000). 
13 For a thorough analysis of what dependency theory is, see Duvall (1978). 
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literature dealing with currency unions and (bilateral) trade. In an historical context, 
two databases have been created recently, RICardo (for further information see 
Dedinger and Girard, 2016) and Tena DB (Tena, forthcoming). The possibility of 
exploiting these new sources and the application of up-to-date econometric 
techniques, may help to shed additional light on the LMU-related trade issues. The 
additional introduction of two separate dummies, for hub-and-spokes and spoke-
to-spoke relationships, will allow to clarify “within” trade phenomena. Finally, part of 
the analysis will also be devoted to understand possible beggar-thy-neighbor 
effects, i.e. whether trade benefits were created at the expenses of non-member 
countries. To my knowledge there is no previous contribution on this issue for my 
period of reference, and it may also serve to check whether the results are 
compatible with the estimations of heterogeneous LMU effects. 
1.3 Historical context 
 
The establishment of the LMU was not motivated exclusively by the French 
ambition to increase its political influence across Europe. It was also motivated by 
economic reasons (mainly related with the willingness of deepening trade 
relationships), as well as growing federative ideas and solidarity sentiments 
circulating throughout the continent (Flandreau, 2000; Einaudi; 2000). Those 
motivations were also highlighted by influential policy-makers of that time:  
“Back then in 1865, for a sentiment of federation and 
solidarity which prevailed in all economic relations in Europe 
[...] [and] that had to  bind all people in currencies, exchanges, 
trade, common treaties, and for reasons of need, was 
established the monetary convention”.14 
(Luzzatti, 1881)15 
Indeed, the birth of the LMU came after a turbulent period for the majority of the 
European currencies – including those of the countries that will later join the LMU – 
partially related with the unexpected decline in the price of gold (Einaudi, 2007).  The 
unilateral responses to the destabilizing effects of wide changes in the market 
bimetallic ratio often included modifications to the fineness of national silver coins, 
in an effort to reduce their intrinsic value and reinforce the legal bimetallic ratio(s). 
This was, for example, the case of Switzerland (1860) and Italy (1862). However, 
                                                          
14 In Italian in the original: “Allora nel 1865, per un sentimento di federazione e di solidarietà che 
prevaleva in tutte le relazioni economiche dell’Europa […][e] che doveva avvincere tutti i popoli nelle 
monete, nei traffici, nei commerci, in trattati comuni, e per una ragione di necessità, fu stabilita la 
convenzione monetaria” 
15 Please refer to Appendix A.1 for further explanations on the pivotal importance of Luzzatti in Italian 
politics, and with particular regards to trade, monetary and finance issues. Appendix A.1 also 
provides extensive information on the relevance of his personal archive – preserved at the Istituto 
Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Venice – for this chapter. 
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the lack of coordination fragmented the European monetary system, as the new 
fineness of silver coins were not homogenous across countries. Perhaps, the 1865 
monetary agreement was seen by policy-makers as the silver bullet capable of 
removing “every impediment to free transaction among the inhabitants of the four 
[signatory] states, deriving from the different fineness of their silver divisional 
currency”.16 Indeed, their objective was to eliminate trade disruptions and 
speculations deriving from such monetary distortions. The transcriptions of the 
debate in the Italian Parliament on the day of the approval of the agreement support 
this view: “The silver coins fineness variance [across countries], apart from offering 
opportunities to private speculations, had as an effect the restriction of the currency 
tender within the borders of the country of origin, so it is easy to imagine the 
consequent perturbations on the exchanges with the neighbouring populations.” 17 
However, since its creation, the LMU was a purely intergovernmental structure 
(see Appendix A.3 for a complete chronology of LMU conferences and their main 
achievements),18 which did not foresee any mechanisms or criteria clearly defining 
rights and obligations of the member states within the decision making process, 
consequently favouring international relations based on a hierarchical distribution of 
power (Fabbrini, 2015).19 In addition, the LMU had to struggle for adapting with an 
ever-changing European and global economic situation. It underwent several 
structural reforms in a long-lasting fight for survival, which finally lost de jure in 1927. 
However, de facto its relevance started to fade away well before, already in the 
1870s-1880s. In these two decades the LMU faced several challenges, but the 
historical literature usually highlight two major ones. The first was an external threat: 
bimetallism stability was declining and, contemporaneously, the gold standard was 
emerging as the overarching monetary reference (Flandreau and Oosterlinck, 2012; 
Meissner, 2005). The rise of the latter was neither inevitable nor happened abruptly, 
as it was the result of a combination of economic and political factors, deriving from 
                                                          
16 In Italian in the original. See draft bill presented to the Italian Parliament for the approval of the 
LMU, 16 April 1866: “Signori! Il 23 dicembre 1865 è stata conchiusa e sottoscritta a Parigi fra i 
Governi d’Italia, Francia, Belgio e Svizzera una convenzione intesa a stabilire un mutuo accordo nella 
rispettiva legislazione monetaria e togliere ogni impedimento alle libere transazioni fra gli abitanti de’ 
quattro Stati, derivante dal diverso titolo della loro moneta divisonaria dello scudo d’argento”. 
Available at https://archivio.camera.it/. 
17 Ibid. In italian in the original: “Cotesta varietà di titolo negli spezzati dello scudo d’argento, a parte 
lo allettamento che offriva a profittevoli speculazioni private, ebbe necessariamente per effetto di 
restringere il corso delle stesse monete entro i confirni de’ singoli stati d’origine, con quale 
perturbazione negli scambi delle popolazioni limitrofe è facile immaginare.” 
18 In the course of its existence, LMU Member States organised 13 conferences for a varied set of 
purposes; more precisely in 1865 (founding convention), 1874, 1875, 1876, 1878, 1879, 1885, 
1893, 1897, 1902, 1908, 1920 and 1921. In addition, International Monetary Conferences, where 
LMU members attended regularly, were held in 1867, 1878, 1881, and 1892. For further details, see 
De Cecco (1996). 
19 On the topic of intergovernmentalism and distribution of power, see Fabbrini (2015). To have an 
interdisciplinary overview on the consequences of an increased intergovernmentalism, see Adams, 
Fabbrini and Larouche (2016).  
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the rivalry between Germany and France (Flandreau, 2003). Potentially, market 
expectations on the viability of silver as a fundamental part of a global bimetallic 
standard could have been intertwined to those on the future of the LMU and its 
institutional architecture, indirectly influencing trade. Markets change their views in 
1874, following the French (late 1873) and LMU (early 1874) silver minting 
restrictions, with a gradual adjustment of their beliefs on the sustainability of the 
bimetallic standard throughout the year (Flandreau, 1996; Flandreau, 2003; 
Flandreau and Oosterlinck, 2012). The second was an internal challenge: the 
troubled revision of the treaty in 1885 – Belgium temporarily left the Union – ended 
with the introduction of a “liquidation clause” (Cottrell et al., 2007), the new Article 
XIV of the agreement. The provision foresaw that: 
“In case of the denunciation of this convention, each of 
the contracting states shall be bound to redeem the silver 5-
franc pieces which it shall have issued, and which shall be in 
the circulation or the public treasuries of the other states, by 
paying to those states a sum equal to the nominal value of the 
coins redeemed” 
(LMU Convention, signed on 6 November 1885) 
The international “liquidation of balances”, i.e. the repatriation of the respective 
silver coins to other LMU members, was an inconvenience arising from the constant 
depreciation of silver (with respect to gold), and a particular concern for France, 
which “held much more coin issued form the Mints of Belgium and Switzerland, and 
to some extent Italy, than was held by these Governments of the French coins” 
(New York Times, 1885). The transformation fuelled through this channel was 
believed to be so important for the member states, that they decided to stipulate a 
special arrangement – delineating the details of its potential implementation – and 
appended it to the convention (De Cecco, 1996; Bae and Bailey, 2011). In Willis 
(1901, p.236) own words, “the ratification of the treaty of 1885 really meant the 
abrogation of the Latin Union and the substitution of a new monetary league in its 
place”.20 The change of the rules, and the new division of risks and responsibilities 
arising from it, could also have been a game changer in the domain of international 
trade, as it was hampering the easiness of moving coins across borders. 
Therefore, changes in LMU’s rules and institutions should be taken explicitly 
into account in the empirical analysis of trade determinants. Indeed, as stated by 
Gowa and Hicks (2013), “[p]olitically powerful states can create agreements and 
institutions and implement them using the rules of the game that have as their raison 
d’être the production of heterogeneous effects across their members.” In the case 
of the LMU, the drivers that may have favoured the creation of heterogeneous 
effects could have been the following: 1) the relevance of national institutions in 
                                                          
20 Emphasis mine. 
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implementing the monetary agreement – for example the role of central banks21 in 
providing facilities to favour (or halt) the procedures of exchanging coins, possibly 
discriminating by country of origin; 2) the changing “rules of the game” – i.a. the 
inclusion of the “liquidation clause”, which in case of a dissolution of the Union, 
forced the return of divisionary (silver) coins to the respective countries of issue, in 
exchange of gold at its legal tender rate. Since Sumner (1896) and Willis (1901), the 
literature acknowledges the predominant role exerted by France within the LMU. 
Indeed, it was Paris the place chosen to hold conferences and meetings of the 
members of the Union, which – to use Sumner’s words – “has bound France to 
Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece”. This vision is also supported by Einaudi, 
which refers to France as the “hegemonic power” within the Union (Einaudi, 2000, 
p. 304). 
Consequently, the empirical approach will devote particular attention to these 
two issues, i.e. heterogeneous effects both in terms of geography (hub-and-spokes 
relationships) and institutions (due to the changes and challenges outlined above in 
this paragraph). 
1.4 Methodology and data 
The quantitative analysis presented in this chapter exploits RICardo,22 a publicly 
available database that collects bilateral trade flows since the beginning of the 19th 
century onwards. The database includes trade values of both imports and exports, 
providing comparable series of data for the period under scrutiny.23 For every 
country pair (country A and country B), RICardo database shows four bilateral trade 
data: imports from and exports to B recorded by A, and imports from and exports 
to A recorded by B – i.e. mirror flows. Depending on the method used by each 
country to record trade flows, discrepancies may emerge, and indeed are so 
common that a relevant part of the literature try to deal with such issue (see 
Dedinger and Girard, 2016). For the purpose of this research, I used three criteria 
to assemble the database: more reliable sources over less reliable sources (i.e. 
prioritising statistical offices/bureaux with higher historically recognised capability), 
                                                          
21 To simplify, we use here the term “central banks”. However, being in a transitory era where the 
institution of central bank is steadily but not rapidly emerging, it would be more precise to refer to 
the institutions involved as “national banks of issue”, or “national issuing banks”, this being 
particularly true in the cases of Italy and Switzerland for a relevant part of the period under scrutiny.  
22 RICardo – Research on International Commerce – is the result of the efforts of a team of economic 
historians, which initiated the project in 2004, with the aim of assembling a unique database including 
all world’s bilateral trade flows, from the 19th century until WWII (as after WWII trade statistics are 
published and available online). More information about the project are available at 
www.ricardo.medialab.sciences-po.fr 
23However, we are fully aware of the limitations of international trade historical statistics, with 
particular reference to reliability and comparability. Indeed, until approximately 1850s statistics 
record values in constant prices; before 1870s they mainly refer to the “port of transit”; since the 
1870s they report the nationality of the vessel of origin. It is only at the beginning of the 20th century 
when public officers in charge of statistics start to investigate further the real country of origin. See 
Tena (1992) for further discussion. 
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longer time-series data over shorter time-series data (to avoid “jumps” in trade data 
only due to a change in the source used), and imports data over exports data, as in 
a historical context they are more reliable (see i.a. Tena, 1992). The correct selection 
of time and space boundaries also constitutes a key issue. Concerning space, I 
followed Flandreau (2000), and restricted the analysis to intra-European trade flows. 
The sample is representative as it is approximately equal to 80 per cent of total 
world trade (Bairoch, 1996). The period of analysis is important for two main 
reasons: 1) endogeneity concerns and 2) understanding exactly what is measured 
with the LMU dummy. To control for endogeneity, I follow Head and Mayer (2014), 
and I include a period previous to the signature of the Monetary Convention. I 
expand the database backward until 1861. It is not possible going further back, as 
this would imply a significant and non-casual loss of observable dyads. Moreover, I 
should also highlight that Italy, a LMU member, became unified only in that year.24 
On the other end of the database, the LMU lasted de jure until 1927. There is little 
doubt that after WWI the LMU lost completely its meaning (Bae and Bailey, 2011), 
however it is still unclear when it is exactly its end de facto. Consequently, the 
chapter will analyse the period 1861 – 1913, allowing for three different time 
specification for the LMU dummy, to cover the possibility to have diverse trade 
effects related to a set of key events, which will be further discussed below in this 
section – together with the rest of the variables. The final database consists of an 
unbalanced panel of more than 6,500 dyads (see Table 1.1 for summary statistics), 
and contains 53 year of observation (1861-1913). 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics for the main variables 
             
VARIABLES Description and sources N mean sd min max 
imports 
Imports from country j to country i 
RICardo Database 
6,503 4.259e+06 7.518e+06 0 8.041e+07 
lnPOP 
Logarithm of population Maddison 
Project Database 
6,650 18.48 1.416 15.50 21.81 
lnGDP 
Logarithm of GDP Maddison 
Project Database 
5,770 20.23 1.660 15.75 24.70 
lndistcap 
Logarithm of the distance between 
capitals  
CEPII GeoDist Database 
6,650 6.905 0.621 5.153 8.003 
contig 
Existence of a shared border in a 
dyad 
CEPII GeoDist Database 
6,650 0.218 0.413 0 1 
LMU 
dummy variable for dyads where 
both countries are LMU members 
(time-variant), with three alternatives 
related to LMU effects: 1865-1913 
(LMU), 1865-1885 (LMU1885), and 
1865-1874 (LMU1874) 
6,650 0.131 0.337 0 1 
                                                          
24 The consequences of such “epoch-making event” (Federico and Tena, 2013, p.1) on trade are 
definitely not negligible. Italian trade flows are not available before 1861, and despite the impressive 
efforts in the literature for reconstructing early 19th century imports and exports of “Italian” polities 
(Federico and Tena, 2013), these are not comparable and cannot be included in the database 
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Author’s elaboration 
LMUFrance 
dummy variable for dyads which 
includes France (the hub) and any 
of the other LMU members (a 
spoke) (time-variant), same three 
alternatives as above (see LMU 
variable) 
Author’s elaboration 
6,650 0.0589 0.236 0 1 
LMURest 
dummy variable for dyads where 
both countries are LMU members, 
but excluding France (two spokes) 
(time-variant), same three 
alternatives as above (see LMU 
variable) 
Author’s elaboration 
6,650 0.0716 0.258 0 1 
GS 
dummy variable for dyads where 
both countries adhere to the gold 
standard (time-variant) 
Author’s elaboration on Officer 
6,650 0.415 0.493 0 1 
SCU 
for dyads where both countries are 
members of the Scandinavian 
Currency Union (time-variant) 
Author’s elaboration 
6,650 0.0241 0.153 0 1 
LMU-other 
dummy variable for dyads where 
one country is a LMU member and 
the other is not (time-variant), same 
three alternatives as above (see 
LMU variable) 
Author’s elaboration 
6,650 0.412 0.492 0 1 
France-other 
dummy variable for dyads which 
includes France (the hub) and any 
other non-LMU member (time-
variant), same three alternatives as 
above (see LMU variable) 
Author’s elaboration 
6,650 0.134 0.340 0 1 
LMURest-
other 
dummy variable for dyads where 
one country is a LMU member 
(excluding France) and the other is 
not (time-variant), same three 
alternatives as above (see LMU 
variable) 
Author’s elaboration 
6,650 0.279 0.448 0 1 
AllianceTreaty 
Dummy variable signalling a formal 
alliance (including mutual defense 
pacts, neutrality and non-
aggression treaties, ententes, etc.) 
between the dyad (bilateral treaties) 
or among a number of countries 
including those of the dyad  
Author’s elaboration on Correlates 
of War Project 
6,650 0.0995 0.299 0 1 
    Source: Author’s elaboration 
The analysis relies on an augmented gravity model, based on the theoretical 
contributions of i.a. Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2003), which explains bilateral trade flows by transaction costs and economic size: 
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(1)      =    +    ln       ∗        +          +         +          +
+	                    +     +     +     +          
where      denotes the logarithm of nominal imports flows from country j 
(exporter) to country i (importer) in year t.25 The economic size of country i and j at 
time t are proxied by the product of their  population (as in Huberman, Meissner and 
Oosterlinck, 2017), due to limited availability of GDP data (used as robustness test). 
LMU is a dummy variable taking the value of one when both countries pertain to the 
LMU and zero otherwise. This variable varies over time as the database include a 
period prior to the Union, and also retains a (minimum) cross-sectional variance as 
not all members entered at the same time. Such characteristics allows to include 
pair fixed effect in the model without incurring in problems related with collinearity. 
In the “baseline”, the LMU is considered to last from 1865 to 1913. Alternatively, 
two other dummies are constructed: LMU1874 and LMU1885. The first aim to 
understand whether market beliefs on the sustainability of the bimetallic standard 
influenced the LMU trade effects (LMU = 1 from 1865 to 1874). On the other hand, 
the second aims to understand whether the changing nature of the treaty, and its 
“liquidation clause” in particular, was detrimental to within-union trade flows (LMU 
= 1 from 1865 to 1885). In any of these three specifications, the LMU dummy aims 
to quantify the “overall” LMU effects on trade (as in Flandreau, 2000). GS and SCU 
are two additional control variables. GS is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if both countries i and j are in the gold standard at time t, and zero otherwise. 
SCU is a dummy variable identifying the Scandinavian Currency Union (=1 if both 
countries are SCU members and =0 otherwise). “AllianceTreaty” is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 when a formal alliance (including mutual defense 
pacts, neutrality and non-aggression treaties, ententes, etc.) between the dyad 
(bilateral treaties) or among a number of countries including those of the dyad has 
been signed. Data are from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset. Different 
measures of military alliances, such as “defense pacts”, which are “the highest level 
of military commitment, requiring alliance members to come to each other’s aid 
militarily if attacked by a third party” (Gibler, 2009), are also used as further 
robustness tests. Introducing another dummy identifying countries shadowing LMU 
standards would have been ideal, however the limited number of observations 
contained in the database for such group of countries (see Appendix A.2 for the list 
of countries shadowing the LMU standards) do not allow to do so. Following Head 
and Mayer (2014), I include in the main specification of the model also importer time-
varying effects (   ), exporter time-varying effects (   ), 26 and pair fixed effects (   ). 
In this way it is possible to account for factors such as macroeconomic policies or 
                                                          
25 When “poisson” regression is used, then imports are inserted in level and not in logarithmic scale, 
as the poisson function automatically adapts the level to its logarithmic correspondent.  
26 Importer and exporter time-varying effects consist in importer and exporter fixed effects multiplied 
by year fixed effects. 
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consequences deriving from trade treaties (i.e. tariff levels, a concern of particular 
importance due to the parallel development of the Cobden-Chevalier network, see 
discussion below), importer and exporter GDP and GDP per capita (separately), and 
other transaction costs, such as distance, contiguity, and common languages 
(including pair fixed effects automatically excludes these variables from the equation 
due to collinearity).27 In particular, the inclusion of pair fixed effects is in line with 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) suggestion for ruling out possible endogeneity biases 
deriving from previous level of trade exchanges (i.e. the argument being that nations 
with intense trade relations can be more prone to reach an international agreement, 
such as the LMU, among themselves), or other factors like pre-monetary convention 
exchange rate agreements, informal coinage arrangements, previous 
homogenization of currency standards. Separate model specifications with (a) 
importer and exporter fixed effects with year fixed effects, and (b) importer and 
exporter time-varying effects have also been considered for comparative purposes. 
However, the choice of including    ,    , and     is in line with what suggested in the 
literature (see i.a. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). Using different specifications – as (a) 
and (b) – influence the results, as expected, as the risk of incurring in an omitted 
variable bias is higher. Therefore, the results of these models should be considered 
sub-optimal with respect to the specification included in the text and should not be 
interpreted as robustness tests, as highlighted by Glick and Rose (2016). For 
example, they do not take into account tariffs explicitly. Even though several papers 
relativised the role of tariffs, they mainly focused on the beginning of my period of 
analysis. Indeed, Accominotti and Flandreau (2008), i.a., argue that trade 
liberalization (in the form of trade agreements) achieved little, and this being 
particularly true in the 1860s-1870s decades, both for institutional and political 
reasons. Lampe (2009) finds no effects of those years of liberalization (by the means 
of bilateral treaties) on overall trade, nevertheless he argues that product-specific 
preferences are effective in enhancing trade in goods pertaining to the categories 
directly affected by non-generalised tariff reductions, mainly manufacturing. In a 
successive publication, Lampe (2011) stresses the ex-ante economic and political 
forces as main drivers and pillars of the success for this 19th century European 
integration experiment, rather than any substantial overall ex-post results. In 
addition, Federico and Vasta (2015) argue that – using Italy as a case study – trade 
restrictiveness measures were probably overestimating the tariff-based protection, 
downplaying the role of tariffs in economic development during the pre-WWI era. 
                                                          
27 Before the Baier and Bergstrand (2007) contribution, it was a standard procedure in literature to 
proxy for transaction costs by measuring distance between countries pair (in logarithm), and 
including a dummy that takes value one when a dyad has a common border (called “contiguity”). I 
do so in one robustness test (see Section 5). In our case distance measures and contiguity dummies 
are from CEPII GeoDist Database. Distance therefore is a computation of geodesic distance on the 
basis of the “great circle formula” and using capital cities in term of population, “distcap” variable in 
CEPII GeoDist Database. In addition, common language is also inserted in the regression as an 
additional robustness test (results are not reported for simplicity, but are available upon request). 
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On the other hand, Flandreau and Mauriel (2005) include a measure of protection28 
both for the importer and the exporter country. For the period they analysed, 1880-
1913, their inclusion has relevant effects on the final estimations, particularly to 
those of the “gold standard” dummy and the “LMU” dummy. The authors explain 
the variation in the gold standard dummy, i.e. reduction of the coefficient when 
introducing protection measures, arguing that countries on gold were also relatively 
more prone to “free trade” policy. The effect on LMU, i.e. the negative coefficient 
becoming not statistically significant, may be linked to the disruptive Italian-French 
tariff war of the 1890s. Finally,    is the constant and      the error term.  
In addition, to consistently test the hypothesis of different trade patterns 
between hub-and-spokes flows and spoke-to-spoke flows, the LMU dummy is 
substituted by LMUFrance and LMURest, also dummy variables. The former takes 
value one when describes dyads which includes France (the hub) and any of the 
other LMU members (a spoke), and zero otherwise. The latter instead identify a 
bilateral trade flow between two spokes, both LMU members (=1; and 0 otherwise) 
(2)      =    +    ln       ∗        +                +
+             +	       +        +                    +     +     +
+    +          
Finally, a variation of equation (2) is considered to test whether the trade-
enhancing effects of the monetary agreement where obtained at the expenses of 
non-members, i.e. if the creation of the LMU had de facto beggar-thy-neighbor 
effects, as argued for other interwar agreements by a consistent part of the historical 
literature (see i.a. Aldcroft, 2001). As suggested in Gowa and Hicks (2013) if the 
database contains only a limited number of countries (16 in my case) it is preferable, 
due to a high risk of collinearity,  not to include at the same time dummies that – as 
in equation (1) and (2)– detect intra-agreements trade flows (LMU, LMUFrance, 
LMURest, GS, SCU) and those that try to capture eventual trade diversion effects 
(“beggar-thy-neighbor” dummies: LMU-other; France-other; and LMURest-other) 
outside the block.  
The quantitative analysis will rely on the use of Poisson estimators. Indeed, 
basic econometric procedures, such as the OLS procedure has increasingly been 
challenged by scholars, i.a., Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The reasons for 
discarding OLS estimations in favour of Poisson may be clustered in three major 
groups (UNCTAD and WTO, 2012): (1) Poisson estimator is consistent with fixed 
effects, a rare property for a nonlinear maximum likelihood estimator; (2) it is able to 
deal with zero values, a situation that may arise when there is no trade between a 
country pair, automatically considering those observations in the estimates; (3) 
Coefficients obtained from a Poisson regression are of unequivocal interpretation, 
                                                          
28 Protection is defined as “the ratio of custom revenues to total trade”. 
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and retain the same meaning as in OLS estimations with a logarithmic dependent 
variable. 
1.5 Results 
The results from the gravity equation models are presented in Table 1.2. I 
confirm previous findings (i.a. Flandreau, 2000), of an overall non-significant effect 
of LMU on within-Union bilateral trade flows during the period 1865-1913. This is 
also true when separating flows between France and the rest of LMU members on 
one side, and among the rest of the LMU members on the other. However, when 
contemplating the LMU as “active” only for the periods when market still considered 
the bimetallic standard as viable, the LMU produced positive effects on bilateral 
trade flows, but for those between France and the other members, and not for those 
among the rest of members. These results are in line with the historical evidence 
presented in this text.  
Results in column 1 shows that the LMU did not exert any positive effects on 
trade among its members, when considering 1865-1913 as a period of reference 
for its existence, i.e. from its creation until the beginning of the WWI. Its “overall” 
effects are not significant. When discerning France-related trade flows from the rest 
of the Union, results are again in line with the conventional knowledge of no LMU-
related trade effects (column 2). However, when interacting the LMU with a time 
dummy, to focus on the period from 1865 to 1885, until the moment in which the 
“liquidation clause” is introduced in the treaty, the coefficient of the LMU dummy 
becomes significant, and negative (column 3, LMU<0). This may reflect that trade 
links between France and the rest of the LMU were deteriorating in the long term, 
as were the functioning of LMU institutions that may have cause such drawback 
(column 4, LMUFrance<0). Nevertheless, in the 1865-1885 period the LMU 
coefficient is positive (LMU1885>0), but these positive effects are concentrated in 
the flows from and to France (column 4, LMUFrance1885>0). Overall, the “LMU” 
effects in 1865-1885 are not significantly different from zero (LMU+LMU1885=0). 
However, when the period of LMU “de facto effectiveness” is reduced to 1865-
1874, year in which markets started requiring a premium for silver (Flandreau and 
Oosterlinck, 2012), meaning that the market started downgrading the chances of 
bimetallism to last, LMU effects on trade flows are positive (column 5, 
LMU+LMU1874>0), and concentrated in the flows from and to France (column 6, 
“LMUFrance1874”). France-directed trade may have several explanations, ranging 
from the structure of trade itself to finance and politics. Indeed, the significant effects 
on trade between France and the rest of members may be the consequence of an 
integration that fostered the development of an underlying Heckscher-Ohlin type of 
trade, involving exchanges of differentiate goods between the hub and the spokes. 
They can also be related to the enhancement of capital exports – from France to 
the rest of the members – that in turn would boost trade, as part of these financial 
flows “would lead to an increase in demand on the part of the borrowing nation of 
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foreign goods” (Flandreau, 2000). In addition, the contribution of France to monetary 
stability of the LMU was also important, through the role of the Banque de France 
– the principal institution in the LMU – in supporting both domestic and foreign silver 
(Flandreau, 1996), and this could have had spillovers on trade. Summarising, as 
Luzzatti (1883, cited in Nardi Spiller, 1994, p. 366) remarked, “bimetallism, limping 
as today, could not stand without that great centre of attraction and compensation 
that is France”.29 However, as this research uses aggregate trade data, it is not 
possible to separate empirically these effects. 
Further, in line with what expected, the coefficients of other variables are stable 
across the different specifications included in Table 1.2. The attraction “size” (the 
natural logarithm of the product of population in country i and j) is positive and 
significant. The gold standard dummy is positive and significant, in agreement with 
the literature on its trade enhancing role (i.a. Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2003). 
The SCU reports an unexpected negative sign, but it is important to remember that 
all dyads where SCU=1, have also GS=1, so the coefficient would represent the 
SCU effects net of the GS, which is somewhat artificial. However, if reading together 
the two coefficients, they approximately average out. The effects of formal alliances 
(“AllianceTreaty”) are negative. Indeed, there is no clear-cut lesson in the literature, 
and the sign may vary depending on the content of the treaty (robustness test 
provided in the subsection below), on the perceived signatories’ commitment (as 
the benefits deriving from trade to income can be translated into increases in military 
power, if the parties involved do not trust each other, they have the incentive in 
lowering trade rather than increasing it, see Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994), 
and on the importance that weapons, ammunitions, and other items related to 
public procurement have on overall trade (which at the time was non-negligible, see 
Flandreau, 2000). 
 
Table 1.2: Bilateral trade flows and monetary agreements, 1861-1913. 
  
(1) 
LMU 
1861-1913 
(2) 
LMU 
1861-1913 
(3) 
LMU 
1861-1885 
(4) 
LMU 
1861-1885 
(5) 
LMU 
1861-1874 
(6) 
LMU 
1861-1874 
LMU 
-0.127 
(0.094) 
 
-0.182* 
(0.095) 
 
-0.158* 
(0.094) 
 
LMUFrance  
-0.132 
(0.093) 
 
-0.209* 
(0.095) 
 
-0.147* 
(0.094) 
LMURest  
0.0817 
(0.159) 
 
0.129 
(0.166) 
 
0.0810 
(0.163) 
LMU1885   
0.155*** 
(0.0336) 
   
LMUFrance1885    0.167***   
                                                          
29 In Italian in the original: “Il bimetallismo, zoppo qual è oggidì, non potrebbe sostenersi senza quel 
grande centro di attrazione e di compensazione che è la Francia”. 
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    (0.0330)   
LMURest1885    -0.222*** 
(0.059) 
  
      
LMU1874     0.205*** 
(0.055) 
 
      
LMUFrance1874      0.205*** 
(0.055)       
LMURest1874      -0.105 
(0.093)       
lnPOP 
1.665*** 
(0.190) 
1.665*** 
(0.190) 
1.664*** 
(0.190) 
1.654*** 
(0.189) 
1.663*** 
(0.190) 
1.658*** 
(0.190) 
SCU 
-0.441*** 
(0.092) 
-0.441*** 
(0.092) 
-0.459*** 
(0.093) 
-0.449*** 
(0.093) 
-0.473*** 
(0.094) 
-0.467*** 
(0.094) 
GS 
0.295*** 
(0.040) 
0.295*** 
(0.040) 
0.259*** 
(0.039) 
0.253*** 
(0.039) 
0.262*** 
(0.039) 
0.264*** 
(0.039) 
AllianceTreaty 
-0.157*** 
(0.025) 
-0.156*** 
(0.025) 
-0.158*** 
(0.024) 
-0.132*** 
(0.025) 
-0.155*** 
(0.025) 
-0.140*** 
(0.025) 
       
N 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Imports (value). All regressions include a constant, 
importer-year, exporter-year and dyad fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Robustness tests 
Additionally, to ensure the robustness of these findings, a set of alternative 
specifications have been considered, and results are included in Table 1.3. 
As a first robustness test, I run the standard gravity model used by Flandreau 
(2000) in order to compare the results with my database extracted from RICardo 
(Column (1) in Table 1.3). The only differences are in the dependent variable, that in 
my regression is “imports” only (as I take into account the development of the 
debate on gravity models, e.g. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Glick and Rose, 2016), 
whereas in Flandreau’s paper (previous to that debate) is represented by “total 
trade” (exports+imports), and in the variable representing the economic size which, 
to maintain coherence, in my regression is represented by the natural logarithm of 
the product of population of country i and j, instead of the logarithm of the product 
of total trade in country i and j, for the period 1861-1885. In addition, the current 
analysis includes annual observations for each country pair, meaning – in practice 
– that relies on a panel data set structure. Flandreau’s analysis instead, is cross-
sectional in nature. All the variables have the expected signs, and are in line with 
Flandreau’s estimations. In addition, to have a simply and clear picture of the 
sensitivity of results to alternative specifications, I report in this subsection further 
robustness tests. To be concise, I focus on the main specification, the one 
separating trade flows between France and other members from those among the 
rest of the members, for the period 1865-1874. In column (2), I show the results 
using OLS, and ln(1+trade) as dependent variable (to avoid subjective truncation). 
However, literature suggest (e.g. Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Gomez-Herrera, 
2013) that OLS – even if corrected for information losses (truncation) – does not 
behave well if heteroscedasticity is present in data. Indeed, in this case, estimators 
will not be consistent. The gold standard coefficient turns negative (and non-
significant), consistently with evidence collected in Gomez-Herrera (2013). 
Coefficients of LMUFrance and LMURest does not change sign, but their 
significance is affected. However, even if the specification is ill-defined and possibly 
biased, significant difference between the two remains. I also test specification: a) 
excluding dyad fixed effects and cluster errors instead, to allow more variance in the 
data (column 3); b) excluding Germany from the data (column 4), as literature 
suggests that results may be sensible to the evolution of trade outside the currency 
block (e.g. Glick and Rose, 2016); c) including GDP data instead of population data 
(column 5), which have the benefit of reflecting more closely the “economic mass”, 
but the cost of consistently reducing the sample (-12%); d) considering only those 
treaties which implied “the highest level of military commitment, requiring alliance 
members to come to each other’s aid militarily if attacked by third party”, technically 
defined as “defense pacts” (Gibler, 2009).     In general, across different models the 
LMUFrance1874 coefficient is always positive and significant. The LMURest 
coefficient is always negative. However, its significance depends on the 
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specification. Nevertheless, the central argument of this chapter, a consistent 
difference between LMUFrance and LMURest, is stable and significant across all 
specifications. Therefore I can argue that these results do not depend on 
specification choices (Table 1.3). 
 
Table 1.3: Robustness tests 
 (1) 
Flandreau’s 
specification 
(OLS) 
(2) 
OLS 
[ln(1+trade)] 
(3) 
poisson, 
clustered 
error 
no dyad 
FE 
(4) 
PPML 
clustered 
error 
(5) 
poisson, 
without 
Germany 
(6) 
poisson, 
with 
GDP 
instead 
of POP 
(7) 
poisson, 
only 
defense 
agreements 
LMU 
0.0209 
(0.093) 
      
LMUFrance 
 -0.214 
(0.179) 
0.865*** 
(0.204) 
0.370 
(0.294) 
-0.146 
(0.095) 
-0.101 
(0.099) 
-0.235** 
(0.092) 
LMURest 
 0.366 
(0.265) 
0.216 
(0.529) 
-0.224 
(0.451) 
0.128 
(0.170) 
0.260 
(0.161) 
0.122 
(0.161) 
LMUFrance1874 
 0.153 
(0.133) 
0.508* 
(0.280) 
0.624*** 
(0.123) 
0.138** 
(0.052) 
0.205*** 
(0.055) 
0.227** 
(0.054) 
LMURest1874 
 -0.380* 
(0.200) 
-0.491 
(0.405) 
0.046 
(0.171) 
-0.378*** 
(0.082) 
-0.129 
(0.096) 
-0.207** 
(0.092) 
lndistcap 
-1.716*** 
(0.056) 
      
contig 
0.441*** 
(0.085) 
      
lnPOP 
0.946*** 
(0.021) 
2.071*** 
(0.190) 
0.730*** 
(0.102) 
0.613*** 
(0.059) 
1.630*** 
(0.190) 
 1.612*** 
(0.188) 
lnGDP 
     1.567*** 
(0.179) 
 
SCU 
1.487*** 
(0.231) 
0.965*** 
(0.171) 
1.404*** 
(0.284) 
0.555* 
(0.292) 
-0.479*** 
(0.094) 
-0.459*** 
(0.094) 
-0.415*** 
(0.093) 
GS 
 -0.015 
(0.0988) 
0.720*** 
(0.211) 
1.038* 
(0.102) 
0.195*** 
(0.039) 
0.284*** 
(0.041) 
0.293*** 
(0.040) 
AllianceTreaty 
 0.090 
(0.064) 
1.204*** 
(0.222) 
0.334 
(0.209) 
-0.189*** 
(0.024) 
-0.137*** 
(0.025) 
 
Defense 
      0.040 
(0.045) 
N 2,668 6,503 6,503 6,503 5,474 5,714 6,503 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Imports. All regressions include a constant, column (2) to (7) also importer-year, exporter-
year and dyad fixed effects (unless differently specified) not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (unless differently specified); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Nevertheless, the gravity model alone is not able to identify beyond any 
reasonable doubts the precise date in which the LMU power (in terms of within-
Union trade creation) started to fade away. Further tests are needed, and they will 
be provided in the subsection below. 
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LMU trade effects: When was the turning point? An assessment of 
structural breaks  
Once identified the effects of the 1874 and 1885 events through the use of 
gravity models, the readers may still wonder whether these outcomes may simply 
reflect other external shocks, like wars or changing trade patterns. The latter is a 
particular concern for 1885, which indeed may only capture, endogenously, the 
persistency of the decline generated by the 1874 turmoil. To test my hypotheses, 
then, I need to reinforce my analysis with structural break analysis, focusing on 
bilateral trade relations. The aim is to understand whether LMU countries bilateral 
trade flows are experiencing a “structural break” in these dates. The procedure used 
is standard in the literature, and consist in performing a Wald test of whether the 
coefficients of trade flows in a specific country-pair time series regression are 
varying or not (H0: no structural break).30 Table 1.4 shows the results of the test for 
LMU country-pairs in 1874 and 1885. All the time series analysed, excluding those 
concerning Switzerland – France and Switzerland – Italy (which could be subject to 
the flaws typical of Swiss trade data that are less evident in a panel data structure; 
see Tena, 1992), show a structural break in 1874. In 1885 instead, there is no 
evidence of a LMU-wide structural break. 
 
Table 1.4: Structural break tests, LMU country-pairs trade flows 
Country pairs Structural 
break in 1874 
Structural 
break in 1885 
Belgium – Switzerland YES** NO 
France – Belgium YES** YES** 
Italy – Belgium YES*** NO 
Belgium – Greece n.d. n.d. 
France – Greece YES* NO 
Switzerland – France NO NO 
France – Italy YES* YES** 
Italy – Greece YES** NO 
Switzerland – Italy NO NO 
Greece – Switzerland n.d. n.d. 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Approximately 5% of 
data for Italy – Greece have been interpolated to allow the test 
to be performed. n.d.= no data. 
 
 
                                                          
30 This procedure is robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity, differently from the traditional 
Chow test. 
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Nevertheless, whereas evidence showed above is sufficient to exclude a LMU-
wide effect of the 1885 treaty reform on trade flows, there is still the need of further 
analysis for avoiding a sort of “false positive” identification. Indeed, I must be sure 
that the identified 1874 structural break affects only within-LMU trade flows. If also 
other trade relationships, i.e. members with non-members, would be affected, this 
would raise doubts over the proper identification of the structural break as a “LMU 
shock”. Therefore I have to perform a further test for the robustness of my 
hypothesis, selecting external countries not affected by other exogenous shocks in 
1874, as these could introduce noise in the results. Natural candidates are Britain, 
a symbol of stability, and those countries which also had a bimetallic standard but 
were not part of the LMU. Arguably, this is the best possible solution to isolate “pure-
LMU” shocks. I proceed to analyse all the complete (i.e. no gaps between 1861 and 
1913) time series available for these dyads. In any of these cases bilateral trade 
flows registered a structural break in 1874 (see Table 1.5). 
 
Table 1.5: Structural break tests, LMU-Britain trade flows 
Country pairs Structural 
break in 
1874 
Belgium  – Britain NO 
France  – Britain NO 
Greece  – Britain NO 
Italy  – Britain NO 
Switzerland – Britain n.d. 
  
Additional tests for other bimetallic 
countries 
France – Austria-Hungary NO 
France – Spain NO 
Italy – Austria-Hungary NO 
Belgium – Spain NO 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. n.d.= no data, i.e. no 
sufficient data to perform the test. 
 
 
Combining the outcomes of the gravity model with those of the structural break 
analysis, I am inclined to postulate that the LMU affected trade flows of its members. 
Results show that this was the case for trade flows between France and the rest of 
countries in the period 1865-1874, until its underlying economic foundations (i.e. 
bimetallism) were credible to the eyes of markets. As showed in this subsection, 
this represented a turning point in the evolution of trade between members. Since 
then, the LMU effects on trade flows diminished. Indeed, when considering the “full 
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pre-WWI period” of activity, gravity models do not find any influence on the Union 
on trade. 
 
Beggar-thy-neighbor 
In this section, I try to shed some light on not only whether trade-enhancing 
monetary agreements actually manage to enhance trade among their members, but 
also whether they create distortionary effects diverting trade among member and 
non-member states to members’ only relationships instead. To do so, I follow Gowa 
and Hicks (2013) and Yang and Martínez-Zarzoso (2014) methodology. Therefore, 
starting from the same  gravity model specification, I drop the dummy variables 
related to monetary agreements, as – due to sample restrictions –  they are collinear 
with the “new” dummies that I insert to identify eventual trade diversion, i.e. an 
increase in trade between members’ and non-members’ pairs. Overall, as it is 
possible to see in equation (1) reported in Table 1.6, the LMU had no trade diverting 
effects, when considering the period 1861-1913 (LMU-other=0).  On the contrary, 
there is evidence that the gold standard had some trade diversion effects (GS-
other<0). This is consistent with the evidence proposed in the literature (Meissner, 
2005), explaining the adherence to gold standard in terms of trade-related network 
externalities.31 The LMU appears to have trade diverting effects particularly in the 
periods when it enjoyed market credibility, i.e. until when bimetallism lost its 
attractiveness as an alternative to gold (LMU-other+LMU-other1874<0). It is 
important to note that results are consistent with the ones reported in Table 1.2, 
concerning trade effects of monetary agreements among their members. 
  
                                                          
31 Meissner highlights also the importance of a more accessible borrowing and the level of 
development as drivers of gold standard membership. 
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Table 1.6: Beggar-thy-neighbor trade and monetary agreements 
  (1) 
LMU 
1861-
1913 
(2) 
LMU 
1861-
1913 
(3) 
LMU 
1861-
1885 
(4) 
LMU 
1861-
1885 
(5) 
LMU 
1861-
1874 
(6) 
LMU 
1861-
1874 
LMU-other 0.053 
(0.045) 
 0.082* 
(0.046) 
 0.071 
(0.046) 
 
LMUFrance-other  0.158*** 
(0.078) 
 0.270*** 
(0.078) 
 0.256*** 
(0.078) 
LMURest-other 
 
-0.050 
(0.079) 
 
-0.087 
(0.080) 
 
-0.062 
(0.079) 
LMU1885-other 
  
-0.077*** 
(0.017) 
   
LMUFrance-
other1885 
   
-0.284*** 
(0.031) 
  
LMURest-
other1885 
   
0.119*** 
(0.029) 
  
LMU-other1874 
    
-0.101*** 
(0.028) 
 
LMUFrance-
other1874 
     
-0.291*** 
(0.039) 
LMURest-
other1874 
     
0.093*** 
(0.036) 
lnPOP 1.686*** 
(0.191) 
1.644*** 
(0.193) 
1.697*** 
(0.191) 
1.619*** 
(0.192) 
1.692*** 
(0.191) 
1.630*** 
(0.192) 
SCU-other 0.227*** 
(0.051) 
0.227*** 
(0.051) 
0.239*** 
(0.051) 
0.234*** 
(0.051) 
0.246*** 
(0.052) 
0.237*** 
(0.052) 
GS-other -0.147*** 
(0.020) 
-0.147*** 
(0.020) 
-0.129*** 
(0.020) 
-0.126*** 
(0.020) 
-0.130*** 
(0.020) 
-0.124*** 
(0.020) 
 
AllianceTreaty -0.158*** 
(0.025) 
-0.156*** 
(0.025) 
-0.158*** 
(0.024) 
-0.131*** 
(0.025) 
-0.155*** 
(0.024) 
-0.136*** 
(0.025) 
 
       
N 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 6,503 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Imports (value). All regressions include a constant, 
importer-year, exporter-year and dyad fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter revises the conventional view that the LMU had no overall effects 
on international trade. I confirm the findings of Flandreau’s (2000) pioneering work 
– being the first paper using cliometric techniques on such issues. In addition, 
however, I allow for heterogeneous effects on trade relations between France and 
the rest of the LMU members on one side, and among the rest of LMU members 
on the other side, characterising different periods of “LMU effectiveness” based on 
historical circumstances and evidence, and using an augmented gravity model 
which also take into account political powers. Within such framework, this study 
has shown that the LMU was relevant for trade flows under certain conditions. 
Indeed, if analysing the entire period under consideration (1865-1913), 
estimates show an insignificant effect on overall within-LMU trade, a result that 
mirrors its institutional weaknesses. Nevertheless, when considering factors related 
to the changing conditions in the international environment affecting the LMU 
underlying economic foundations (i.e. the limits on silver coinage agreed upon in 
1874) and the rules of the Union (i.e. the “liquidation clause” of 1885), the data 
support the hypothesis that the LMU had significant trade effects for the period 
1865-1874. These effects were nonetheless concentrated in the flows between 
France and the rest of LMU members. Moreover, structural break analysis 
confirmed that only in 1874 (and not in 1885) there was a “LMU-wide” structural 
break, which affected the course of trade flows within the Union. These new findings 
are in line with primary sources obtained from archival research, and previous 
qualitative evidence available in the literature. 
Even if it is tempting to expand and apply the results to present times, we should 
keep in mind that the LMU structure never reached a level of complexity and 
development similar to the current EU architecture: it did not foresee any 
prearranged form of structural intervention at the Union level, nor shared decision 
methods going beyond the intertwinement of varied international relations within a 
framework of pure intergovernmental procedures. Any comparison should therefore 
be extremely cautious taking into consideration the level of integration reached in 
contemporary times within the EU, being the Euro (and consequently a common 
European Central Bank) and the “community” method for decision making 
(emphasising the supranational sphere) two overarching examples. However, the 
LMU represented a political entity – with an inadequate institutional backbone – 
which struggled for decades to adapt itself to a fast-changing economic reality, and 
finally failed in its attempt. Under this perspective, the LMU provides potential 
lessons. The LMU limited engagement with supranational activities and its weak 
institutional setting – lacking of any shared space where to build constant, fluent, 
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and multi-stakeholder networks (with the exception of ad hoc conferences held in 
Paris) – was unsuccessful in establishing a consistent Union-level economic space. 
Further research is needed to discern the drivers of the LMU heterogeneous 
effects on trade flows, to embrace (or reject) the hypotheses of 1) an underlying 
Heckscher-Olhin type of trade involving exchanges of differentiate goods within the 
LMU; 2) significant LMU-related capital exports influencing trade flows; 3) various 
institutional and political drivers associated to the LMU structure. 
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APPENDIX A 
_______________________________________________ 
Appendix: Chapter 1 
_______________________________________________ 
 
A.1 Luigi Luzzatti in the Italian political arena 
 
The importance of Luigi Luzzatti in the Italian political arena and its internationally 
respected role as a scholar in the discipline of economics are widely acknowledge 
both by historians and politicians. A clear example of its relevance is the publication 
dedicated to him by the Archive of the Italian Chamber of the Deputies, a privilege 
and a honour reserved to few other Italian personalities. The introduction of the book 
is signed by the President of the Chamber himself that wanted to actively contribute 
to the promotion of this historical document. 
Luigi Luzzatti actively worked for almost fifty years (1871-1920) (to be precise 
Luzzatti started in 1869 working few months as Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry and Trade) within the Italian public institutions, as a deputy of 
the Chamber (in fourteen legislatures), as a Minister (of Treasury and Finance, in 
1891-1892; 1896-1898; 1903-1905 and in 1906), as President of the Council of 
Ministers (1910-1911), and lastly as a Senator. In addition to that, for long time he 
was one of the Italian delegates to the LMU and to the International Monetary 
Conventions and, since 1875 until WWI, he was responsible, with different roles, for 
trade and tariff negotiations. During this long period, his work focused mainly in the 
following and largely relevant fields: Constitutional law, political economy, public 
finance, credit and banking, agricultural and industrial development, social rights, 
international trade and monetary issues, financial markets and capital flows. 
Unquestionably he was one of the key actors on political economy and finance 
matters, both when his party was in power and at the opposition. 
The Luzzatti (personal) Archive in Venice (his home town) collects an impressive 
amount of documents since the family’s donation to the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, 
Lettere ed Arti, authorised by the R.D. of 9 February 1933. 
The Luzzatti Archive is constituted by 400 folders containing approximately 100,000 
documents, of which 35,000 are letters addressed to or received from the most 
important European and Italian political and economic stakeholders of that time, 
such as Director Generals of diverse Bank of Issues, Presidents of the Council of 
Ministers, Senators and Deputies, LMU delegates, etc. 
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This appendix is based on the following documents:  
Ballini P.L., P. Pecorari, F. Margiotta Broglio and M. Toscano (eds.) (2013), Luigi 
Luzzatti. Discorsi Parlamentari, Roma: Camera dei deputati – Archivio storico. 
Franchini S.G. (2007), “Le carte di Luigi Luzzatti per la storia d’Italia”, Clio, 4:625-
639. 
Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti official website: www.istitutoveneto.it. 
Nardi Spiller C. (1994), “Luigi Luzzatti e l’Unione Monetaria Latina”, in P.L. Ballini 
and P. Pecorari (eds.) Luigi Luzzatti e il suo tempo: atti del Convegno internazionale 
di studio, Venezia 7-9 novembre 1991, Venezia: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere 
ed Arti. 
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A.2 LMU membership 
 
 
Table A.2.1: LMU (membership and shadowing) chronology 
Country Condition Date Period 
Belgium LMU founding 
member 
23 December 1865 
(W) 
1865-1927 
France LMU founding 
member 
23 December 1865 
(W) 
1865-1927 (H) 
Italy LMU founding 
member 
23 December 1865 
(W) 
1865-1927 (H) 
Switzerland LMU founding 
member 
23 December 1865 
(W) 
1865-1926 (from 
1920 Switzerland 
banned the 
imports of LMU 
coins) (H) 
Greece LMU member 10 April 1867 
declaration of intent 
by internal law made 
by Greece  
18 November 1868 
ratification of Greek 
admission by all 
member states (W) 
1865-1927 (H) 
Algeria (French 
colony) 
shadowing 23 December 1865 
(W) 
n.a. 
Austria-Hungary shadowing 
(aligned for 25 
francs gold only) 
n.a. 1870-1892 (E) 
Bulgaria shadowing 17 May 1880 (W) 1881-1914 (E) 
Colombia (United 
States of) 
shadowing 9 May 1871 (W) n.a. 
Finland shadowing 
(aligned for gold 
only) 
9 August 1877 (W) 1878-1914 (E) 
Peru shadowing 31 July 1863 (first 
shadowing the 
French system) (W) 
n.a. 
Poland shadowing 1926 (E) 1926 (E) 
Pontifical State shadowing 1866 (E) 1866-1870 (E) 
Romania shadowing 14 April 1867 law 
approval 
1 January 1868 
entrance into force 
(W) 
1867-1914 (E) 
Russia shadowing 
(aligned for gold 
only) 
n.a. 1886-1895 (E) 
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Serbia shadowing 11 November 1878 
(W) 
187*-1914 (E) 
Spain shadowing 19 October 1868 (W) 1868-1914 (E) 
Sweden shadowing 
(aligned for gold 
only) 
n.a. 1868-1872 
Tunisia (French 
colony) 
shadowing 23 December 1865 
(W) 
n.a. 
Venezuela (United 
States of) 
shadowing 11 May 1871 (W) n.a. 
Source: Willis (1901), Einaudi (2007), and Helleiner (2003) 
Notes: (W) = Willis; (E) = Einaudi; (H) = Helleiner. There are some discrepancies for some of the 
Balkans countries: (1) for Serbia, Einaudi states that it “adopted LMU type legislation in 1873 and 
started minting in 1874.” (p.34), (2) for Bulgaria that it “adopted legislation in June 1880 and started 
minting bronze in 1881 and silver in 1882.” As the 25 francs gold coin was never minted, Austria 
minted “gold trade coins”, which never became part of the national monetary system, but they 
remained confined in an ad-hoc system for international trade and were exchanged following their 
value at the stock market (p. 34). 
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A.3 LMU agreements – a chronology 
 
Table A.3.1: LMU conferences brief chronology and main achievements 
Date and classification Main achievements 
23 December 1865 - Convention • LMU agreement signed (Belgium, 
France, Italy, Switzerland) for a 15 years 
period; 
• Rules on coinage, particularly on 
fineness, weights and issuance; 
• Open-ended admission clause:  
possibility to join for other interested 
countries. 
18 November 1868 – French Government 
declaration 
• Greece admission ratified by all the LMU 
members. 
31 January 1874 – Additional Convention • Coinage limits for 1874; 
• Limits to “open-ended” admission 
clause: Admission formally subordinated 
to the previous agreement of all 
members. 
5 February 1875 – Declaration • Coinage limits for 1875; 
• Exceptional coinage concessions to 
Italy. 
 
3 February 1876 – Declaration • Coinage limits for 1876. 
1877 Diplomatic correspondence • Coinage limits for 1877. 
1878 Diplomatic correspondence • Coinage limits for 1878. 
5 November 1878 – Declaration • Coinage limits for 1879. 
5 November 1878 – Convention • Extension of the LMU for a 6 years 
period. The agreement includes the 
possibility of a year-on-year renewal 
after the first six; 
• Provisional suspension of the 5 francs 
silver coinage (despite the provisional 
nature of the measure, the prohibition of 
issuing new coins will remain valid until 
the end of the LMU); 
• Stipulates the repatriation conditions for 
Italian divisionary coins 
20 June 1879 – Additional Act • Foresees changes in the repatriation 
conditions for Italian divisionary coins 
(the Italian Parliament was called to 
choose between the 1878 and 1879 
agreement, selecting the latter) 
6 November 1885 - Convention • Extension of the LMU for a 5 years 
period. The agreement includes the 
possibility of a year-on-year renewal 
after the first five; 
• Confirms and includes the “repatriation” 
principle (i.e. “liquidation clause”); 
• Specifies the “repatriation” rules; 
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• Specifies the conditions under which the 
Banque de France will accept other 
members’ coins. 
12 December 1885 – Additional Act • Confirms the adhesion of Belgium to the 
LMU. 
15 November 1893 – Arrangement • Regulates the “repatriation” of Italian 
divisionary coins 
29 October 1897 – Additional Convention • Increases the coins/population ratio 
(from 6 to 7 francs per habitant). 
15 March 1898 – Additional Protocol • Ends the circulation of Italian divisionary 
coins. 
15 November 1902 – Additional 
Convention 
• Provisions on coins issuance 
4 November 1908 – Additional 
Convention 
• Increases the coins/population ratio 
(from 7 to 16 francs per habitant); 
• Regulates the “repatriation” of Greek 
divisionary coins. 
25 March 1920 – Additional Convention •  Regulates the reciprocal “repatriation” 
of divisionary coins between France and 
Switzerland; 
• Provisions on coin issuance 
9 December 1921 – Additional 
Convention 
• Regulates the “repatriation” of LMU 
divisionary coins from Switzerland (after 
they were declared out of circulation) 
28 December 1925 – Belgian Government 
Declaration 
• Declares the willingness of Belgium of 
exiting the LMU; 
• The other members agree on ending the 
LMU experience. 
Source: Einaudi (2001); Flandreau (2000, 2003); “Procès-Verbaux” of the different LMU conferences 
(1874; 1875; 1876; 1879; 1885; 1893); Treaties of the different LMU conventions and the 
agreements (1865; 1878; 1885; 1908). 
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A.4 Gold standard – a chronology 
 
Table A.4.1: Classical Gold Standard adherence chronology 
Country Years 
Austria-Hungary 1892-1914 
Belgium 1878-1914 
Denmark 1872-1914 
Finland 1877-1914 
France 1878-1914 
Germany 1871-1914 
Greece 1885 and 1910-1914 
Italy 1884-1894 
Netherlands 1875-1914 
Norway 1875-1914 
Portugal 1854-1891 
Spain 
De jure  never adhered to the gold 
standard 
Sweden 1873-1914 
Switzerland 1878-1914 
United Kingdom 1774-1797 and 1821-1914 
Source: Officer. 
Note: The table reports information for all the countries included in the sample. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
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Addendum to Chapter 1 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Jacopo Timini* 
 
Abstract 
 
The conventional view in economic history describes the Latin 
Monetary Union as an imperfect currency union, where member 
countries had different influence in shaping its functioning. In 
particular, France is often described as the “hegemonic power” 
within the Union (Sumner, 1896; Willis, 1901; Einaudi, 2001; Timini, 
forthcoming). Nevertheless, these judgments rely on qualitative 
evidence only. In this addendum, after summarising the 
characteristics of the LMU, I aim to elaborate a formal quantitative 
test based on Baldwin’s approach (1994) and Mann’s theory 
(1986) – with qualitative extensions, based on new archival 
evidence, when necessary – to confirm, or reject, this view. 
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ADD 1.1 Introduction 
 
Did the different members of the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) have all the same 
influence or was there a “great-power hub” (Gowa and Hicks, 2013), i.e. a 
“hegemonic” power, reflecting a “hub-and-spokes” structure? 
In the context of the long 19th century, there were several experiments of 
monetary integration in the world (Cottrell, Notaras and Tortella, 2007). Their 
institutional diversity implies that any comprehensive comparative analysis – in line 
with Tan (2016) contemporary exercise – would need, first, a degree of abstraction 
and, second, a lengthy recollection of primary sources, including hard data, 
dispersed in archives in a myriad of different countries. To avoid these two 
shortcomings, I decided to focus – in this addendum – on Europe, and in particular 
on the LMU, and to use a within-Union approach for analysis. Indeed, the primary 
goal of the addendum is to explore the LMU institutional settings and understand 
whether member countries had different degrees of influence in shaping its 
functioning. Indeed, the LMU-related literature (Sumner, 1896; Willis, 1901; Einaudi, 
2001; Timini, forthcoming) acknowledges the diversity of France, often describing 
the country as the “hegemonic power” of the Union. Nevertheless, these judgments 
rely on qualitative evidence only. In this addendum, after summarising the 
characteristics of the LMU, I aim to elaborate a formal quantitative test – with 
qualitative extensions, based on new archival evidence, when necessary – to 
confirm, or reject, this view. 
The LMU was constituted by the 1865 monetary convention, signed by 
Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland (later joined by Greece in 1868). The Union 
– based on purely intergovernmental methods – aimed to act as a catalyst for the 
creation of common currency standards, through the use of previously agreed 
principles for coinage and exchange of specie. Indeed, in the distinguished 
parsimony of the agreement, the international treaty provided only for a basic set of 
rules associated with a very light structure of enforcement, and no foreseen 
supranational entity. Within such framework, “the delegated powers, the practical 
implementation, and the ordinary functioning of the Union were delegated to 
national institutions” (Timini, forthcoming). 
Within this context, I combine Baldwin’s approach (1994, 2006, 2008) of “hub-
and-spoke” integration, with Mann’s theory of power (1986), and its IEMP model (it 
is an acronym which summarise the four elements which in Mann’s view are the 
sources of social power: Ideological, Economic, Military and Political) to detect the 
existence of a great-power hub. Applying this method to the LMU, I will 
quantitatively portray the borders of “hub” and “spokes”, during the period just 
before the signature of the agreement (to avoid endogeneity which may affect some 
of these indicators), to capture the relative “weights” of each future member of the 
Union. I will enhance the quantitative analysis with new archival evidence (Luzzatti 
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Archive) when needed, and, in case of consistency of a majority of indicators across 
the realms, I will confirm the existence of a “great-power hub” (Gowa and Hicks, 
2013) within the LMU. The “enhanced” quantitative analysis developed in this 
addendum confirms the conventional wisdom of France as a hegemonic power in 
the Latin Monetary Union. 
This addendum develops as follow: Section ADD.2 provides a brief summary of 
the major characteristics of the LMU, Section ADD.3 depicts the methodology and 
data used, Section ADD.4 shed light on the results obtained, and Section ADD.5 
concludes. 
ADD 1.2 The Latin Monetary Union: a brief overview 
 
The LMU was constituted by the 1865 monetary convention, signed by 
Belgium, France, Italy and Switzerland (later joined by Greece in 1868). The Union 
– based on purely intergovernmental methods – aimed to act as a catalyst for the 
creation of common currency standards, through the use of agreed principles for 
gold and silver coinage, and exchange of specie. Even if the formation of the LMU 
was driven not only by economic reasons, but also by the spread of “European” 
ideals and sentiments of solidarity throughout the continent,1 and in the 19th century 
context, the LMU was expected – in light of the economic theory developed at that 
time (see Einaudi, 2001, for an in-depth investigation on this issue) – to generate 
different economic effects, i.a.: 1) to reduce speculators’ power, which allowed 
them to profit from the high costs of obtaining information and from low competition 
in the exchange business; 2) to reduce transportation costs; 3) to help the 
stabilization of the exchange rate (the LMU agreement implied something similar to 
a “peg”, which entails – for example –  positive but milder effects on trade with 
respect to a “full-scale” currency union, see De Grauwe, 2014, for further details); 
4) to create a bimetallic regime capable to compete with (but also to be 
complementary to) gold and silver standard regimes; 5) to enhance the symbolic 
value of having coins from different states in circulation (even if with very limited 
effects, as these coins preserved its own names, images and symbols); 6) to 
enhance capital exports; 7) to promote and help “a larger process of economic and 
political integration guided by economic development ad free trade”; 8) to 
encourage broader political interaction (annual conferences; informal networks);2 9) 
                                                          
1 For more details on this topic, please refer to Luzzatti (1881) 
2 Indeed, during the existence of the LMU, physical reunions were supported in parallel by frequent 
exchange of letters, memoranda, etc. among the main stakeholders, such as the Ministries of 
Finance, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,  Directors General of National Central Banks, and other 
lower-level public officers concerned with the LMU (e.g. conference delegates). Informal networking 
completed the set of interactions, and was occasionally held in disparate locations. An example of 
such activities, despite its modest achievements, is the four day travel to Belgium of the Banca 
Nazionale del Regno d’Italia (BNRI) Director General, Mr. Grillo, around the 29 September 1885 to 
attend the “Business law conference” held in Antwerp. In that date, he addressed a letter to Mr. 
Luzzatti (at that time Member of the Parliament in Italy), explaining the risk of seeing the “trip 
becoming meaningless”, as the conference was likely to bring no relevant conclusion on issues 
concerning exchange law (“diritto cambiario” in the original) and, more importantly, he realised that 
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to create an institutionalised political relation, whose end may cause widespread 
retaliations as the “governments of the other states may consider as not polite or 
even impolitic to break such relations”3 (Janssen, 1911, p.382: cited in Dubois, 
1950, p.19) (Einaudi, 2001; Flandreau, 2000; Flandreau, 2003; De Grauwe, 2014; 
Bordo and Rockoff, 1996; and Burgoyne et al., 1999). 
However, despite theoretical expectations, LMU “effects” have been generally 
limited. Nonetheless, the LMU had certain positive effects on bilateral trade flows. 
These effects were concentrated between 1865 (its creation) and 1874 (the year in 
which the LMU imposed limits on silver coinage and markets lost confidence in the 
survival of bimetallism, see Flandreau and Oosterlinck, 2012; Meissner, 2005), and 
between France and the rest of the LMU members, following a hub-and.spokes 
structure (Timini, forthcoming) 
 
ADD 1.3 Methodology and data 
 
Until recent time, dynamics within currency unions have been under-
investigated, particularly in a historical perspective. Indeed, the literature generated 
by Rose’s seminal contribution (2000) focuses predominantly on trade flows, and 
assumes homogeneous effects. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2013) constitute an 
exception, trying to capture the effect of the process of European integration on the 
variance across intra-EU trade. Nevertheless, geography and time are the only 
determinants that measure such process, but no economic or political variables are 
taken into consideration. Within this context, Baldwin (1994, 2006, 2008) illustrates 
the hypothesis of an integration process which take a “hub-and-spokes” form. In 
this case, integration will follow asymmetrical and heterogeneous developments, 
where few (or one) leading nations (the “hub(s)”) will be able to interconnect with the 
rest of the members (the “spokes”), either by generation or attraction. Timini 
(forthcoming) applies these considerations to the Latin Monetary Union. As 
summarised by Duvall (1978), dependency theories – a research line in international 
relations and economics, closely related not only to Marxism, but also to liberal 
reformism and world system theory (Ferraro, 2008) – also provide a rationale for the 
existence of heterogeneity (i.e. the “core” and the “periphery”), mainly grounded in 
                                                          
he would have had hard times in succeeding to exchange views and opinions on the “monetary 
question” with the Belgian LMU delegates, Mr. Pirmez and Mr. Frère-Orban. In the three pages letter 
to Mr. Luzzatti, Mr. Grillo devotes barely half page to describe the conference developments. Per 
contra, the remains are dedicated to relate with abundance of details his dialogue with Mr. Pirmez. 
Mr. Pirmez repeatedly refused to enter in the details of the question, always escaping from talking 
about substantial issues. On the other hand, Mr. Frère-Orban is not in Brussels in those days, or at 
least it is what he communicated to Mr. Grillo, jeopardising any attempts to meet. See Archivio 
Luzzatti, Fondo Luigi Luzzatti; Sezione 1, Serie1, Lettera G, UA 2008. 
3 In French in the original: “les gouvernements des autres Etats considéraient comme peu courtois 
et même impolitique de rompre ces relations”.   
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social, political, and economic factors. However, this part of the literature is not 
considered further in the addendum.4 
To define where the hub starts and the spokes end may be a straightforward 
exercise for some trade agreements, as it is enough to distinguish the signatory 
parties and eventual tariff concessions (Gowa and Hicks, 2013). However, the same 
task becomes more challenging in the case of a currency union. Different 
approaches have been adopted in the literature, mainly using sovereign bond yields 
and spreads. For example, Basse (2014) uses cointegration techniques allowing for 
structural changes on bond yields time series, with the aim of defining the centre 
and the periphery of the Euro-zone (Economic and Monetary Union, EMU). 
However, this method would lost its sense in the case of the LMU, as there was no 
“single currency” to take as a reference, and national bonds were not denominated 
in gold and silver in parallel. Consequently, it would be impossible to extrapolate the 
“real” LMU effect. 
Nevertheless, Mann (1986) provides a “theory of power” which combines 
different economic and political realms. Concretely, he created a model, the “IEMP” 
model, where he explains and categorise the main sources of power in human 
societies: in his view power can be of ideological, economic, military and political 
nature. In Table ADD 1.1, I illustrate the components, and their justification. 
 
Table ADD 1.1: Sources of power, the “IEMP” model 
explained 
Ideological Economic 
It derives “from the 
human need to find 
ultimate meaning in life, to 
share norms and values, 
and to participate in 
aesthetic and ritual 
practices with others” 
 
It derives “from the 
human need to extract, 
transform, distribute and 
consume the produce of 
Nature” 
Military Political 
It is linked with “the 
social organization of 
concentrated and lethal 
violence” 
 
It consists in “the 
centralized and territorial 
regulation of social life” 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Mann (1986). Quotes are from the same source. 
 
This addendum will analyse each of these four realms, excluding “Ideology” 
because from a macroeconomic and quantitative perspective would represent a 
particularly slippery concept, that would require a humongous amount of data to be 
measured, if such operation is at all possible. Therefore, attention will be 
                                                          
4 For a variegate perspective of dependency theory and globalization, see Roberts et al. (2015). 
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predominantly devote to “economics”, as well as “politics” and the “military”. 
Moreover, in the analysis there is an underlying assumption of power relations as 
“static”, i.e. countries cannot become a hub if they previously were a spoke, in the 
short run. To avoid possible endogeneity issues, I focus on the part of the 1860s 
exactly before the creation of the Latin Monetary Union (1860-1865), and use a five 
years average to smooth out eventual peaks and troughs. 
 
ADD 1.4 Results 
 
The results from the quantitative analysis are presented in this section, and divided 
between two pillars, the “economic” and the “military and political”. The first pillar, 
“economic”, will also be further divided in three aspects: trade, macroeconomic, 
and monetary. 
ADD 1.4.1 ECONOMIC POWER 
- Trade aspects 
Pre-LMU trade relations are an obvious candidate for measuring the “hub-ness” 
of the members. Table ADD 1.2 presents a set of different indicators. Using imports 
data,5 I calculated the average number of countries that were trading with the 
different members-to-be of the LMU, during the period 1860-1865. This indicator 
can be seen as a measure of the “pervasiveness” of its trade linkages. Its average 
imports relative to the total world imports highlight the relative importance in the 
1860s international economy. The same is calculated for the LMU countries, and 
for the two nations that the literature define as hegemonic powers at that time, 
France (which is also part of the LMU) and UK. Following any of the indicators taken 
into account, France results of outstanding importance in comparison with the rest 
of other LMU members. In addition, Table ADD 1.3 provides a unique quantitative 
indicator that measures the “hub-ness” of country j with respect to country i, 
following Baldwin’s definition (2008). The index ranges from 0 to 100,6 and relates 
the shares of exports of country i to country j on its total exports (   
 ) with the same 
share for imports (   
 ) as follows:    
  ∗ (1 −    
 ). The higher the index, the more 
important the role of country j in i’s trade relations (i.e. the more j is a hub for i). The 
index has already been applied to a historical context by Lampe (2011), assessing 
the probability of bilateral trade agreement formation. Table 3 indicates that France 
is the only nation that is an important hub for all the other countries. 
 
Table ADD 1.2: Trade relations of LMU members (1860-1865) 
                                                          
5 In the context of the 19th century, imports data are supposed to be more accurate than exports 
data. For more details, see Tena (1992). 
6 If expressed in percentage, otherwise the index ranges from 0 to 1. 
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 Extensive 
margins 
of trade 
(n) 
Top 3 
country of 
origin for 
imports 
Average 
imports 
from all 
countries 
(million of 
£) 
Average 
imports as 
% of total 
world 
imports 
Imports 
from 
future 
LMU 
partners 
(% of the 
sum of 
total 
imports 
reported)  
Imports 
from 
France 
(% over 
total) 
Imports 
from UK 
(% over 
total) 
France 
56 
UK, Belgium, 
Italy 
93.4 11.4 19.6 / 21.9 
Belgium 
42 
France, the 
Netherlands, 
UK 
26.9 3.3 22.0 21.6 15.4 
Switzerland n.a. n.a. 18.2 2.2 58.1 37.2 n.a. 
Italy 
17 
France, UK, 
Austria 
37.2 4.5 44.7 34.2 19.3 
Greece 
13 
UK, Turkey, 
France 
2.0 0.2 23.4 17.6 26.8 
Source: Author’s elaboration on RICardo database and Federico and Tena (2016). 
Note: Values are average for the years 1860-1865. Extensive margins of trade are the number of country of 
origin for imports reported in RICardo database. I am aware that this number can depend on the quality of the 
original source that RICardo’s creators used to retrieve the information.  Total world imports are based on 
Federico and Tena (2016). 
 
Table ADD 1.3: Badlwin’s hub-ness measure (1860-1865) 
 France Belgium Switzerland Italy Greece 
France  6.9 6.2 7.5 0.4 
Belgium 30.5  2.1 2.0 0.1 
Switzerlan
d 9.8 0.9  13.2 n.a. 
Italy 30.4 0.4 14.5  0.5 
Greece 12.7 0.3 n.a. 1.5  
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Note: The hub-ness value expresses the dependency of country in line x on country on column y. 
Values are average  
for the years 1860-1865 and are expressed in percentage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Macroeconomic aspects 
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International relations literature, i.a Moravcsik (2010), proposes two main 
indicators to measure “economic” power at the macroeconomic level in a XIX 
century framework:  aggregate population and the aggregate GDP. In a historical 
context, it is possible to assume a linear relationship among the indicators and the 
“economic power” without oversimplifying the reality. In contemporary times, where 
technology and productivity play a much bigger role, both aggregate and per capita 
GDP would matter. For this reason, I perform a robustness check with the 
Moravcsik (2016) “Economic Relative Power Index” (ERPI), which is a non-linear 
combination of the two aforementioned indicators (i.e. GDP and GDP per capita).7 
 
Figure ADD.1.1: Economic power within the LMU (1861-1865) 
 
Source: GDP (in million 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) and POP (in thousands of people) 
Maddison Project’s database. ERPI: Author’s elaboration on Maddison Project’s database, scale 
adapted to the needs of the graph. 
Figure ADD.1.1 summarises the three indicators discussed above, namely 
GDP, population, and the ERPI. These measures indicate Belgium Switzerland and 
Greece as the spokes in macroeconomic terms, whereas the hub seems to be 
incarnated by France. Italy has an intermediate position. 
- Monetary aspects 
As Eichengreen’s (2008, p.1) words forcefully describe: “It is impossible to 
understand the operation of the international economy without also understanding 
its monetary system”. The monetary and – broadly speaking – financial structure are 
intrinsically interconnected with the real economy that are supposed to serve. As 
follow, the performance of the monetary system will help shaping the relative power, 
and positioning in the international economic arena. This means that, in presence 
of a dysfunctional monetary system, it is expected to be observed a scarce ability 
                                                          
7       =     ∗        , where GDP is the level of Gross Domestic Product and GDPpc the 
level of Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
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of exerting influence and power on other international actors.8  Research dealing 
with monetary geography and related issues, which enters the details of the 
monetary networks tying European (and non-) countries, is very limited. Few 
exceptions approached such issue quantitatively, and provided a precise and 
analytical description. Two studies span from the pre-Industrial Revolution period 
(Flandreau et al., 2009), when some of the national states under analysis did not 
exist yet, to the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Flandreau and 
Jobst, 2005). Those two studies do not overlap, and indeed leave a gap of more 
than a hundred years.  Despite the lack of data for the period of interest, it is possible 
to elaborate a “second-best” strategy, using Flandreau and Jobst (2005) as a proxy 
even if it means to rely on a posteriori analysis. Such choice is motivated by the 
stability over time of the results of the authors, i.e. if a country was included in a 
certain group in 1890, it has very high probability to be in the same group in 1910. 
In case of LMU countries, the probability is equal to one, as they never switch from 
one group to another. The authors compute with block-modelling techniques9 
network estimations for 1890, 1900 and 1910, dividing countries in 3 groups,10 
calling them “key”, “intermediate”, and “peripheral”. Namely, France is included 
among key countries; Belgium, Switzerland and Italy are found among 
intermediates, and Greece pertains to peripheral. France, therefore, appears as the 
monetary/financial “hub” of the Union, and the rest as LMU “spokes”. 
 
ADD 1.4.2 MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER 
What was the ability of the different members to exert political pressures? This 
question refer to the capability of certain members of using power efficiently and 
effectively – along the lines of the decision-making process of the Union – with the 
aim of  shaping the final outcome of the negotiations in its own favour. To a certain 
extent, political power can also boost bilateral relations, through the respective 
diplomatic network, which may play a role in trade promotion (Rose, 2007). 
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) acknowledge the validity of this argument, i.e. 
that politics and political relations matter for trade, even in the 19th century context. 
In other words, this would mean that a range of political forces may be able to 
influence trade dynamics, giving different “visibility” to each of the LMU members.  
Figure ADD.1.2 reports the results of the relevant indicators contained in the 
“National Material Capabilities” (Singer et al., 1972) and the “Diplomatic Exchange” 
(Bayer, 2006) datasets, which are subsets of the “Correlates of War” database. The 
variables included collect information on diplomatic representation (wDIPL and 
                                                          
8 For a thorough description of the global (and European) financial network and its functioning see 
Denzel (2010). 
9 For more details, Flandreau and Jobst suggest to refer to T.A.B. Snijders and K. Nowicki (2001), 
Manual for BLOCKS version 1.5, Groningen. 
10 The number of groups is also determined by bloc-modelling techniques, relying on Gibbs 
simulations. 
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unwDIPL), military personnel (MilPer) and expenditure (MilEx), and a Composite 
Index of National Capability (CINC). 
Figure ADD.1.2: Military and Political power within the LMU (1861-1865) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on CoW database, scale adapted to the needs of the graph. 
Note: MilEx = military expenditure; MilPer = military personnel; CINC = Composite Index of National 
Capability; unwDIPL = number of diplomatic representations with other LMU members, no weight 
attached to different levels (chargé d’affaires; minister; ambassador); wDIPL = weight attached (0.25 
to chargé d’affaires; 0.5 to minister; 1 to ambassador). 
 
Again, France stands as the “leader” of the group, with Belgium, Switzerland, 
and Greece fairly distant from its results. The position of Italy is in the middle of this 
two groups. A certain degree of uncertainty in both its economic and political power 
classification requires support from qualitative data, to complement the quantitative 
analysis, through the use of primary sources, aiming to provide a clearer picture. 
 
ADD 1.4.3 QUALITATIVE DATA: FRANCE AND ITALY 
The French power in international relations – and particularly on monetary issues 
– at that time is visible. In the case of the LMU, the rapid choice of Paris as the place 
designated for holding LMU periodical conference may exemplify the firm 
commitment of the French for leading the monetary debate. The French approach 
emerges both French and non-French literature. Cernuschi’s book “Monetary 
diplomacy in 1878” is a great example of the former, and may reinforce the vision 
of France as the hub:  
“Switzerland and Belgium [...] [are] two small states whose 
necessity has always subordinated and naturally subordinates 
to the monetary system of France” (Cernuschi, 1878, p.39) 
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Italian diplomatic sources,11 i.a., also show that its government strictly followed 
the French political stance. A private manuscript found in the Luzzatti Archive 
(Venice)12 recites the following:  
“The Italian Government, aiming at preserving the Latin Union, 
and hoping to reach it[s objective], even with harsh 
discrepancies on pivotal questions, do not think to separate 
its position from the one of France on this particular motion. 
In the case that France declares that instead of allowing a one 
year prorogation asked by Belgium, will prefer to face the 
break of negotiations, with its regret Italy will subordinate its 
decisions on that point of view.” 13 
(undated, presumably around 1885, Luzzatti) 
Another diplomatic document, sent from Luzzatti (negotiator at the LMU) to 
Lacava (Ministry of Finance) highlights the French pivotal role during negotiations 
and other political events, depicting a de facto hub-and-spokes relational 
framework:  
“So the question that separated, in this way, the Italian 
administration from the French one is solved [...] Primarily the 
French Government that conduces the same negotiations with 
Belgium, Switzerland, and Greece desires not to give public 
notice before the agreement will be finalised with all the other 
Governments of the Latin League.”14 
To this consideration, in the same letter Luzzatti adds a part of his conversation 
with the French Finance Minister Caillaux, where he states the following: 
 
                                                          
11 Archivio Luzzatti Venice (Fondo: Luigi Luzzatti; Sezione 2, Ministero del tesoro (e interim delle 
finanze), UA 165 & UA 203 & UA 204 & UA 219). 
12 Luigi Luzzatti was a pivotal figure in the Italian politics, as it worked almost for half century within 
the Italian institutions. For more details on the Luzzatti Archive, and the role of Luzzatti in the Italian 
politics, see Timini (forthcoming), Appendix A.1. 
13 In French in the original “Mais le Gouvernement Italien, visant au but suprême de la conservation 
de l’Union Latine et ayant l’espoir de l’atteindre, quoiqu’il y ait encore des dissentiments graves sur 
des points capitaux, ne croit pas de se séparer de la France dans cette motion particulière. Au cas 
où la France allait déclarer que plutôt de consentir à la prorogation d’une année, demandé par la 
Belgique, elle affronterait la rupture de la négociation, l’Italie devrait à son regret subordonner ses 
décisions à ce point de vue.” 
14 In Italian in the original: “Quindi la questione che divideva, in questa materia, l’Amministrazione 
italiana e quella francese è risoluta. […] Primieramente il Governo francese che conduce le stesse 
negoziazioni col Belgio, colla Svizzera e colla Grecia desidera che non se ne dia pubblica notizia 
prima che l’accordo sia stretto con tutti gli altri Governi della Lega latina.” 
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“I noted laughing that what Italy stipulated with France, [Italy] 
also intended to be agreed upon with Switzerland through [the 
agency of] France”15 
(Luzzatti, approx. 1907-1908)  
Further evidence of the marginality of the relationships among peripheral 
members of the Union, may be found, again, at the Luzzatti Archive. In particular, 
two letters provide anecdotal evidence of the LMU failure in enhancing peripheral 
relations and reciprocal interest. The exchange of letters between the two Italian 
representatives to the LMU in December 1885, Mr. Luzzatti and Mr. Ellena is an 
epic example of extraordinary frankness. Using very confidential manners,16 the 
latter evokes to the former the need for Italy to concentrate on its own interests and 
to avoid considering the ones of the other members. Particularly referring to the 
position of Belgium (exceptionally troubled at that time), Mr. Ellena states:  
“Materially speaking, we don’t give a damn about the 
presence of Belgium in the Union”17 
(Ellena, 1885) 
 
brilliantly summarising, to explain it in a very considerate way, the total absence 
of interest in Italian-Belgian relations of the Italian negotiators. This attitude may 
reasonably be expanded to the Italian political and administrative spheres which 
Ellena and Luzzatti were asked to represent. 
However, this apathy is proved to be bilateral by a letter Mr. Grillo addresses to 
Luzzatti only few weeks before Ellena. With the excuse of a business law congress 
in Antwerp, Grillo travels to Belgium with the objective of meeting important Belgian 
personalities, which however refuse or avoid to either discuss with him relevant 
topics of monetary policy or even to consider his request to gather together.18  
Table ADD 1.4 provides a recapitulation of the results of the hub-and-spokes 
categorization for LMU members in each of the three dimensions under 
assessment.
                                                          
15 In Italian in the original: “Io notai sorridendo che quanto l’Italia stipulava con la Francia lo intendeva 
concordato anche con la Svizzera per mezzo della Francia” 
16 As an examples, Ellena addresses Luzzatti using “Caro Gigi” (i.e. “Dear Gigi” which in Italian 
highlights a much higher degree of confidence with respect to an English speaking context; in 
addition he uses Luzzatti’s nickname), and he closes the letter with the quite unusual “scrivimi e 
ama” (i.e. “write me and love”). 
17 In Italian in the original: “A noi materialmente parlando, la presenza del Belgio nell’Unione non 
importa un cavolo”. Archivio Luzzatti Venice (Fondo: Luigi Luzzatti; Sezione 2, Ministero del tesoro 
(e interim delle finanze), UA 219). 
18 Archivio Luzzatti Venice (Fondo: Luigi Luzzatti; Sezione 1, Serie1, Lettera G, UA 2008). 
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Table ADD 1.4: Hub and spokes categorization 
 
Economic Power Military  
and 
Political 
power 
 
Qualitative 
data 
Overall 
Evaluation Trade Macroeconomic Monetary 
France Hub Hub Hub Hub Hub HUB 
Belgium Spoke Spoke Spoke Spoke Spoke SPOKE 
Switzerland Spoke Spoke Spoke Spoke Spoke SPOKE 
Italy Spoke Intermediate or 
Spoke (?) 
Spoke Intermediate 
or Spoke (?) 
Spoke SPOKE 
Greece Spoke Spoke Spoke Spoke Spoke SPOKE 
         Source: Author’s elaboration 
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ADD 1.5 Conclusions 
 
This addendum revises from a quantitative perspective the conventional view in 
economic history, based on qualitative evidence only, which describes the LMU, in 
general, as an imperfect currency union, where member countries had different 
influence in shaping its functioning, and France, in particular, as a great-power hub, 
i.e. the “hegemonic power” within the Union (Einaudi, 2001; Timini, forthcoming). 
After having elaborated a formal quantitative test based on Baldwin’s approach 
(1994) and Mann’s theory (1986) – with qualitative extensions, based on new 
archival evidence, when necessary – I confirm this view. 
Indeed, the set of indicators proposed in the analysis points towards a 
unambiguous categorization – from a quantitative perspective – of the LMU member 
states where, following Baldwin’s lexicon, France is identified as the “hub” and the 
rest of the members are the “spokes”. To a certain extent, Italy is an exception, at 
least in the aspect related to macroeconomics, politics and the military, where the 
selected indicators document an “intermediate” position. Therefore, for this specific 
case, I enhance the quantitative with a parallel qualitative analysis based on new 
archival research using Italian diplomatic sources conserved at the Luzzatti Archive. 
The qualitative analysis not only confirms that the Italian government strictly followed 
the French political stance, but also provides further evidence of the marginality of 
the relationships among peripheral members of the Union. 
The “enhanced” quantitative test is not an immutable reference for an 
assessment of power structure and power distribution within a currency union – 
even in the case of an incomplete one such as it was the LMU. The necessity of a 
stricter methodology and its operationalization remains, and the test elaborated in 
this addendum should rather be interpreted as a first step of an incremental 
process.  
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The Margins of Trade: Market Entry and Sector 
Spillovers, the Case of Italy (1862-1913)  
_______________________________________________ 
 
Jacopo Timini* 
 
Abstract 
 
Between its Unification and WWI, Italy faced a period of increasing 
participation in the international economy. The growth of Italian exports 
was gradual, and alternately promoted by its intensive and extensive 
margins. In this chapter, using a disaggregated database at country-
product level, I first construct the intensive (average export per product) 
and extensive (number of products) margins of trade (for Italian imports 
and exports) and, second, within a quasi-gravity model framework, I 
estimate the drivers of market entry for Italian exports (1862-1913), with 
particular attention to the presence of eventual sector spillover effects. I 
find that the presence of “similar” exported products increased the 
probability of entry in the destination market (export spillovers), even if 
with diminishing marginal effects, potentially linked to a 
“saturation”/“congestion” of the market. Equally, I find that the higher the 
imports’ growth rate for a specific product, the more likely it was to be 
internationalised by Italian exporters (import spillovers). 
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2.1 Introduction 
During the first wave of globalization, which began in the early nineteenth 
century and ended with the First World War (O’ Rourke and Williamson, 2002), the 
world saw a spectacular decline in trade costs paralleled by a stable increase in 
world trade (Federico and Tena, 2016; Dedinger and Girard, 2017) and a 
remarkable economic expansion (Jacks et al., 2010). Whereas transportation costs 
faced a steady decline, liberalizing trade policy (i.e. policies promoting international 
market integration such, e.g., tariff cuts) experienced changing fortunes, with 
national policy makers alternating the promotion of protectionism with “free trade 
epidemic[s]” (Lazer, 1999; cited in Lampe, 2011). By large, Italian developments 
went de jure in line with the wider European dimension: Italy alternated liberal with 
protectionist trade policies. However, de facto the latter group have been described 
as having little – if any – effect on both Italian growth and openness, which were 
thriving at the turn of the 20th century. As remarked by Felice and Vecchi (2015), in 
line with Federico and O’Rourke (2001) and Federico and Tena (1998), Italian 
protectionism was “more apparent than real” (p.516). In this context, it is interesting 
to delve into the various components of the Italian external sector.  
Using disaggregated data I first construct the extensive (number of products) 
and intensive (average export per product) margins of trade (for both exports and 
imports), and second, I perform a quantitative assessment of market entry decisions 
at product level, taking into account eventual spillover effects. As I have product 
(and not firm) level data, I have to follow Huberman et al. (2017), in its key 
assumption: the identification of firms with products, which means, in other words, 
to assume that any exported product constitutes “a variety produced by a 
representative firm” (Huberman et al., 2017, p.11).  In this framework, I exploit an 
emerging strand of product-level analysis of exports in historical perspective. Using 
a quasi-gravity model capturing trade costs, market and product specific forces, I 
test the importance of export and import spillovers in determining the entry of Italian 
products in ten different countries (in Europe, North and South America). Export 
spillovers had positive effects on market entry, but this relationship followed an 
inverted-U shape, possibly related to a market “saturation”/“congestion” effect. 
Import spillovers are positive, due to either direct (reduction in production costs) or 
indirect (technology/productivity) effects, or both.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follow: Section 2.2 provides a brief 
literature review, connecting international trade theory with market entry and 
potential spillovers; Section 2.3 describes the external sector of the Italian economy 
within its historical context, and provides the estimations of the intensive and 
extensive margins of trade; Section 2.4 explains the empirical strategy and data 
sources; Section 2.5 discusses the results; and Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
 59 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
Within the international trade literature, market entry represents an increasingly 
important segment. For long time, trade theory – based on Krugman seminal 
contribution (1980) – assumed firm homogeneity and treated transportation costs 
as variable only (as opposed to fixed costs), focussing consequently on intensive 
margins only. Krugman-based models explained bilateral trade flows in terms of 
consumers’ preferences for variety (“love-of-variety”), which would overcome 
obstacles posed by trade barriers and boost trade in differentiated goods (even 
between identical countries). However, such models did not provide an explanation 
for the existence of “zeroes” in bilateral trade, a very common feature of trade 
databases – no matter if historical or contemporary, country or product-level – 
practically assuming a random distribution. Only recently there has been a growing 
consensus among economists that zero trade in bilateral flows are not arbitrarily 
distributed. Such a change in the interpretative analysis had implications both at the 
methodological level (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and on the underlying theory. The 
introduction of firm heterogeneity – in terms of productivity – and fixed costs as part 
of transportation costs for trade activities (Melitz. 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; 
Helpman et al., 2004; Chaney, 2008) implied the discovery of a new dimension of 
exports: exports respond to a variation in trade costs not only in terms of size (either 
quantity or value, “intensive margins”), but also in terms of variety (the basket of 
products exported, “extensive margins”). This innovation originated a new strand of 
literature analysing the margins of trade and the determinants of market entry. This 
chapter builds on the literature that connects entry in foreign markets (i.e. whether 
or not a product is exported to certain destinations) with export and import 
“spillovers”. 
There are various channels explaining the existence of spillovers: Banerjee 
(1992) formalises a model where every individual (either a person or an entity) 
internalises, the choices made by its peers when optimising its decision-making 
function, recalling human ecology theories (Hawley, 1950), where functional 
relationships play an important role in influencing human behaviours. The result is 
what he calls a “herd behaviour”, where people mimic others’ actions, instead of 
using their own information, possibly considering it unsatisfactory, insufficient, 
inadequate, expecting peers’ information to be superior, or simply interpreting the 
commercial viability of certain products in certain foreign markets as a “signal” of 
the market potential for similar products. In the international management and 
sociology literature, this concept has been adapted by Di Maggio and Powell (1983). 
They argued that the institutional environment of a particular field in which 
organizations act tend to push them towards becoming increasingly similar within 
that field. They defined the combination of these forces as “institutional 
isomorphism”. Additionally, both “old” trade models – underlining the importance of 
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search and networks in promoting international trade (Rauch and Watson, 2004) – 
and “new” theories – focusing on the role played by a specific technology able to 
exploit economies of scale and/scope in exports (Ahn et al., 2011; Bernard et al., 
2011; Felbermayr and Jung, 2011; Crozet et al., 2013; Cheptea et al., 2015; Ito et 
al., 2017; Akerman, 2018; Emlinger and Poncet, 2018) – make the case for trade 
intermediaries to serve as facilitators of international trade, boosting exports of 
“similar” products, either in terms of capability of enter intermediaries’ networks, or 
to exploit intermediaries’  economies of scale, possibly specializing in a specific 
sector. However, most of the literature uses an empirical approach and focuses on 
the former (see Blomström and Kokko, 1998), using detailed firm-level data: 
Greenaway et al. (2004) find that the choice of exporting made by domestic firms is 
positively influenced by the presence of multinational enterprises in their area; 
Kinuthia (2017) extends the validity of the findings comparing two developing 
economies. Greenaway and Kneller (2008) detect that both geographical and 
sector-level agglomeration is positive for the probability of exporting; Koenig et al. 
(2010) describe that export spillovers exist for French firms (1998-2003) but only 
when calculated at the extensive (and not at the intensive) margin; Muñoz-
Sepulveda and Rodriguez (2015), using a dataset of Spanish firms from a 10 years 
period, test for eventual spillovers generated by previous export activities in similar 
countries or industry, finding evidence for these effects to exist and be positive, even 
if relatively small. Additionally, Castillo-Giménez et al. (2011) use a dataset with 
detailed information on firm location to identify whether firms’ proximity affects 
information-related sunk costs, and therefore the patterns of market entry. 
Choquette and Meinen (2015) decide to open the “black-box” of export spillovers, 
investigating if exporting firms influence non-exporting firms, and finding positive 
effects through the channels of movement of labour and industry-wide linkages. 
Mion et al. (2017) focus on managers’ mobility instead as a vector for spillovers. 
However, as there are no firm-level data available, these different causes of spillover 
effects are hard – not to say impossible – to disentangle in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to prove, through secondary sources, that many of these 
“spillover determinants” were at work during the first globalization in Italy, making 
therefore the case for gauging these effects at the product level: 
Trade intermediaries  the presence in Italy of trade intermediaries is well 
documented (Lupo, 1987; Battaglia, 2003; Stanziani, 2010). They played an 
important role in the primary sector, where Bernard (2010) argues intermediaries 
would have more lever, and possibly in helping small and medium enterprises 
(Madsen et al., 2012), which were of non-negligible importance in Italy (Colli and 
Rose, 1999; Colli et al., 2003); 
Labour/human capital mobility  using A’Hearn’s words (1998, p. 739), 
“[n]umerous examples can be culled from the experiences of Italian textile 
industrialists who undertook research trips abroad, brought in English, Swiss, or 
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Belgian overseers and mechanics, and arranged apprenticeships for their sons at 
textile mills and machine builders abroad”; 
Multinational enterprises  they had an increasing importance, although limited 
to certain sectors in the Italian economy, particularly during the Giolittian era. 
Possibly, the main example is the one of Montecatini, a conglomerate mainly acting 
in the mining and chemical sectors, which history has been reconstructed in detail 
by Amatori and Bezza (1990), Zamagni (1990) and Perugini (2014) (see Appendix 
B.2 for a graphical representation of Montecatini’s involvement in different 
products). 
 
All the channels suggested here imply reductions of transaction costs and, 
more in general, of trade costs, therefore being in line with the theoretical 
mechanisms and empirical findings described in Jacks et al. (2010), Huberman et 
al. (2017), and Meissner and Tang (2017), where a reduction in trade costs is 
associated to an increase in the margins of exports. 
On the other hand, this chapter specifically connects also with the literature on 
import spillovers, as it aims to understand whether higher imports’ growth rate for 
a specific product at time t-1 will affect the probability of being exported at time t. 
An important part of the literature studied the interconnection of imports (and import 
competition, see Autor et al., 2016) with productivity (Aghion et al., 2005; Amiti and 
Konings, 2007). However, Bas and Strauss-Khan (2013) focus on the 
interconnections between imported inputs and exports, emphasizing not only the 
“indirect effect” through productivity or technology, but also the “direct effect” 
through a reduction in production costs. However, if imported products are not 
used as inputs in the domestic production process, but compete with domestic 
products in the market instead, the effects of increased imports on exports may be 
different: they can be positive, if the firm (product) strive for survival will oblige 
domestic (and less competitive) firms (products) to find compatible foreign markets, 
characterised by lower productivity. Additionally, import competition may have 
positive effects through an indirect channel, stimulating productivity and innovation 
as in a model à la Aghion et al. (2005), where firms decide to face the increase in 
foreign competition investing more in innovation, increasing productivity and 
overcoming fixed costs related to export activities (similarly to Bas and Strauss-
Khan, 2013), therefore opening a wider set of markets, which were previously 
unaffordable. Negative effects may be present if an increase in imports detect an 
expansion in domestic demand that may absorb a higher proportion of domestic 
production, reducing export incentives. However, the latter issue is controlled by 
time fixed effects in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, negative effects may also 
be related to a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, where an increase 
in imports identifies an increase in competition, eventually squeezing out of the 
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market less productive firms. However, if existing at all, this last channel is expected 
to be relatively small, as less productive firms do not have a large contribution in the 
exporting sector. 
In historical perspective the literature is in its inception phase, as disaggregated 
databases had not been available until very recently. Differently from contemporary 
literature, data do not include firm-level characteristics, but offer product-level 
insights and have only been collected for a very limited number of countries: Belgium 
(Huberman et al., 2017), France (Becuwe et al., 2015), Italy (imports and exports, 
Bankit-FTV,50 Federico et al., 2012), Japan (Meissner and Tang, 2017), Spain 
(Betrán and Huberman, 2016), Germany (Hungerland, 2018), Mexico (Kuntz-Ficker 
and Tena-Junguito, 2018), Brazil (Absell and Tena-Junguito, 2018), Argentina 
(Rayes, 2018), and Honduras (Ledezma Díaz, 2018) . However, only Meissner and 
Tang (2017) focuses on market entry. They exploit a new database at product (SITC 
3 digit) and country level, with intervals of five (reference) years, between 1880 and 
1910, they identify trade costs and (destination market) demand factors as main 
determinants of market entry.51 
Introducing in the economic history literature export and import spillovers as 
possible determinants of market entry (i.e. new products exported to new 
countries), I aim to exploit the comprehensive and granular nature of the Bankit-FTV 
database (see Section 2.4.2 for more details). Additionally, the availability of 
standardise data for both imports and exports provide the unique opportunity to 
test empirically the existence of different types of spillovers. To my knowledge, it is 
the first time that import and export data are linked and exploited simultaneously to 
understand the drivers of market entry. 
 
2.3 Historical context 
2.3.1 Italy: the structure of trade and the (debated) effects 
on economic growth 
Since Federico (1996) defined it as a “little known success story”, the role of 
Italy within the world economy during the first globalization wave has been largely 
revisited. Indeed, early contributions focused on internal factors as potential engines 
of economic growth, considering Italy in complete isolation from the external 
                                                          
50 The collection of disaggregated data on Italian trade statistics was an initiative of the Bank of Italy, 
which was in charge of data collection, under the scientific direction of G. Federico, G. Tattara and 
M. Vasta. Following Federico et al. (2012), I refer to the authors of the project with the acronym 
“Bankit-FTV”. 
51 In a different fashion, outside the international trade literature, Greve (2000) tests market entry 
decisions in the Japanese banking sector at the beginning of the 20th century, and Ehrardt and 
Nowak (2011), focusing on institutional determinants of market exit for listed stock corporations in 
post-WWII Germany. 
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environment (e.g. Romeo, 1959; Sereni, 1966). Since Gerschenkron (1962), 
however, the importance of international factors in shaping Italian economic growth 
emerged rapidly. Indeed, the role of trade policy has been widely discussed, to 
understand why, how, and how much Italy sheltered its internal market from the 
international economy, i.e. the causes and levels of protection. Initially, trade policy 
was regarded as a positive factor for Italian growth (Zamagni, 1978).  
However, such interpretation has been gradually moderated towards positions 
in line with more mixed views, where trade policy effects are heterogeneous (Coppa, 
1970; Fenoltea, 1993; Ciccarelli and Nuvolari, 2015) or practically irrelevant 
(Federico and O’Rourke, 2001; Federico and Tena, 2002), and, in any case, not 
responding to “any clear strategy for industrialization” (Federico and Vasta, 2015). 
The debate has been largely similar for exports: they have been initially considered 
as a strong driver of growth and the development process of the Italian peninsula 
since its Unification (Bonelli, 1978). Toniolo (1988) argued that the lack of data was 
limiting the validation of Bonelli’s argument. Since then, data availability increased 
exponentially thanks to the efforts that various scholars dedicated to the 
reconstruction of Italian economic history figures (see i.a. Felice and Vecchi, 2015; 
Felice and Carreras, 2012; Toniolo, 2013; Fenoltea, 2010; Ciccarelli, 2015; Daniele 
and Malanima, 2017).  
Exploiting the disaggregated information provided in the Bankit-FTV database, 
Federico and Wolf (2012) analyse the Italian export course in the long run, 
highlighting “a strong coincidence between periods of economic growth […] and of 
good export performance” (p.20), and particularly for the “boom giolittiano” (1895-
1913; Cohen and Federico, 2001) (see Figure 2.1). Even if the authors argue that 
conventional wisdom support the view that openness was “beneficial” for Italy, they 
however do not claim any causality. Pistoresi and Rinaldi (2012), using aggregate 
data, found that export growth did not Granger-caused GDP growth, establishing 
a unidirectional causal relationship only from import growth to GDP growth. In this 
context, the analysis of trade margins may provide useful insights to understand the 
product-level dynamics of Italian internationalization, which revived the debate 
among economic historians for decades. 
During this period, Italy contribution to world trade remained almost constant, 
ranging around 3% of world total trade. That means, as world trade was 
experiencing a phase of strong growth (Dedinger and Girard, 2017), that Italian trade 
was increasing approximately in line with global trade. 
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Figure 2.1: Imports, Exports and GDP, Italy 1862-1913
 
Sources: Imports&Exports Toniolo, GDP Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database 
 
However, the increase in the availability of public sources for bilateral and 
product-level trade flows (Bankit-FTV database, RICardo database) allows to 
analyse trade by country and product. On the export side, Figure 2.2 shows that 
Italy, since Unification, had large and increasing commercial relationship with 
France, until the 1880s tariff war, which halved exports to that destination.52 On the 
other side, Figure 2.2 shows positive trends – in relative terms – for exports to 
Germany, Switzerland, US and – only to a certain extent – Argentina. In particular, 
the first two are those that seem to compensate for the French market tariff-related 
shrinkage. Product-level analysis also confirms that Italy was and remained primarily 
an agricultural economy, and consequently its exports where composed 
predominantly by primary products,53 even if their importance was decreasing from 
more than 82% of total exports in Bankit-FTV in 1862, to approximately 61% in 
1913. Complementarily, manufacturing products grew from 17% in 1862, to almost 
40% in 1913. Using product-level data (see Figure 2.3), it is possible to differentiate 
further within both agricultural and manufacturing goods. The former experienced a 
                                                          
52 The late 1870s and the 1880s were years of protectionist resurgences of protectionism. Italy was 
no exception and revised its overall trade policy twice, first in 1878, and later in 1887 with a “new 
1887 tariff”, which was the results of the convergence of industrialists, landowners and the Treasury. 
To compensate these increases and to control international complains, Italy negotiated a set of 
bilateral treaties. However, the situation with France turn out to be peculiar. In December 1886, Italy 
denounced the 1881 bilateral treaty, with the aim of reaching a new – more favourable – agreement. 
Nevertheless, for both economic and political reasons, negotiations fell apart in February 1888. A 
new trade treaty, which gained emphatic titles on the first pages of international newspapers (e.g. 
Chicago Sunday Tribune, the Spectator), was signed only a decade after, in November 1898. For 
more details, see De Cecco and Pedone (1995), Asakura (2003), House of Commons (1908). 
53 I follow Federico et al. (2012) and Federico and Wolf (2012) defining primary products as those 
products in the SITC 1-digit category 0 to 4 and in SITC 4-digit category 6511 (silk), and 
manufacturing products those products in the SITC 1-digit category 5 to 9, excluding silk (6511). 
Indeed, even if silk has been classified in SITC 6 (together with other industrial yarns) in the Bankit-
FTV database, the bulk of its value derived from the raw material (an agricultural product), and its 
processing operations (Federico and Wolf, 2012). However, this consideration only matters for 
estimating the relative importance of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 
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relative increase in primary products, food and live animals (0) and beverages and 
tobacco (1), whereas crude materials (2), and animal and vegetable oils (4) saw a 
reduction in their shares. Exports of mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
(3) were minimal until 1903 (0.1%), and experienced an exponential increase 
afterwards, however remaining in overall low levels (0.3% in 1913). Within the set of 
manufacturing products, manufactured goods (6), machinery and transport 
equipment (7), and miscellaneous manufactured products became more important 
in relative terms. 
Figure 2.2: Italian exports, by country of destination, share of total exports, 1862-1913 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV 
Figure 2.3: Italian exports, by sector (SITC 1-digit category), share of total exports, 1862-
1913 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV 
When combining the two dimensions (country-product) the picture is more 
variegate. As Figure 2.4 shows, there are important differences across product and 
countries. For example, even if the category “food and live animals” had an 
important role almost anywhere, Italian exports related to this sector were quite 
heterogeneous ranging from 10 to almost 40% of total exports. 
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Figure 2.4 Italian exports, by country of destination and sector (SITC 1-digit category, 
1862-1913) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV 
On the import side, Figure 2.5 shows that Italy, had large commercial 
relationship with Great Britain, France, Germany, as well as US and Austria. In 
particular, German and US increase in imports share goes in parallel with the French 
decline. Using product-level data as for exports (see Figure 2.6), it is possible to 
depict the evolution of imports by sector: food and live animals (0) and 
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manufactured goods (6) were important but shrinking in relative size, whereas 
imports of animal and vegetable oils (4) and mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials (3) increased their relative importance over time. In line with what seen for 
exports, the combination of the two dimensions (country and sector) creates a more 
diverse picture (see Figure 2.7). 
Figure 2.5: Italian imports, by country of origin, share of total imports, 1862-1913 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV 
 
Figure 2.6: Italian imports, by sector (SITC 1-digit category), share of total imports, 1862-
1913 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV 
 
Figure 2.7: Italian imports, by country of origin and sector (SITC 1-digit category, 1862-
1913) 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV 
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2.3.2 The estimation of imports and export margins 
 
To decompose Italian exports in their intensive and extensive margins, I follow 
the procedure explained in Mion and Muus (2014), based on Bernard et al. (2010) 
and Behrens et al. (2013). Italian total exports (identified as X in the equation) can 
be written as 
   =    ∗    ∗  ̅  
where p is the number of products exported at time t, C is the number of countries 
of destination. Solving for  ̅ ,  ̅  =     ∗  . In other words,  ̅  is equal to the average 
export for a product p in a country c, and represents the intensive margins of trade. 
In this context,    and    correspond to the extensive margins: product and country 
margins. Due to the geographical limitations of the sample, imposed by historical 
sources – the FTV-Bankit database include data for the ten major destinations – I 
will focus on the extensive margins at the product level, rather than at the country 
level. However, differently from Mion and Muus (2014), I have product (and not firm) 
level data. Therefore, I have to follow Huberman et al. (2017), in its key assumption: 
the identification of firms with products, which means, in other words, to assume 
that any exported product constitutes “a variety produced by a representative firm” 
(Huberman et al., 2017, p.11). Countries and trade flows coverage (percentage of 
total Italian exports covered by FTV-Bankit data) of the database are reported in 
Appendix B.1. Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 show the extensive and intensive margins 
of Italian exports and imports respectively. Particularly, in the case of exports, export 
growth seems to be characterised by the alternation of the intensive and extensive 
margins. For both exports and imports, the “return to protectionism” in the 1880s 
seems to affect the intensive rather than the extensive margin. France is an 
outstanding example: the beginning of the tariff war (1888) between France and Italy 
coincides with a dramatic decrease in the intensive margins of both imports and 
exports. In general, the country-level analysis of the intensive and extensive margins 
provide a variegate picture (see Figure 2.10 for exports and Figure 2.11 for imports). 
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Figure 2.8: Extensive and intensive margins of exports 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Extensive margins represents the number of product exported by Italy to at least one of the 
countries in the sample. Intensive margins calculation: see text. Value expressed in nominal Italian 
local currency (“Lira”). 
 
Figure 2.9: Extensive and intensive margins of imports 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Extensive margins represents the number of product exported by Italy to at least one of the 
countries in the sample. Intensive margins calculation: see text. Value expressed in nominal Italian 
local currency (“Lira”) 
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Figure 2.10 Extensive and intensive margins of exports by country of destination 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Extensive margins represents the number of product exported by Italy to the country. 
Intensive margins calculation: see text. Value expressed in nominal Italian local currency (“Lira”) 
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Figure 2.11 Extensive and intensive margins of imports by country of origin 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Note: Extensive margins represents the number of product exported by Italy to the country. 
Intensive margins calculation: see text. Value expressed in nominal Italian local currency (“Lira”) 
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2.4 Methodology and Data 
 
2.4.1 Empirical strategy 
 
The traditional approach used to estimate the determinants of export flows is 
based on gravity models (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Anderson and Van 
Wincoop, 2003; Head and Mayer, 2014). However the objective of this chapter is 
to understand the choice of entry in a specific export market in a precise moment 
in time. Thus, I follow, adapt and expand Roberts and Tybout (1997), Aitken et al. 
(1997), and Greenaway and Kneller (2008), which consider entry (and exit) decision 
to a specific export market with sunk costs. The aim is to understand the reasons 
beyond the entry of product p in the market of country j in sector s at time t, 
conditional to its absence at time t-1 (otherwise it would identify both “entry” and 
“persistence”) i.e. to estimate       , which is represented by the following formula, 
as in Paravisini et al. (2014), Muñoz-Sepulveda and Rodriguez (2015) and Gutierrez 
and Moral-Benito (2018):  
       = (        	 |        	    = 0) 
where the choice of entry is represented by a binary variable that takes the value 
of either 0 (“no entry”) or 1 (“entry”). To check the robustness of the results, I also 
adopt an alternative approach expanding the “entry” definition to “entry” and 
“persistence”, as in Koenig et al. (2010), i.e.         = (        	 ). 
Due to the structure of the dependent variable, it follows that I need to use a 
discrete choice model (which will take the logit form) that can be spelled out as 
follow: 
  ( )     =    +   ′     +   ′     +    +       
where         is the probability of market entry, defined as above. Concretely, 
in the main definition, I assigned 1 to every product-country-year observation where 
bilateral exports are different from zero at time t, subject to being equal to 0 at time 
t-1, and zero otherwise.   ′     is a vector of independent variables that are the 
object of the research, and identifies spillover effects. In detail, following Muñoz-
Sepulveda and Rodriguez (2015), I include Exp_Sect_Spill, which measures the 
number of products pertaining to the same sector (SITC 3-digit level) exported in 
country j at time t-1.  In other words, export sector spillovers are computed for every 
product k (SITC 4-digit level) exported to country j at time t, and calculates the 
number of products (SITC 4-digit level) exported to country j belonging to the same 
sector (defined as the one-level broader SITC level, i.e. SITC 3-digit) at time   − 1. 
Table 2.1 shows the method of calculation for a sample of two sectors (SITC 3-
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digit), two countries and one year. Values in Table 2.1 are included as an example, 
and do not necessarily reflect those included in the Bankit-FTV database.  
Table 2.1: Explanatory example of calculating export sector spillovers 
SITC 3-digit 
sectors 
SITC-4 
product 
analyse
d 
Country Year SITC 4-digit products Export 
sector 
 (exported product only) within the same 
SITC 3-digit category 
Spillovers 
001 0011 ARG 1863 0011 / 0013 0014 / 2 
012 0123 ARG 1863 / / 0123 / 0125 1 
001 0011 DEU 1863 0011 0012 0013 / 0015 3 
012 0122 DEU 1863 0121 0122 / / 0125 2 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
These spillovers may be driven by a variety of forces, as pointed out in the 
literature review. However, every new entry may also be viewed as a step towards 
the “saturation” of a sector-relevant market, i.e. a marginal increase in the risk of 
“swamping” the market with foreign products. This motivate the inclusion of a 
quadratic term (Exp_Sect_Spill_2) to check for the existence of an inverted-U 
relationship between new and old entries within the same sector. This is a 
generalization of the mimetic isomorphism principle that Haveman (1993) proposed 
for organizational change in similar firms, and recalls the density dependence theory 
of Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Hannan and Freeman (1987). In other words, 
this term aims to capture the relative opportunities and risks that a market can offer. 
As stated by Greeve (2000), a market with no product entry is similar to an 
unexplored territory, it may hide both gains and losses. However as organizations 
are, generally, risk adverse and fear the uncertainty, they are prone to postpone the 
entry decision until the moment that others dig into the unknown. Consequently, 
once market entry started, probability of market entry should immediately go up due 
to the increase of available information, nevertheless if too many exploit the same 
opportunity they can spoil it, creating a “saturation” or a “congestion” of the market, 
making expected gains to fall, therefore reducing the probability of entry. 
In international trade historical statistics, as in the original literature of business 
and organization theory, this metric faces the challenge that not all sectors/products 
have the same number of categories. A sector with more products – as defined by 
historical categorization – will have higher probability to report higher numbers. Even 
if in the main specification I follow the original, widely used, measure, to address 
this concern I normalize the number of products at the sector level in one of the 
robustness tests, i.e. the number of product exported within a certain sector will 
take a value between 0 (no “similar” product exported) and 1 (all the possible 
“similar” product exported). At a very first sight, it is possible to see that the 
normalized number of sector spillover increase in time: product exported move 
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towards to the possible maximum, but still remain far from it. More precisely, the 
mean value of the normalized sector spillover variable is equal to 0.15 in 1870, and 
0.46 in 1913. A priori, I expect that using the normalized variable will not affect the 
results. In addition, to address potential remaining concerns I also include a 
robustness test using wider “sector” categories (SITC 2-digit).   
Change in total (i.e. from all countries in the database) imports of a specific 
product (SITC 4-digit) is the last variable of interest (Imp_Sect_Spill). I have no a 
priori expectations on the sign as, as mentioned in the literature review, it may have 
either positive effects on exports, for example through the reduction in production 
costs, the improvement in productivity, or an increase in domestic competition, or 
negative, for example by the mean of a Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction. 
 ′     is a vector of control variables, largely taken from the literature of market 
entry and product specialization (e.g. Meissner and Tang, 2017; Betrán and 
Huberman, 2016; Schott, 2004). They encompass 1) the logarithm of the sum of 
exporter and importer GDP as a variable capturing the size of destination market 
demand (as a proxy for capturing the  “economic mass”); 2) the difference between 
exporter and importer GDP per capita (in absolute terms), to account for diverse 
levels of development – which may affect the composition of importers’ demand 
(Schott, 2004; Pham, 2008; Bertrán and Huberman, 2016; Pham and Ulubasoglu, 
2016; Meissner and Tang, 2017); 3) a dummy which takes the value of 1 when a 
country pair has a de facto fixed exchange rate (i.e. whether or not both countries 
pertain de facto to the gold standard, to include – for Italy – a long period of  “gold 
shadowing” – 1903-1911 – as argued by Cesarano et al., 2012) and zero otherwise, 
aiming at controlling for the potential positive effect of a stable exchange rate on 
trade flows (Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2003). In line with Meissner and Tang 
(2017), I also control for a set of other factors that may influence the decision of 
entering a specific market: change in the total number of products exported to 
destination j (t-1), the number of markets in which the product is present (t-1), and 
the growth rate of exports to country j between the current period and the previous 
year (excluding product p). Finally, Stanziani (2010), inter alia, acknowledges the 
presence of Italian immigrants in the destination country as an important factor 
influencing market entry.54 Therefore, it would be ideal to control for this factor too. 
                                                          
54 In particular, Stanziani (2010) argues that: “Italian traders willing to enter a new market abroad 
were above all in search of Italian correspondents. The sizeable presence of Italian immigrants […] 
encouraged this approach. The importance of the overseas Italian community in commercial 
relations made it easier for the Italian foreign office to get timely information for homeland companies 
and traders seeking to enter a particular market. Emigration also assisted the establishment of 
commercial networks usually followed patterns of emigration; family members (in the broad sense) 
gave commercial support to their relatives’ homeland trade or productive unit. They provided 
information about their local market, helped to find correspondents) when they themselves did not 
play this role) and promoted the family or local product” (p.54). 
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Unfortunately, there are no annual data on the Italian immigrants’ stock sorted by 
destination country. The only yearly measure I was able to derive is a very rough 
approximation derived from data on migration flows (Istat, 2018). Perfectly 
acknowledging the strong limitation of the variable, I nevertheless included as a 
robustness test. Finally, I use year dummies to control for any time-sensitive 
variable, such as the world’s and Italy’s state of technology and its business cycle, 
as well as other revelant Italian features; and robust standard error, clustered at 
product-country level (as in Meissner and Tang, 2017), to control for, respectively, 
heteroscedasticity and those phenomena that affect homogeneously each group 
sharing the two characteristics above (product and country). Other standard gravity 
variables, such as diplomatic representation (Rose, 2007), colonial relationship or 
common language are not included as there is not enough variance in the sample. 
The same applies – to a certain extent – to trade agreements. Indeed, bilateral trade 
agreements between Italy and the other countries in the sample exist for the entire 
period under consideration, even if with changing conditions. Therefore, identifying 
the existence of a treaty with a dummy could be problematic for two reasons: first 
because the value would be 1 for most dyads, and second because it would not 
allow to capture eventual changes in the treaty conditions without a value 
judgement. Nevertheless, to provide a robustness test, I follow Accominotti and 
Flandreau (2008) in using an alternative method to account for “openness” to trade 
(see section 2.5.2 for further details). 
 
2.4.2 Data 
The data were obtained from the recently released Bankit-FTV database. This 
database is the result of an incredible effort in digitalising all the sources that directly 
and indirectly collected trade transaction statistics, such for example the volumes 
of Movimento Commerciale, released annually by the Kingdom of Italy since 1862 
(the primary source par excellence for Italian trade data), and other secondary 
sources which summarised the enormous amount of information collected by the 
Movimento, e.g. Istat55 publications (Federico et al., 2012). The database 
enumerated Italian exports and imports by quantity and value, at the SITC 4-digit 
level. Indeed, the fine level of detail of the data (see Table 2.2 below for an example 
of differences among SITC 1, 2, 3, or 4 digit,), allows to group products which share 
common characteristics (or a similar intended usage), making the existence of 
“spillovers” plausible (or more plausible that in the case – say – of having access to 
SITC 1 or 2 digit data). 
The Bankit-FTV database contains information on approximately 400 different 
products at SITC 4-digit level per period t, between Italy and its ten major trade 
partners (Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, the 
                                                          
55 Istituto Nazionale di Statistica – National Institute of Statistics 
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Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, and United States). Moreover, the database 
contains data for different products within the SITC 4-digit, categorised by the name 
of the product as recorded in the primary source. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
use this further separation, as product labels are not coherent in time and space.  
The original database contains only those products that have been exported to one 
destination in a specific year. I inflate the database to include additional “zeros” of 
trade. The final database, for the period 1862-1913, contains more than 200,000 
observations at the country-product-year level. Its yearly – and continuous – 
coverage permits also to relax the assumption – made by other historical studies 
that use benchmark years or interpolation techniques – of no entry, exit, and/or 
subsequent entry between two points in time, and precisely determine the entry 
time of a specific product. 
Table 2.2: Example of a SITC Categorization 
SITC 1 digit SITC 2 digit SITC 3 digit SITC 4 digit 
0 - Food and live 
animals 
1 - Beverages and 
tobacco 
2 - Crude materials, 
inedible, except fuels 
3 - Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related 
materials 
4 - Animal and 
vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes 
5 - Chemicals and 
related products, 
n.e.s. 
6 - Manufactured 
goods classified 
chiefly by material 
7 - Machinery and 
transport equipment 
8 - Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles 
9 - Commodities and 
transactions not 
classified elsewhere in 
the SITC 
 
00 - Live animals other than 
animals of division 03 
01 - Meat and meat 
preparations 
02 – Dairy products and 
birds’ eggs 
03 - Fish (not marine 
mammals), crustaceans, 
molluscs and aquatic 
invertebrates, and 
preparations thereof 
04 - Cereals and cereal 
preparations 
05 - Vegetables and fruit 
06 - Sugars, sugar 
preparations and honey 
07 - Coffee, tea, cocoa, 
spices, and manufactures 
thereof 
08 - Feeding stuff for animals 
(not including unmilled 
cereals) 
09 - Miscellaneous edible 
products and preparations 
 
022 - Milk and 
cream and milk 
products other 
than butter or 
cheese 
023 - Butter and 
other fats and oils 
derived from milk 
024 - Cheese and 
curd 
025 - Eggs, birds', 
and egg yolks, 
fresh, dried or 
otherwise 
preserved, 
sweetened or not; 
egg albumin 
 
0221 - Milk (including 
skimmed milk) and 
cream, not 
concentrated or 
sweetened 
0222 - Milk and 
cream, concentrated 
or sweetened 
0223 - Yogurt; 
buttermilk, curdled, 
fermented or acidified 
milk and cream; ice-
cream 
0224 - Whey; 
products consisting 
of natural milk 
constituents, n.e.s 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on unstats.un.org. 
The percentage of total trade captured by the commercial relations with the 
countries included in the database is relatively constant over time, and oscillates 
between 70 and 90 per cent, which constitutes a representative share of the total 
(for more details see Appendix B.1). I recall that information is at product – and not 
firm – level. Therefore I have to assume (same as in Hubermann et al., 2017) that 
the specific variety is produced by a “representative firm” or that firms within a 
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product category are sufficiently homogenous. The observations included in the 
Bankit-FTV database are combined with a set of macroeconomic, political, 
geographic, sector, and market specific characteristics collected by a variety of 
sources. Summary statistics are provided in Appendix B (Table B.1.3). 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Market entry 
This subsection presents the regression results of the determinants of market 
entry of Italian products (SITC 4-digit) in the top 10 export destinations over the 
period 1862-1913. Results for the logit model are reported in Table 2.3. The 
variables of interest, related to exports and imports “spillovers”, namely 
Exp_Sect_Spill, Exp_Sect_Spill_2 and Imp_Sect_Spill are all significant, and with 
the expected sign. In details Exp_Sect_Spill is positive and Exp_Sect_Spill_2 is 
negative across all specifications including them (column 2 and 4). This means that 
the presence of “similar” exported products (at SITC 3-digit) increased the 
probability of entry in the destination market, due to a variety of possible drivers, 
that should be investigated further in future research, such as the role of trade 
intermediaries; the effect of labour mobility; the increasing role played by 
multinational enterprises; as well as, more broadly, the creation of a superior sector-
specific knowledge accumulated by the same or a similar firm selling similar 
products; the consequences of mimetic forces; or when firms with similar or 
complementary products decide to export as an effect of the behaviour of their 
peers. Only with firm level data it would be possible to unfold these effects. 
In addition, the coefficient of Exp_Sect_Spill_2 is negative. This points towards 
the existence of an inverted-U relationship between the presence of similar exports 
in a specific market (i.e. destination country) and the probability of entry in that 
market, in line with mimetic isomorphism and density dependence theories 
(Haveman, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hannan and Freeman, 1987; and 
Greeve, 2000). In other words, once the initial uncertainty linked to the “unknown” 
disappears (lowering the associated risk), exports of similar products are more 
prone to enter a specific market. However, when there are too many new entrants 
the market reaches a “saturation”/“congestion” level, possibly related to increasing 
competition effects. This effect also holds when I consider a larger group of similar 
products (SITC 2-digit, a maximum of 28 product within each category), to avoid 
potential problems related to a “too narrow” definition of categories. 
 Imp_Sect_Spill also affects positively the likelihood of product entry in a market. 
In other words, the greater the increase in the imports of a product k at time t-1, 
the more likely the product was to be exported at time t. This positive effects may 
not only be “indirect” through productivity or technology, but “direct” through a 
reduction in production costs. However, if imported products were not used as 
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inputs in the domestic production process, but competed with domestic products 
in the market instead, the effects of increased imports on exports may act through 
a different channel: the firm (product) strive for survival may oblige domestic (and 
less competitive) firms (products) to find compatible foreign markets, characterised 
by lower productivity. Finally, import competition may have positive effects through 
an indirect channel, stimulating productivity and innovation as in a model à la Aghion 
et al. (2005), where firms decide to face the increase in foreign competition investing 
more in innovation, increasing productivity and overcoming fixed costs related to 
export activities, therefore opening a wider set of markets, which were previously 
unaffordable. 
Table 2.3: Main regressions. Spillovers at SITC-3 
  
(1) 
Market Entry 
(2) 
Market Entry 
(3) 
Market Entry 
(4) 
Market Entry 
lndist 
0.0277 
(0.0171) 
0.0282* 
(0.0171) 
0.0281 
(0.0175) 
0.0307* 
(0.0175) 
lnGDPGDP 
0.0439 
(0.0283) 
0.0417 
(0.0282) 
0.0446 
(0.0292) 
0.0419 
(0.0291) 
ABSdiffGDPc 
0.0250 
(0.0308) 
0.0241 
(0.0308) 
0.0254 
(0.0311) 
0.0253 
(0.0311) 
     
L.DExpAllMark 
0.0852*** 
(0.0316)  
0.0863*** 
(0.0319) 
0.0863*** 
(0.0319) 
0.0885*** 
(0.0322) 
     
L.NofMarket 
0.0128*** 
(0.00384) 
0.0129*** 
(0.00385) 
0.0130*** 
(0.00387) 
0.0130*** 
(0.00387) 
     
GS 
0.152*** 
(0.0545) 
0.151*** 
(0.0544) 
0.154*** 
(0.0550) 
0.153*** 
(0.0548) 
     
DLnproddest 
0.00105 
(0.00113) 
0.000917 
(0.00113) 
0.00106 
(0.00114) 
0.000866 
(0.00114) 
     
L.Exp_Sect_Spill  
0.220*** 
 (0.0295) 
 
0.234*** 
(0.0297) 
     
L.Exp_Sect_Spill_2  
-0.0638*** 
(0.00748) 
 
-0.0641*** 
(0.00747) 
     
L.Imp_Sect_Spill   
0.0994*** 
(0.00259) 
0.0995*** 
(0.00259) 
     
N 204,183 204,183 204,183 204,183 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Market entry, as defined in the text. All regressions 
include a constant, and time fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard 
errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Control variables’ coefficients have, in general, the expected signs. Trade costs 
are proxied by distance and the gold standard dummy. The former is positive and 
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often not significant. Although against conventional wisdom, it is likely that strong 
export performances to US and Argentina may influence this variable. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by the results of the robustness tests, when – excluding 
non-European countries from the sample – distance becomes negative and 
significant. The latter instead is positive and significant, meaning that the gold 
standard favoured market entry, in line with the literature (e.g. Lopez-Cordova and 
Meissner, 2003). Demand-side variables offer some insights on the importance of 
the economic size of markets, and on how similarity mattered for Italian exports. 
Economic size is positive but non-significant. However, this result can also be due 
to the usual problems of historical GDP data when used in trade literature. The same 
applies to the absolute difference of GDP per capita. Finally, the difference of total 
number of products exported, the growth rate of other products exported to 
destination j during the previous period, and the number of markets in which the 
specific product (SITC 4-digit) present the expected sign and, in the majority of the 
cases, a significant coefficient.  
2.5.2 Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of the results, I run different specifications of the model 
(see Table 2.4 and Table 2.5). In column 1 I use a different definition for market 
entry, which includes “persistence”, i.e. identifies market entry as the presence of a 
product in a given country and year (see section 2.4.1 on methodology for more 
details). In column 2, I uses a normalized indicator for export spillovers: the number 
of similar products will be comprised between 0 (no similar product exported) and 
1 (all the similar product exported), to minimize possible biases deriving from the 
different number of products included within each SITC 3 digit category. In column 
3, I define spillovers at SITC2 level instead of SITC3, to include a wider set of “similar 
products” (passing from a maximum of 6 to a maximum of 28). In column 4, I 
consider the importance of Italian immigration for exports and market entry, 
including a rough approximation of the number of Italian immigrants to check 
whether results are consistent. In theory, the “attraction” for Italian products should 
be related to the “mass” of immigrants present in the country of destination (i.e. the 
“stock”), and not necessarily to the change in the number of immigrants (“flows”). 
Unfortunately, annual data directly measuring the “stock” of Italian immigrants 
sorted by country of destination are not available. Nevertheless, Istat (the Italian 
statistical office) reconstructed yearly measures of gross immigrant flows to a subset 
of these countries (available at http://seriestoriche.istat.it and based on Istat, 1933). 
From these data, I derived the migrant stock, cumulating flows through time. I am 
perfectly aware that this measure is very far from perfection, and it requires very 
strong assumptions (for example, I am forced to assume that 1) the initial stock of 
Italian immigrants was equal in all the countries of the sample, and 2) repatriation 
flows were either zero or proportional from all countries). Nevertheless, it is the 
closest possible approximation to gather the size of the Italian immigrant 
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community. Results are robust to its inclusion, and its coefficient is positive, however 
not significant. 
In column 5 and 6, I drop from the dataset non-European country of destination 
(i.e. Argentina, Russia and US) and France (the most relevant country for Italian trade 
during a substantial part of the period) respectively. In the first case, the distance 
coefficient turns negative (in line with what expected) when the sample is restricted 
to European countries. In addition, in column 7, I use population instead of GDP 
data, to fill relevant gaps (mainly for Russia). In an additional robustness test, I drop 
silk data (product SITC 6511), Italy main export during the whole period considered 
(Federico, 2005). Their prominent role in Italian exports may be the source of biases 
in the results. However, the test performed in column 8 excludes this possibility, as 
results are robust to this specification. Finally, in Meissner and Tang (2017), it is also 
included an additional control variable, a dummy identifying the MFN treaty status. 
In the case of Italy, the use of a similar variable will raise at least two major issues. 
The first is that, if interpreted sensu lato, the dummy will show very little variance for 
some of the countries. The second consist in the value judgment that an 
interpretation more sensu stricto will imply. Indeed, the signature of a “new” treaty 
that has the effect of substituting the previous one should be judged as “liberalizing” 
or “protectionist”, in order to decide whether to keep the dummy with the same 
value, or to switch it off. This will apply even for those cases where the treaty may 
have implications that go in opposite directions for different categories of goods. To 
solve this situation, due to the impossibility of gathering all the combinations 
tariff/product/country/year in force, I follow Accominotti and Flandreau (2008) in 
calculating an average measure of protection per each combination country/year, 
as “the ratio of custom revenues to total imports”. In line with their results, the 
coefficient of this measure is not statistically significant, potentially indicating little 
influence of liberalization on market entry. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Lampe 
(2009), the MFN treaties often “did not pursue overall trade liberalization, but rather 
reductions in duties on specific commodities”. Consequently, the lack of 
significance may also be due to the level of aggregation used. 
Additionally, in Table 2.6, I address the potential problems arising from a time-
varying efficiency of the Italian administration. Indeed, 18th century states had 
limited administrative means (Loïc and Daudin, 2015), including for the management 
of their economic frontiers, the imposition of customs and duties, and the correct 
registrations of trade flows, and in particular of those of limited size. Indeed, the 
minimum trade flow registered, an indicator for the efficiency of the administration 
(i.e. the more efficient an administration, the more likely it is to capture and record 
small trade flows), varies from 2.5 liras in 1907 (10 “2015 euros”)56 to 720 in 1891 
                                                          
56 Calculated using the Sole 24 Ore (main financial newspaper in Italy) web address: 
http://www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2016/05/17/calcola-potere-dacquisto-lire-ed-euro-dal-1860-
2015/ 
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(approximately 3000 “2015 euros”).57 Therefore, I consider like “zeros of trade” all 
those trade flows that are below 50, 100, 500 and 1000 liras (respectively column 
10 to 13). The proposed changes do not affect the sign nor the significance of the 
main variable of interests (export and import spillovers). 
Finally, in Table 2.7, I address the potential concerns related to the assumption 
of proxing the number of firms with the number of products (as in Hubermann et al., 
2017). However, this assumption requires a constant number of potential products, 
i.e. a stable classification of the products over the years. However, in the specific 
case of Italy, the classification happened to change often. Changes of particular 
magnitude happened with the approval of the new tariff schedule of 1878, 1888, 
and 1907. In the main specification of this paper, as well as in the robustness tests, 
I use the FTV SITC 4-digit categorization, instead of the original categories, named 
“voci” (in practice, this means to aggregate some “voci” into different SITC 4-digit 
categories). Even if this strategy contributes to reducing the possible bias, it does 
not suppress it completely. To address this consideration, I first display the time 
dummies (already included in the main specification) of the major changes in the 
tariff schedule (column 14). As they are significant, I decide to include as additional 
variables period-specific dummies for the periods with no overall changes or reform 
of the tariff schedule (i.e, 1862-1878, 1879-1887, and 1888-1906, therefore using 
1907-1913 as a benchmark). Their significant coefficients (column 15) imply the 
presence of different trends within the sample (in comparison with the latter period), 
whose presence, however, does not affect the significance of the main results. 
Finally, I also run a separate regression for any of the periods reflecting the dummies 
included in the previous regression, to minimize the incidence of changes in product 
classification within each of these samples (columns 16 to 18). Results hold for all 
the different samples used. 
  
                                                          
57 1891 is indeed a year of particular financial constraints: even the once every ten year planned 
census was suspended due to financial restrictions (Fracassi, 1961). 
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Table 2.4: Robustness tests (part 1) 
  
(1) 
Market Entry 
(including 
“persistence”) 
(MEP) 
(2) 
Market 
Entry 
(Normalized 
Spillovers) 
(3) 
Market Entry 
(Spillovers 
SITC 2-digit) 
(4) 
Market 
Entry (with 
immigrants) 
(5) 
Market Entry 
(without US, 
ARG, RUS) 
lndist 
-0.268*** 
(0.0311) 
0.0315* 
(0.0175) 
0.0474*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0247 
(0.0199) 
-0.384*** 
(0.0977) 
      
lnGDPGDP 
0.0636 
(0.0478) 
0.040 
(0.029) 
0.0282 
(0.0290) 
0.0391 
(0.0367) 
0.306*** 
(0.0554) 
      
ABSdiffGDPc 
-0.160*** 
(0.0478)  
0.026 
(0.031) 
0.0366 
(0.0312) 
0.0959**  
(0.04) 
0.0520 
(0.0427) 
      
L.DExpAllMark 
0.0242 
(0.0152) 
0.0871*** 
(0.0321) 
0.0918*** 
(0.0326) 
0.167*** 
(0.0434) 
-0.0288 
(0.0538) 
      
L.NofMarket 
0.0120*** 
(0.002) 
0.0129*** 
(0.004) 
0.0128***  
(0.004) 
0 
(0.006) 
0.0156*** 
(0.046) 
      
GS 
0.0408  
(0.0505) 
0.152*** 
(0.0548) 
0.144***  
(0.0545) 
-0.152* 
(0.0919) 
0.162** 
(0.0799) 
      
DLnproddest 
0.00407*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0011) 
0.000392 
(0.0012) 
-0.000956 
(0.0016) 
-0.001 
(0.0014) 
      
L.Exp_Sect_Spill 
0.471*** 
(0.0427) 
0.694*** 
(0.1344) 
0.0852*** 
(0.0086) 
0.172*** 
(0.0404) 
0.170*** 
(0.0351) 
      
L.Exp_Sect_Spill_2 
-0.0319*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.722*** 
(0.1434) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.00053) 
-0.0565*** 
(0.0097)  
-0.0533*** 
(0.0085) 
      
L.Imp_Sect_Spill 
0.0183*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0998*** 
(0.0026) 
0.100***  
(0.0026) 
0.117*** 
(0.0038) 
0.112*** 
(0.003) 
      
L.ItalianImmigrants  
 
 
0.0227 
(0.03) 
 
N 204,183 204,183 204,183 86,436 151,704 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Market entry, as defined in the text. All regressions 
include a constant, and time fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.5: Robustness tests (part 2) 
  
(6) 
Market Entry 
(without 
France) 
(7) 
Market Entry 
(with POP) 
(8) 
Market 
Entry 
(without 
“silk”) 
(9) 
Market Entry 
(including 
“protection”) 
lndist 
0.0332* 
(0.0178) 
0.0410** 
(0.0169) 
0.0301* 
(0.018) 
0.0688** 
(0.0284) 
     
lnGDPGDP 
0.0344 
(0.0291) 
 
0.0426 
(0.0291) 
0.116*** 
(0.0326) 
     
lnPOPPOP  
-0.0132 
(0.0319) 
  
     
ABSdiffGDPc 
0.0289 
(0.0323) 
0.0317 
(0.0306) 
0.0250 
(0.031) 
-0.0778*** 
(0.0347) 
     
L.DExpAllMark 
0.074** 
(0.0337) 
0.0856*** 
(0.032) 
0.0859*** 
(0.032) 
0.134*** 
(0.0337) 
     
L.NofMarket 
0.0156*** 
(0.004) 
0.0126*** 
(0.004) 
0.0129*** 
(0.004) 
0.0113*** 
(0.004) 
     
GS 
0.182*** 
(0.056) 
0.170*** 
(0.0551) 
0.154*** 
(0.055) 
0.140** 
(0.0548) 
     
DLnproddest 
0.0011 
(0.0012) 
0.0009 
(0.0012) 
0.0009 
(0.0014) 
0.0012 
(0.0012) 
     
L.Exp_Sect_Spill 
0.248*** 
(0.0312) 
0.235*** 
(0.0297) 
0.236*** 
(0.03) 
0.224*** 
(0.0310) 
     
L.Exp_Sect_Spill_2 
-0.0663*** 
(0.008) 
-0.0643*** 
(0.007) 
-0.0642*** 
(0.008) 
-0.0625*** 
(0.0077) 
     
L.Imp_Sect_Spill 
0.0906*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0995*** 
(0.00258) 
0.0995*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0998*** 
(0.0027) 
     
Ln(1+Protection)    
-0.039 
(0.0257) 
     
N 182,133 204,183 203,720 186,102 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Market entry, as defined in the text. All regressions 
include a constant, and time fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.6: Robustness tests (part 3) 
  
(10) 
Market Entry 
(if bilateral 
flows>50  
liras) 
(11) 
Market Entry 
(if bilateral 
flows>100 
liras) 
(12) 
Market Entry 
(if bilateral 
flows>500 
liras) 
(13) 
Market Entry  
(if bilateral 
flows>1000 
liras) 
lndist 
0.033* 
(0.0175) 
0.0347* 
(0.0177) 
0.0324* 
 (0.0185) 
0.0313*** 
(0.019) 
     
lnGDPGDP 
0.045 
(0.029) 
0.0431 
(0.0295) 
0.0549 
(0.0307) 
0.0531 
(0.0315) 
     
ABSdiffGDPc 
0.021 
(0.0312) 
0.2324 
(0.0313) 
0.0216 
(0.032)) 
0.1128 
(0.0325) 
     
L.DExpAllMark 
0.0896 
(0.0322) 
0.0879*** 
(0.00387) 
0.0888*** 
(0.0326) 
0.0798*** 
(0.0322) 
     
L.NofMarket 
0.0124*** 
(0.004) 
0.0125*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0127*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0123*** 
(0.0016) 
     
GS 
0.1519*** 
(0.0549) 
0.1495*** 
(0.0549) 
0.139 
(0.0548) 
0.143** 
(0.0552) 
     
DLnproddest 
0.00099 
(0.0011) 
0.0011 
(0.0011) 
0.00148 
(0.0011) 
0.0014 
(0.0011) 
     
L.Exp_Sect_Spill 
0.2302*** 
(0.0298) 
0.2308*** 
(0.0299) 
0.238*** 
(0.0307) 
0.255*** 
(0.031) 
     
L.Exp_Sect_Spill_2 
-0.06296*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0627*** 
(0.007) 
-0.0621*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0628*** 
(0.0076) 
     
L.Imp_Sect_Spill 
0.0989*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0980*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0932*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0891*** 
(0.0026) 
     
N 204,183 204,183 204,183 204,183 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Market entry, as defined in the text. All regressions 
include a constant, and time fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard 
errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2.7: Robustness tests (part 4)  
  
(14) 
Market Entry 
(dummies 1878, 
1888, 1907) 
 
(15) 
Market Entry 
(with period-
specific 
dummies) 
(16) 
Market 
Entry 
(1862-1877 
only) 
(17) 
Market 
Entry 
(1878-
1887 only) 
(18) 
Market 
Entry 
(1889-
1906 only) 
lndist 
0.0307* 
(0.0175) 
0.0307* 
(0.0175) 
-0.1218** 
(0.0473) 
0.0826** 
(0.039) 
0.076*** 
(0.0247) 
  
 
   
lnGDPGDP 
0.0419 
(0.0291) 
0.0419 
(0.0291) 
0.1596** 
(0.0715) 
0.0753 
(0.0654) 
-0.0023 
(0.0397) 
      
ABSdiffGDPc 
0.0253 
(0.0311) 
0.0253 
(0.0311) 
-0.0832 
(0.0529) 
0.1059** 
(0.0518) 
0.0327 
(0.0579) 
      
L.DExpAllMark 
0.0885*** 
(0.0322) 
0.0885*** 
(0.0322) 
-0.1227* 
(0.0678) 
0.212*** 
(0.0511) 
0.1082 
(0.0788) 
      
L.NofMarket 
0.0130*** 
(0.00387) 
0.0130*** 
(0.00387) 
0.01623 
(0.0112) 
0.0191* 
(0.0111) 
0.00098 
(0.00546) 
      
GS 
0.153*** 
(0.0548) 
0.153*** 
(0.0548) 
0.250 
(0.1859) 
0.1106 
(0.0902) 
0.1877*** 
(0.0696) 
      
DLnproddest 
0.000866 
(0.00114) 
0.000866 
(0.00114) 
0.00335 
(0.0031) 
-0.0022 
(0.0022) 
-0.00227 
(0.00186) 
      
L.Exp_Sect_Spill 
0.234*** 
(0.0297) 
0.234*** 
(0.0297) 
0.450*** 
(0.0712) 
0.214*** 
(0.0598) 
0.2087*** 
(0.0413) 
      
L.Exp_Sect_Spill_2 
-0.0641*** 
(0.00747) 
-0.0641*** 
(0.00747) 
-0.1014*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0399*** 
(0.0152) 
-0.0579*** 
(0.013) 
      
L.Imp_Sect_Spill 
0.0995*** 
(0.00259) 
0.0995*** 
(0.00259) 
0.0930*** 
(0.0057) 
0.1286*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0976*** 
(0.00364) 
      
1878 
0.318** 
(0.1178) 
0.318*** 
(0.1178) 
   
      
1888 
0.590*** 
(0.1147) 
0.0625 
(0.0797) 
   
      
1907 
0.535*** 
(0.1262) 
0.2388*** 
(0.0838) 
   
      
1862-1878  
-0.2966** 
(0.1296) 
   
      
1879-1888  
-0.3708*** 
(0.10108) 
   
      
1889-1906  
0.2312*** 
(0.0816) 
   
      
N 204,183 204,183 48,510 41,013 83,790 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Notes: Logit regressions. Dependent variable: Market entry, as defined in the text. All regressions 
include a constant, and time fixed effects, not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust 
standard errors clustered at country-product level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter revises the evolution of Italian exports since the Unification until 
WWI, with a particular focus on market entry. Building on the existing literature and 
exploiting the recently released Bankit-FTV database, I first construct the intensive 
and extensive margins for Italian exports during the period 1862-1913 and, second,  
show the existence of “spillover” effects influencing the probability of Italian exports 
to enter a foreign market. Those effects are linked to the Italian export and import 
dynamics. 
The quantitative analysis, based on a logit model, shows robust support for 
what it has been referred to, throughout this chapter, as “export spillovers” and 
“import spillovers”.  
In the first case, this means that the presence of “similar” exported products 
increases the probability of entry in the destination market, due to either the creation 
of a superior sector-specific knowledge, accumulated by the same or a similar firm 
selling similar products when firms with similar or complementary products decide 
to export as a consequence of the behaviour of their peers, or other mechanisms 
that should be unfolded using firm-level data. In addition, I detect an inverted-U 
relationship between the presence of similar exports in a specific market and the 
probability of entry in a market. This would prove the existence of a threshold, above 
which the market reaches a “saturation”/“congestion” level, possibly due to 
increasing competition among Italian products in the foreign country.  
In the second case, “import spillovers” also affect positively the likelihood of 
product entry in a market: the greater the increase in the imports of a product k at 
time t-1, the more likely the product was to be exported at time t. This positive 
effects may not only be “indirect” through productivity or technology, but “direct” 
through a reduction in production costs. However, if imported products were not 
used as inputs in the domestic production process, but competed with domestic 
products in the market instead, the effects of increased imports on exports may act 
through a different channel: the firm (product) strive for survival may oblige domestic 
(and less competitive) firms (products) to find compatible foreign markets, 
characterised by lower productivity. Finally, import competition may have positive 
effects through an indirect channel, stimulating productivity and innovation as in a 
model à la Aghion et al. (2005), where firms decide to face the increase in foreign 
competition investing more in innovation, increasing productivity and overcoming 
fixed costs related to export activities, therefore opening a wider set of markets, 
which were previously unaffordable. 
Even if quantitative analysis shows robust results and the theoretical 
explanations elaborated in the chapter may sound appealing, with (Italian) product-
level data it is not possible to confirm the main forces beyond the spillover effects 
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highlighted in the chapter, nor to generalize them outside the Italian experience. 
Whereas for the former further research is immensely needed to retrieve firm-level 
data and to unfold the drivers of these spillover effects, for the latter a new strand 
of literature is emerging, which will allow to put the Italian experience in perspective 
with the rest of Europe and beyond, shedding new light over these issues. For 
instance, combining trade data of different countries will allow to test for the 
existence of “spillovers” from exports/imports of other countries in third markets. 
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APPENDIX B 
_______________________________________________ 
Appendix: Chapter 2 
_______________________________________________ 
 
B.1 
Figure B.1.1: Share of total Italian exports in the sample 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Bankit-FTV and Toniolo (reported in Jorda-Schularick-Taylor 
Macrohistory Database). 
 
Table B.1.1: Abbreviations (Countries/Sectors) 
Countries Sectors 
ARG Argentina 0 Food and live animals 
AUT Austria-Hungary 1 Beverages and tobacco 
BEL Belgium 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
CHE Switzerland 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials 
DEU Germany 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes 
FRA France 5 Chemicals and related products, 
n.e.s. 
GBR Great Britain 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by material 
NLD the Netherlands 7 Machinery and transport equipment 
RUS Russia 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
USA United States of 
America 
9 Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere in the SITC 
Source: Author’s elaboration  
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Table B.1.2: Summary statistics for the main variables 
VARIABLES Description and sources N mean sd min max 
Market Entry 
(ME) 
Binary variable that takes the 
value of either 0 (“no entry”) or 1 
(“entry”), conditional to “no entry” 
in t-1 
 
       = 
(        	 |        	    = 0) 
 
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
229,320 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Market Entry and 
Persistence 
(MEP) 
Binary variable that takes the 
value of either 0 (“no entry”) or 1 
(“entry”), regardless of its value in 
previous time 
229,320 0.32 0.47 0 1 
lndist 
Logarithm of the distance 
between countries  
CEPII GeoDist Database 
229,320 7.47 0.87 6.54 9.32 
GS 
Dummy variable for dyads, which 
takes value 1 when both 
countries are on gold standard 
(for Italy it is considered the 
period de facto, following 
Cesarano et al., 2012), and 0 
otherwise 
229,320 0.38 0.49 0 1 
lnGDPGDP 
Logarithm of the sum of exporter 
and importer GDP 
Maddison Project Database 
216,090 11.6 0.60 10.54 13.31 
ABSdiffGDPpc 
Difference between exporter and 
importer GDP per capita (in 
absolute terms) 
Author’s elaboration on 
Maddison Project Database 
210,357 -0.70 0.54 -4.64 0.17 
DExpAllMark 
Growth rate of exports to country 
j between time t and t-1 
(excluding product p) 
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
220,500 0.04 0.42 -5.86 4.29 
LNMarket 
Variable indicating the number of 
markets in which the product is 
present 
(time t-1) 
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
224,910 3.70 2.72 0 10 
DLnproddest 
 
 
Variable indicating the lagged 
difference between the total 
number of products exported to 
destination j (time t-1) 
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
 
 
 
200,500 3.52 12.68 -95 52 
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Exp_Sect_Spill 
Variable which measures the 
number of products pertaining to 
the same sector (SITC 3-digit 
level) exported in country j (time t-
1) (see next section for more 
details)  
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
224,910 0.82 1.24 0 6 
Exp_Sect_Spill_2 
Exp_Sect_Spill squared (time t-1) 
(see next section for more details)  
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
224,910 2.20 5.07 0 36 
Imp_Sect_Spill 
Growth rate of imports of product 
p between time t and t-1 
 (see next section for more 
details)  
Author’s elaboration on Bankit-
FTV Database 
220,500 0.14 3.36 -21.47 20.77 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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B.2 
Figure B.2.1: Gruppo Montecatini, production structure by sector and product 
 
 
 
Source: Vito (1930) 
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ADDENDUM 2 
_______________________________________________ 
Addendum to Chapter 2 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
This addendum provides a short summary of the major qualitative 
sources and information concerning the firm and business 
structure in Italy (1862-1913). 
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The aim of this short addendum is to provide a sense of what firm and industry 
level structure may have facilitate the diffusion of the “spillover effects” described in 
the main text. However, the nature and the depth of the information gathered may 
only be interpreted as anecdotal evidence, but of certain value added. 
The idea is to give a general overview of the most relevant cases found in the 
secondary literature, which include a wide and diverse range of products and firms. 
For example, the internationalization process of the Pecorino Romano (a 
recognised quality of cheese that still exists nowadays) in the United States may be 
a meaningful example to understand how these forces may have worked. Pecorino 
Romano was exported for the first time in 1884. Operations were managed by a 
group of Tuscan enterprises that were previously in trade, prevalently dealing with 
olive oil, and suddenly decided – due to the increasing demand coming from the 
destination country partly related to the growing number of Italian immigrants, and 
exploiting their pre-existent commercial networks (Stanziani, 2010) – to undertake 
the same operations with cheeses, mainly Pecorino Maremmano, and Pecorino 
Romano, as a result of the limited production of the former (Olmeo, 2013). 
Pecorino was not alone. A considerable number of (products and) firms where 
involved in wholesale trade as intermediaries. This is testified by the data contained 
in Imita.db, a database collecting information on Italian joint stock companies’ 
individual balance sheets and boards’ members (Giannetti and Vasta, 2006).58 
Indeed, in 1913 there were a total of 90 listed companies in the sector of “trade 
intermediaries and wholesalers” (division 51 as for Istat code).59  
Figure ADD.2.1 shows the repartition of this companies at the group level. It 
emerges a majority of companies operating in wholesale trade for non-agricultural 
intermediate products (36), final consumption goods (24), and trade intermediaries 
(11).  
  
                                                          
58 For more information about the database, see http://imitadb.unisi.it/. 
59 Some of them were active in more than one subsector, so when performing the analysis at the 
sub-division level (“group”), I obtain a total of 95 observations. 
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Figure ADD.2.1 Italian trade intermediaries and wholesalers’ joint stock companies, by 
sector (number of companies at Istat code “group” level), 1913. 
   
Source: Author’s elaboration on Imita.db 
Delving into the information contained in Imita.db, I found some names that are 
also object of analysis in other secondary sources.  
For example, the “Enrico Dell’Acqua” enterprise was specialized in exporting 
textile products. Based in Lombardy, it began to export to pre-unitary Italian 
southern states during the pre-unification period, and using the knowledge of such 
experience, it decided to focus on Spain and North Africa during the 1880s, with 
adverse results. As a consequence, it (successfully) turned to Latin America 
countries, and in particular Argentina (Spadoni, 2000).  
Another example are the trade intermediaries based in Sicily. The Messina-
based English merchants Sanderson and Oates, and the US firms Gardner & Rose 
and Marston & Co. – just to name a few among the relatively close circle of large 
merchants – were some of the most important stakeholders. These trade networks 
relied on trust and personal relations as a manner of risk minimization (Lupo, 1987; 
Battaglia, 2003; Stanziani, 2010). Within a broader perspective, Roy (2014) 
acknowledges the presence in Italy since its unification of a set of international trade 
intermediaries (e.g. Volkart’s family business, which established a subsidiary in Italy) 
promoting the country involvement within the ramifications of the international trade 
network, with “a high degree of mobility, institutional adaptation, and mainly focused 
on commodity trading. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the 19th century, in some of the areas and sectors 
of the Italian economy intermediaries were increasingly challenged by entrepreneurs 
and regarded as “speculators”. This hostile environment led to the diffusion of 
alternative organizational structures, known as “cooperatives”: centralised trade 
institutions that offered to enterprises the facilitation of their export activities and 
(often) fixed prices on their products, in exchange of some privileges (often the 
monopoly on the sale management of the enterprises) (Lupo, 1993). Arrangements 
were comparable to cartels (or consortia, depending on the case) and were active 
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both in agriculture and industry. Stringher (1905) provides a detailed description of 
the associations, cooperatives, consortia that had been found in Italy by that time. 
In many of the cases cited (i.a. “Federazione italiana dei Consorzi agrari”; “Consorzio 
agrario cooperativo parmense”; “Società fra I mercanti di campagna e gli esercenti 
industria Agricola e armentizia nell’Agro romano e provincia”) their foundational 
statutes directly include reference to “facilitate” and “participate in” the exporting 
activities of single business members.60 Similar cases also existed for foreign owned 
enterprises (see below). 
Italian economic and business history is also rich of cases that show how firms 
developed along the lines of technology and innovation, foreign capital (including 
human capital) attraction, and infrastructural improvement, as means of boosting 
and diversifying bilateral sector exports. Dettori et al. (2001) describe the case of 
raw cork and corks. Right after the Italian unification, their production flourished in 
Sardinia, to be almost entirely exported to France and Spain. The sector success 
promoted progresses in the know-how and technology used. As a consequence, 
in 1883 the industry expanded to artisanal artefacts made by cork. In Tuscany 
instead, straw – and particularly straw hats – managed to become the main local 
manufacture thanks to foreign demand, predominantly from US, where such goods 
were particular appealing to Italian immigrants. In the 1880s, the stakeholders 
involved in this business achieved to export 8 million units, growing to 10 million 
units by 1913 (Belfanti, 1995). In Veneto, wool producers contributed to the 
expansion of exports. Marzotto, one of the main firm in the area, started exporting 
at the end of the 1880s. However, it began its internationalization not with finite 
goods (i.e. textiles), but with industrial filament yarns, and expanded only later to a 
range of different products (Roverato, 2001). Its main competitor, Lanificio Rossi, 
based its export strategy on technology, organization, and human capital. It 
managed to implement an early introduction of steam machines, to decentralise 
production, to provide access to business and educational trips in foreign countries 
(mainly Britain), and to recruit foreigners for middle management positions (Felice, 
2011; Fontana, 1995). 
Finally, multinational corporations and foreign owned companies attracted a lot 
of research interest, possibly due to a better preservation and access to their 
archives, and brought Italian business history to focus on the corresponding sectors 
such as metal (e.g. steel) and chemical industries. Montecatini was by far the main 
actor in the latter, and its history has been reconstructed in detail by Amatori and 
Bezza (1990), Zamagni (1990) and Perugini (2014). In particular, Zamagni (1990) 
provided a detailed overview, describing the sector as de facto dominated by a 
small number of big foreign (multinational) companies, and numerous secondary 
actors unable to effectively compete for an equal market share, as certified by the 
                                                          
60 For more details on agricultural associations, cooperatives and consortia, see Coletti (1905). 
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estimated Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) for “chemical products” (0,18 – more 
than moderate concentration) in Giannetti et al. (1996).61 Multinationals played an 
important role in the transformation and diversification of the sector, particularly 
promoting the production of fertilizers and other goods based on pyrite, sulphuric 
acid and superphosphates, and in rescuing – at least partially – old activities that 
suffered a protracted crisis, such it happened with the Anglo-Sicilian Sulphur 
Company, which brought together industrialists and entrepreneurs instituting a 
monopsonic market structure (for more details see above on intermediaries) 
(Nicolini, 1989; Lupo, 1993). Such dynamics were also present in the textile 
industry. For the case of cotton, A’Hearn (1998) provides a magnificent example on 
how the sector attracted foreign experts. Camis and Lattes (1884) instead provide 
a useful collection of examples in the mining, quarrying and related sectors. 
Discussing the beginning of asbestos-based products manufacturing, they 
acknowledged that it was both the fruit of foreign intellect and that it was an export-
oriented production: “The industry in Italy was started by the Marquis of Bavaria, which 
extracted the mineral in the provinces of Sondrio and Turin, working it in a small factory in 
Rome […]. Later, that company sold the quarries and factories to the Tursi company, with 
five million equity, who moved the production to Tivoli, and created recently the “Società 
anonima per l’escavazione e lavorazione dell’amianto in Italia” (The United asbestos 
Company), merging with the English company “The Italo-English asbestos Co. limited”, 
based in Turin, and “The patent asbestos manufacture Co.”, from Glasgow, the latter 
limiting its functions to the exports of the raw material to process it in Scotland”. 62 
“In the meantime, arose other companies and private merchants in Turin, 
Nole, Genoa, Chiavenna, and Milan, dedicating themselves to the 
complete industry of quarrying and working asbestos, to working only or, 
finally, to exporting the raw material only.”63 
“the main consumption happens in England, United States, Germany and 
Belgium, servicing the big steam machines of the navy, the general public 
                                                          
61 In 1861 the sector provided employment for almost 2900 people (De Carli, 1939, cited in Nicolini, 
1989). Approximately 30% were working in companies related to the production of waxes, oils and 
matches, another 30% in salts and iodine products, 16% in soaps and candles, very active in 
exporting different product varieties. The rest were distributed among acid minerals, sodas, 
explosives, colouring agents, glues, paints and amids. 
62 In Italian in the original: “L'industria in Italia venne iniziata dal marchese di Baviera che escavava il 
minerale nelle provincie di Sondrio e Torino, per lavorarlo in un piccolo opificio a Roma [....].Più tardi 
questa ditta cedette cave e stabilimenti alla ditta Tursi, che trasporta tutta la fabbricazione a Tivoli, e 
che ha creato recentemente con capitale di cinque milioni la Società anonima per l'escavazione e 
lavorazione dell' amianto in Italia (The United asbestos Company) fondendosi colla ditta inglese The 
Italo-English asbestos Co.: limited, che aveva sede ed opificio a Torino, e coll'altra The patent 
asbestos manufatcture Co. di Glascow, la quale ultima si limitava all'esportazione del minerale 
greggio per lavorarlo in Iscozia.” 
63 In Italian in the original: “Sorsero nel frattempo a Torino, a Nole, a Genova, Chiavenna e Milano 
altre società e privati, che si occuparono dell'industria completa dell'escavo e lavorazione dell' 
amianto, o della semplice lavorazione, od infine del solo commercio di esportazione del minerale 
greggio”. 
 98 
 
and locomotive industry, in such a way that almost the total amount of 
production is exported.”64 
(p.58, emphasis added) 
The authors describe a similar narrative for the case of raw sulphur, refined 
sulphur and, more in general, sulphur-related products. 
On the same line, Vito (1930) elaborated a study on the diffusion of industrial 
groups, agreements and cartels, a phenomenon that previously capture the 
attention of many scholars, such as Flora (1900), Cossa (1900), Pantaleoni (1903), 
Cassola (1904), Bozzini (1906), and Airoldi (1909). The growing importance in Italy 
of such business structures is well underlined in the introduction of the book, which 
describes the expansion – even though limited in size with respect to leading nations 
such as US and Germany – since the end of the 19th century. Even if it refers to a 
later period (interwar), the book provides a set of useful illustration – reported below 
and to be intended as anecdotal evidence – on how the existence and proliferation 
of multinational companies, industrial groups, etc. may have helped spillovers to 
develop, due to both the production and company structure. The first mechanism 
will rely to the production of similar products which will benefit of the same, firm-
level, network for exports. The second instead will rely either on a centralised 
management of different companies, which may impose similar exporting 
techniques or provide centralised structure for channelling product to foreign 
countries, or the centralised ownership of an international network of firms, 
promoting intra-industry trade (Figure ADD.2.2 on Gruppo Italgas, Figure ADD.2.3. 
on Edison, and Figure ADD.2.4 on A.K.U. refer to a later period, but serve the 
purpose of exemplification). 
  
                                                          
64 In Italian in the original: “il consumo principale viene fatto in Inghilterra, Stati Uniti, Germania e 
Belgio, per servizio delle grandi macchine a vapore della marina, dei privati e delle locomotive, in 
modo che quasi tutta la produzione viene esportata.” 
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Figure ADD.2.2: Gruppo Italgas, company structure by firm controlled 
 
Source: Vito (1930) 
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Figure ADD.2.3: Società Generale Italiana Edison di Elettricità,company structure by sector 
of operation and firm controlled 
 
 
Source: Vito (1930) 
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Figure ADD.2.4: Gruppo internazionale seta artificiale – A.K.U., company structure by firm 
controlled and city of operation 
 
 
Source: Vito (1930) 
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CHAPTER 3 
_______________________________________________ 
Staying dry on Spanish wine: the rejection of the 1905 
Spanish-Italian trade agreement 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Jacopo Timini* 
 
Abstract 
 
On 17 December 1905 the Italian Parliament rejected to ratify the 
Spanish-Italian trade agreement signed by the Italian government 
one month earlier, on a diatribe related to the lowering of wine 
import tariffs. This decision left the two countries without a bilateral 
treaty for an entire decade. In the literature, broader political issues 
and local interests are alternatively indicated as the main drivers of 
treaty rejection. Based on a manually assembled database which 
collect economic and political variables, including MPs personal 
features, and using a probit model, this chapter provides a 
quantitative analysis of the vote. Results show that it is not possible 
to discard that local interest, proxied by wine production, had a role 
in the rejection of the bilateral trade agreement. 
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3.1 Introduction 
International trade is firmly embedded in a dense network of multilateral and 
bilateral agreements whose aim is to promote economic integration beyond national 
borders. However, this phenomenon is related to a specific historical process and 
the development of a precise institutional context, which repeatedly overcame very 
diverse resistances but is not immutable (Newman et al., 2006). Its intertwinement 
with the political reality has become evident both in policy-making and academia. 
Indeed, at the 2018 World Economic Forum in Davos, European and other world 
leaders (e.g. Canada, India, Brazil, etc.) have openly shown their worries for the 
rising trend in protectionism (ANSA, 2018). Nevertheless, attempts at reverting the 
international economic integration process (the so-called “economic globalization”, 
see i.a. Benedek, De Feyter and Marrella, 2007) are not new in history. For example, 
during the first globalization – an episode of increasing economic integration during 
the 19th century closely related to a extraordinary fall in trade costs, both in terms 
of trade policy related instruments (i.e. tariffs) and transport (Jacks, Meissner and 
Novy, 2010) – resistances did not take long to emerge. Indeed, by the end of the 
1870s, protectionism was again a la mode: starting with the infamous German “iron 
and rye” tariff of 1879, the European continent (and beyond) witnessed a trend of 
increasing trade protection, through the means of unilateral or bilateral actions 
(Simmons, 2006). 
The 1905 rejection of the Spanish-Italian trade agreement by the Italian 
Parliament is an event that may be an outstanding example of the protectionism 
rejuvenation during the first globalization. Indeed, in the context of a changing 
international environment, with the signature of new treaties with Austria-Hungary 
(1904), Switzerland (1904) and Germany (1904), the Italian authorities felt that, after 
a rapidly increasing bilateral trade deficit, it was the time to adapt and update the 
trade treaty with Spain. Therefore, as foreseen in the 1892 modus vivendi (a 
provisional trade agreement), they denounced the bilateral agreement and opened 
a six-month window for negotiations. After endless discussions between the 
delegations, the agreement reached, signed by the Italian government on 
November 8, 1905 included a drastic cut on tariffs for wine imports. In a heated 
political and social context, the Parliament voted on it on December 17, 1905. The 
roll-call vote was split in two: the first vote was, strictly speaking, a confidence vote 
on the government. The second vote, held during the same session, was set to 
decide the approval or rejection of the trade treaty. This rare case allows, at least to 
a certain extent, to separate the two issue and to fully exploit the variation between 
the two votes. However, so far, the historiography did not treated the issue in detail 
– with the exception of Garcia Sanz (1993) who reconstructed the Parliamentary 
debate within the wider perspective of the Spanish-Italian diplomatic relations. Few 
authors, however, mentioned the failure of the agreement and related it to alternative 
narratives: on one side Lupo (1998) associates it to the successful lobbying of local 
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interests, namely those stakeholders associated with wine production, whereas 
Orsina (2002) and Tomasoni (2011) propend to highlight the wider political 
framework, such as the interests in opposing or supporting the government and the 
President of the Council of Ministers Alessandro Fortis. If only broader political 
factors determined the results of the vote(s), wine production (which I use as a proxy 
for identifying local interests, i.e. the available data do not allow to disentangle 
between special and constituency interests) should be orthogonal to the voting 
patterns. 
In addition, this chapter provides the opportunity to analyse an important public 
policy decision in a period where organized interests, such as trade, business and 
industry associations, started to actively participate in the policy-making process. 
To summarize, in this chapter I exploit a unique database, manually assembled 
from a variety of primary and secondary sources, to analyse a rare roll-call vote on 
a failed attempt to ratify an international trade treaty lowering tariffs, and in particular 
tariffs on wine. I aim to shed some light on the determinants of MPs vote decision. 
Particularly, the objective is to capture whether Italian MPs responded to local 
interests, while controlling for other possible elements that may have influenced the 
vote. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follow: Section 3.2 provides a brief 
literature review delving into political economy and vote choice determinants, with 
particular attention to international trade treaties; Section 3.3 describes the historical 
context in which the rejection of the treaty matured; Section 3.4 illustrates the data 
sources and the methodology used; Section 3.5 interprets the results; and Section 
3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
At least since Hobbes’ most famous book, “Leviathan”, a buoyant part of the 
literature has developed with the aim of understanding the nature of public 
institutions, and their role in shaping and connecting economic and political 
dimensions. Indeed, the vision of the government as a benevolent maximizer of 
social welfare has been gradually giving way to alternative explanations of 
government actions (sensu lato can be referred to public institutions as above), 
where “special interests” – related to both rent-seeking/interest groups models and 
constituent interest models (Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Malcolm, 2017) – influence 
the outcome, and the government (as any forms of organization) may experience 
failures, deviating from possible social optima (see i.a. Grossman and Helpman, 
2001; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Williamson, 1996). Within the political economy 
literature, four strands of research are particularly relevant for this chapter. 
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The first deals with “pork-barrell politics” and the allocation of public investment 
and social spending: political economy incentives would distort public investment 
from its optimal distribution, towards a mechanism targeting special interest groups 
(and/or constituents more broadly) as primary beneficiaries. Results of previous 
elections, members of the Parliament’s (MPs) experience, as well as other personal 
features, and political parties’ characteristics are among the relevant determinants 
for the geographical distribution of public investment (see e.g. Golden and Picci, 
2008; Maskin and Tirole, 2014; Rodriguez-Pose, Psycharis and Tselios, 2016; 
Limosani and Navarra, 2001; Fiva and Halse, 2016; Curto-Grau, Herranz-Loncán 
and Solé-Ollé, 2012; Bugarin and Marciniuk, 2017). 
The second strand focuses on the geographical differences in vote patterns, 
operationalized mainly at the constituency level (e.g. Lampe and Sharp, 2014; 
Gawande and Krishna, 2003; Fernandez, 2016). Particular attention has been 
devoted to elections polarised on specific trade issues (see Irwin, 1994; Mayda and 
Rodrik; 2005; Yu, 2009; Clarke et al., 2017; Lehmann, 2010; Lehmann and 
Volckart, 2010; to see examples of election results driven by wider economic issues 
see Gregor, 2015; Hodgson, 2012) or referendums held on trade agreements 
(Urbatsch, 2013), to extrapolate the economic, political and social determinants of 
electoral support, to measure the intensity and role of electorate mobilization (new 
vs. floating voters) and, eventually, the role of special interest groups in influencing 
election results and, consequently, in shaping the composition of national legislative 
institutions. 
The third strand is related to the understanding of the “do ut des” strategies 
within the corridors of the Parliaments: log-rolling (or “vote-trading”) is identified as 
a constraining issue affecting politicians’ choices and, therefore, their votes (Coates 
and Munger, 1995). Nevertheless, the intrinsic difficulties in properly identifying “log-
rolling” limited the number of empirical studies on this subject (Irwin, 1994; Irwin and 
Kroszner, 1996; Stratmann, 1992; Stratmann, 1995; Esteves and Geisler-
Mesevage, 2017). 
However, log-rolling is only one of the many causes affecting Parliaments’ 
voting outcomes: some research (the fourth relevant strand) expands the study of 
MPs’ vote choices, focusing on other factors, including party affiliation, MPs’ 
ideology, experience and other personal features, levels of political support, 
constituent preferences, and special interests considerations (e.g. Hix and Noury, 
2016; Russell and Cowley, 2015; Levitt, 1996; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). A 
consistent part of this literature relates to trade policy (e.g. Malcolm, 2017; Fordham 
and McKeown, 2003; Weller, 2009; Choi, 2015; Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Tosini 
and Tower; 1987; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006; Schonhardt-Bailey, 1991; Erlich, 2007; 
Erlich, 2009; Xie, 2006; Galantucci, 2013; Willmann, 2003; Conybeare, 1991; 
Hansen, 1990; Marks, 1993; Nollen and Iglars, 1990; Nollen and Quinn, 1994; 
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Kamdar and Gonzalez, 1998; Conconi, Facchini and Zanardi, 2014; Kalt, 1988; 
Boadu and Thompson, 1993; Kang and Greene, 1997; Rodrik, 2018) or “single-
issue” politics (e.g. Poelmans et al.; 2018). 
In absence of direct industry contribution data (for example to political campaign 
of single MPs, see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Gilbert and Oladi, 2012), it 
is a hard task to empirically disentangle between constituent-related interest or rent-
seeking actions related to special interest group pressures. Therefore, this chapter 
will focus on understanding whether the members of the Italian Parliament acted 
following economic interests present in their electoral districts, i.e. what I call “local 
economic interests”, when they tumbled the international trade agreement between 
Italy and Spain, on the 17th December 1905, rather than disentangling the nature 
of the incentives generating these behaviours. This will help to shed some light on 
the historiographical debate. Moreover, it will also help to understand the drivers of 
an important public policy decision in a period where organized interests, such as 
trade, business and industry associations, started to actively participate in the 
policy-making process. 
The chapter also adds to the knowledge of these processes in a peripheral 
country during the first wave of globalization. Indeed, with the exception of Fiorino 
and Ricciuti (2008), whose analysis focuses on the role of interest group in shaping 
public spending at the national level (using time series econometrics), and Curto-
Grau, Herranz-Loncán and Solé-Ollé (2012), explaining the influence of 
parliamentary representation on infrastructure spending in Spain, quantitative 
researchers concentrated – to the best of my knowledge – on the European core 
(i.e. mainly Britain and France) or on the US. Finally, this chapter also relates to the 
vast literature analysing the course of Italian tariffs (e.g. Coppa, 1970; Federico and 
Vasta, 2015; Tena Junguito, 2010a; Tena Junguito, 2010b; James and O’ Rourke, 
2011; Federico and Tena, 1998; Federico and Tena, 1999). 
 
3.3 Historical context 
At the beginning of 1905, trade relations between Spain and Italy were 
governed by a provisional trade agreement – a modus vivendi – signed and ratified 
in 1892, where Italy undertook to apply to Spain tariffs as determined by its 
international treaties concluded with Austria-Hungary (1891), Germany (1891), and 
Switzerland (1892). However, they explicitly agreed that no further reduction in 
tariffs, eventually stipulated by Italy in a bilateral trade agreement with a third party 
would have been extended to Spanish imports. So, for example, the reduction in 
tariffs for wine negotiated in a separate clause with Austria-Hungary (slightly below 
6 Italian lire per hectolitre, from the initial level of 20), or in another trade treaty with 
Greece (1899, down to 12 Italian lire), had no effects for Spanish products. On the 
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other side, Spain agreed to grant to Italy its conventional tariff, without any further 
restriction, and all the benefits deriving from the bilateral treaties signed with the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The parliamentary debate on the 
modus vivendi was, as will happen later in 1905, concentrated on wine (Chamber 
of Deputies, 1892). While acknowledging that it was highly unlikely that Spanish 
wine would be able to successfully compete with Italian wines in Italy, most of the 
interventions argued in favour of maintaining prudence. Jannuzzi’s speech (a MP 
elected in Apulia, where wine producers were especially hostile to the treaty) 
perfectly exemplify the Chamber’s feelings: 
“I also pray the government to pay attention, when he will 
negotiate the trade treaty with Spain, to save us from any far 
danger related to the competition coming from Spanish wines. 
It is true that, few days ago, we have widely proven that there is 
no serious fear of competition in Italy including from the Spanish 
side, but government prudence requires that, in renewing the 
treaty, all diligent precautions shall be used” 
(Jannuzzi, Chamber of Deputies, 1892)65 
 
The government, to avoid “interrupting trade relations” (Chamber of Deputies, 
1892)66 with Spain, followed the precept of excluding wine from the final version of 
modus vivendi. From 1892, the agreement was extended three times, twice in 1893 
and once in 1894 (Chamber of Deputies, 1893, 1894).  
However, with an increasingly protectionist international environment, and the 
new treaties stipulated with, inter alia, Austria-Hungary (1904), Switzerland (1904) 
and Germany (1904), Italy denounced the modus vivendi in May 1905, opening a 
six-month window for negotiations. The 1892 labelling of wine as a “very sensible 
issue” for a trade treaty between Italy and Spain was not considered this time, for 
conflicting interests between the two countries: the agreement signed by the 
Government in November of the same year included a cut in wine tariffs of the order 
of 40%, passing from 20 to 12 liras. However, the tariff still constituted the 60% of 
the average price of imported products (20 liras). 
In December of the same year, the agreement was presented at the Chamber 
of Deputies in a tense political and social climate. Press of the time widely reported 
on the agreement. “La Stampa” – one of the main Italian newspapers, published in 
                                                          
65 Italian in the original: “Rivolgo anch'io la preghiera al Governo, di badare quando negozierà il 
trattato di commercio con la Spagna, di salvarci da qualsiasi lontano pericolo di concorrenza 
spagnuola pei vini. È vero che abbiamo, pochi giorni or sono, largamente dimostrato che pei vini non 
vi ha serio timore di concorrenza in Italia anche per parte della Spagna; ma prudenza di Governo 
esige che, nel rinnovare il trattato, si usino tutte le diligenti precauzioni.” 
66 The sentence was pronounced by Brin, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, while 
discussing the approval of modus vivendi. 
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Turin, Piedmont, a region where wine producers were among the most hostile 
groups to the agreement – dedicated almost an article a day to the issue, since few 
days after the signature until the Parliamentary discussion (more than one month). 
For example, on November 26, the newspaper published at the centre of its cover 
page the article: “Rising tension against the modus vivendi with Spain”.67 In the 
article, the journalist describes as “sure” the approval of the agreement, providing 
however prima facie evidence of the rising social tensions, with street protests and 
the organization of meetings, debates, conventions on the issue by local Chambers 
of commerce, agricultural and other local associations. Indeed, as thoroughly 
analyzed in Federico and Martinelli (2018), wine was a big issue in Italy at the turn 
of the century: it represented 22% of the gross value added of agricultural output, 
approximately 8% of total GDP, and 11% of total private consumption.  The 
parliamentary debate started on the 11th December in a heated political climate, and 
lasted 7 days. Wine was undoubtedly the main subject of the debate (see Garcia 
Sanz, 1993, for more details on the Parliamentary debate). Importantly, it was 
remarked the difficult situation of the European wine markets, with the 
discriminatory trade policy implemented by France by the end of the phylloxera 
plague in the 1890s: France favoured Algerian wine imports over the rest, therefore 
reducing both imports from Spain and Italy (Meloni and Swinnen, 2018). It was 
argued that Spanish exporters found their way in third countries (e.g. Austria-
Hungary, Switzerland) with important presence of Italian exporters, gaining market 
share. As a consequence, Italians started to increasingly fear Spanish competition 
(Pinilla and Ayuda, 2002). 
When the long debate came to an end, six days after, the Government was 
asked to face a confidence vote. As in other institutional frameworks, the Italian 
Parliamentary rules allowed for the possibility of such vote as a way of requesting 
the Parliament to critically examine and vote on Government conduct and actions, 
de facto binding Government survival to the result of the vote. For the objective of 
this chapter, the most important characteristics of the confidence vote on the 
government are two: the first, general, consists in the roll call nature of the voting 
procedure. The second, specific to this vote, is the split of the agenda (“ordine del 
giorno”) in two, consequently having two separate votes. The first vote is to be 
interpreted as a confidence vote sensu stricto, as the Chamber was called to 
express its opinion on the following sentence: “The Chamber, confirming its 
confidence in the Government’s policy”, whereas the second regarded the trade 
agreement, as “[the Parliament] moves on to the discussion of the article”. The 
government gained the confidence vote with 253 votes in favour and 190 against, 
whereas it lost the vote on the trade agreement with only 135 votes in favour and a 
total of 293 votes against. 
                                                          
67 In Italian in the original: “La crescente agitazione contro il “modus vivendi” colla Spagna”. 
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As a consequence, the bill that should have validated the November 18 Royal 
Decree n.548 on the application of the provisional trade agreement between Italy 
and Spain was rejected on December 17, 1905. Therefore, since December 18, 
Spanish products entering the Italian territory were subject to the general tariff and 
forbidden to use free warehouses. On the other hand, the Spanish Royal Order of 
December 20 established that Italian products imported in Spain would have been 
subjected to the general tariff. Additionally, the same Royal Order obliged custom 
officers to “accurately check” the origin of products (by the mean of analysing the 
corresponding necessary documents), with particular attention to those exempted 
from the “justification of origin”. The aim was to avoid Italian products to enjoy 
advantages conceded to other nations “by the means of a trade treaty” (Chamber 
of Commerce in Milan, 1907). This situation lasted for almost ten years, until 1914, 
when the two nations reached a new trade agreement,68 this time excluding wine. 
Finally, I should add few words on the Italian electoral system, and on the reason 
why I expect to see some linkages between the MPs and the respective local 
interests. Since the approval of the Law n. 210 (5 May 1891), Italy had a single-
member constituency system, which traditionally promotes the ties between the MP 
elected in a constituency and the local (economic) interests, as the election of the 
former is very likely to be influenced by the electoral choices of the latter (Finelli, 
2000; Fruci and Finelli, 2000). In line with most of other countries of the time, the 
law did not enact universal suffrage, but limited voting rights to males above 21 
years of age, with a primary school certificate or a certain level of census instead. 
This restricted the electorate to approximately 2,5 million people, only 7% of total 
population (ICSMC, 1946), but almost 30% of male population above 21 years of 
age (Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, 1900), 5 times more the 
population with the right to vote when the Kingdom of Italy was created in 1861. As 
in early 20th century wine production in Italy was fragmented across a myriad of 
small farms (Federico and Martinelli, 2018), the expansion of political rights may 
have strengthened the influence of local interests, as wine producers may have 
gained the right to vote, initially even more restricted to the economic elites. 
  
                                                          
68 The 1914 agreement was not an insignificant change in the trade relations for the two countries. 
The Milan Chamber of Commerce Archive contains various letters from different firms (for example, 
La “Cooperativa Aste Dorate”, part of the firm “P.tro Presbitero & Figli”, producing frames and other 
wood products) requesting information on whether or not the 1914 trade agreement had already 
entered into force (Section III, Box N. 178: “Commercio Estero – A – Trattati e Legislazione – Iº – 
Trattati di commercio – Spagna”). 
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3.4 Methodology and Data 
 
3.4.1 Empirical strategy 
The aim of the study is to capture the influence of alternative indicators of local 
interests, measured by wine production (or per capita wine production), on voting 
against the trade agreement or in switching vote between the two votes on the 
issues discussed in the Parliamentary agenda, i.e. voting in favour of stating the 
“confidence on the Government”, but against the trade agreement approval. In both 
cases, the dependent variable is a dichotomous (“yea” or “nay”) variable. Thus, I 
follow and adapt Malcolm (2017) and Poelmans et al. (2018), using a probit model 
to analyse MPs’ voting pattern. Operationally, the probit model is specified as follow: 
        /     ℎ  =    +         +   ′   +      +     
where the dependent variable is either “No Trade” or “Switch”. In the first case (“No 
Trade”), I take as a reference group the whole set of MPs present during the voting 
session, and recorded their votes on the trade agreement (the second vote of the 
session), independently of the confidence vote (the first vote of the session). 
“NoTrade” takes the value of one when the MP “i” voted against the trade 
agreement and zero when he voted in favour or abstained.69 In the second case, 
(“Switch”) I created a subset, retaining only those MPs that voted “yea” to the 
confidence vote on government. Indeed, MPs that voted against the government 
may well have done so for political reasons, and their vote on the trade agreement 
may be influenced by other political considerations. On the other hand, it can also 
be the case that MPs from constituencies most affected by the agreement wanted 
to make sure to manifest their dissenting voting against both issues in the agenda. 
Therefore, to address potential concerns in using the trade vote only, I use “Switch” 
to disentangle the effects of switching from being in favour of the government to be 
against the trade agreement, having as a reference group those MPs that were in 
favour of both issues. 
Wine is the variable of interest. The aim is to represent the MP local interests 
(due to data limitation is practically impossible to disentangle constituency interests 
from rent-seeking actions related to special interest group pressures; for the sake 
of simplicity I use “local interests” only throughout the chapter). I adopt two different 
measures: total production of wine (expressed in hectolitres) in a province k, or the 
total production of wine in a province k, divided by the correspondent population 
(i.e. wine production per capita). As data is only available at the provincial level, I 
follow Golden and Picci (2008) in “propagating the values of variables available in 
larger units across the smaller subunits” (p.19). In this case, I propagate provincial 
                                                          
69 Only two MPs abstained. 
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values to different constituencies. The main reasons for doing that is to avoid losing 
variance at a smaller geographical unit in the dependent variable. However, as this 
is an issue of foremost importance, I also perform a set of robustness tests 
aggregating the dependent variable at the provincial level, calculating, in the spirit 
of Curto-Grau et al. (2012), the percentage of MPs that voted against within each 
province. 
 ′    is a vector of control variables. It includes MPs personal features such as 
whether or not his principal occupation outside the Parliament was related to 
agriculture, to control for potential personal economic incentives; a dummy that 
reflects party affiliation, i.e. whether or not the MP belongs to the same party of the 
President of the Council of Ministers. If this is the case, it is likely that voting against 
the government implies higher political costs (even if, in the Kingdom of Italy before 
WWI, governments received support mostly from across-the-board formed 
majorities),70 and his political support within the constituency. I combine the share 
of actual voters over the total electorate, as the phenomenon of the abstention was 
widespread (i.e. participation ranged 60%, ICSMC, 1947), and the share of votes 
the candidate received. The idea is that the lower the margins of victory, the more 
limited the room for an MP to support controverted issues, because lower is the 
number of votes the MP may afford to lose to regain next elections. Additionally, I 
include a proxy for MP ideology, a relevant issue in the literature, and in line with 
Jackson et al. (1992), Levitt (1996), Burden et al. (2000) and Griffin (2008). To 
adequately capture “ideology”, I use the vote on one of the approved agendas 
during the discussions for the confidence vote on the government led by Tommaso 
Tittoni. Tittoni was preceded by Giovanni Giolitti’s government, who suddenly 
resigned, adducing health problems. The government led by Giolitti was expression 
of a liberal approach to key issues such as social conflict, strike and other workers’ 
rights, etc.. The sessions evolved in a heated parliament debate, with interventions 
in support and against the creation of the new Tittoni government. However, the 
final vote was divided in two, the first part on the “pure and simple” support to the 
government (160 votes in favour, 281 against), and the second on the support to 
the “liberal ideology” promoted in the “manifesto” of the last general elections.71 
Even if it is not a perfect measure of “ideology”, arguably it is the best way to control 
for it in a context of limited access to MP voting records. Additionally, I also control 
for the MPs experience in government, coding the number of times MPs have been 
appointed for any role in the government. Finally, I control for the change in GDP 
per capita (1881-1901): MPs from regions that grew more during a period of 
                                                          
70 For further details on this issue, see Banti (1989), Banti (1996), Fruci (2000), Fruci (2002), Lupo 
(1998). 
71 In Italian in the original: “La Camera affermando che si deve continuare l’indirizzo di politica liberale 
che costituì il programma delle ultime elezioni generali ed ebbe anche sanzioni dalla maggioranza di 
questa assemblea passa all’ordine del giorno” (Atti Parlamentari, 24 March 1905, p.1674). 
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increasing economic integration (despite the widespread raise in trade 
protectionism) are expected to be the most prone to support trade agreements. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the main variables 
 VARIABLES Description and sources  N mean  sd min max 
Trade_vote 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi voted 
“no” to the trade agreement (Atti 
Parlamentari, 1905) 
428 0.315 0.465 0 1 
Switch_vote 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi voted 
“yes” in the (first part of the) 
confidence vote, but “no” to the 
trade agreement (Atti Parlamentari, 
1905) 
240 0.454 0.499 0 1 
Wine 
Wine production within province k, 
average 1901-1905 (Istat, 1908) 
428 639084 563229 25700 2522000 
Wine_pc 
Wine production within province k, 
average 1901-1905 (Istat, 1908) 
428 1.195 0.941 0.02 3.93 
Prof_Agric 
Dummy variable, =1 if MPi “outside-
the-Parliament” profession was 
related to agriculture (Italian 
Parliament official website) 
428 0.063 0.243 0 1 
∆GDPpc 
Difference between GDP per capita 
in 1901 and 1881 (Felice, 2009) 
428 58.207 58.270 -91 158 
Gov_Exp 
Government experience, number of 
times MPi has been appointed for 
any role in the government (Italian 
Parliament official website) 
428 0.549 1.516 0 15 
Pol_aff 
Political affiliation, dummy variable 
=1 if MPi was affiliated to the same 
party of the President of the Council 
of Ministers (i.e. Prime Minister) 
(Corbetta and Piretti, 2009) 
428 0.683 0.466 0 1 
Lib_vote 
Ideology, dummy variable =1 if MPi 
voted in favour of the confidence to 
the previous government on March 
24, 1905 (i.e. the vote explicitly 
recalled the “liberal orientation” of 
the government, see text for more 
details) (Atti Parlamentari, 1905) 
428 0.518 0.500 0 1 
Part_win 
Political support, participation*vote 
received by the winner (Corbetta 
and Piretti, 2009) 
428 42.66 9.188 21.10 80.77 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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3.4.2 Data 
The database has been assembled from a variety of sources. Nominal votes on 
both the confidence vote on the Italian Government and the 1905 Spanish-Italian 
trade agreement have been manually retrieved from the Atti Parlamentari (Camera 
dei Deputati) – Discussioni, a collection of the Italian Parliament’s work, including 
detailed shorthand reports on the Parliamentary debates and votes. Thanks to an 
impressive effort of the Italian institutions, these documents have recently been 
digitalized and are available to be consulted online on the historical part of the Italian 
Parliament official website (storia.camera.it). As the agenda of the voting day was 
split in two votes, I was able to track both the “confidence vote on the government” 
and the vote on the trade agreement for every single MP that participated in the 
voting session. To be noted that MPs were elected in constituencies, i.e. 
geographical units smaller than provinces and only used for electoral purposes. I 
also exploit this variation in my identification strategy and robustness tests. Data on 
wine production at the provincial level have been collected from the Italian Statistics 
yearbook for the years 1905-1907, edited in 1908 by the Directorate General for 
Statistics at the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade. Population data, used 
to calculate per capita wine production, at the same geographical level are available 
from the same source but refer to the census year 1901. GDP figures are at the 
regional level, and are from Felice (2009). MPs political affiliation and electoral 
support (electoral participation and results), at the constituency level, are from 
Corbetta and Piretti (2009). MPs personal features, such as their profession, and 
the responsibilities in the government have been manually collected from the 
detailed profiles available in the historical section of the Italian Parliament official 
website (storia.camera.it). Data on other confidence votes used in the main 
regression (1905 vote on the “support of a liberal government”, as a proxy for 
“Ideology”) or in the robustness tests (1906 vote on the second Fortis government) 
have also been manually retrieved from the relevant volumes of the Atti Parlamentari 
(Camera dei Deputati) – Discussioni. 
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3.5 Results 
This section presents the main results (Table 3.2) and a series of robustness 
tests (Table 3.3; Table 3.4). 
Wine, the variable which serves as a proxy for identifying local interests, is 
positive and significant across the four different main specifications. Local interests 
are positively associated not only with voting against the trade agreement in general, 
but also when I only consider the subset of “switching” MPs that voted in favour of 
the confidence vote. This means that local interests, identified alternatively by wine 
production and wine production per capita, influenced both the general stance on 
trade and the posture of those MPs that supported the government in the first vote.  
The MP profession, i.e. whether or not his principal occupation outside the 
Parliament was related to agriculture (to be intended as a proxy for private interests), 
seems not to have had a particular role in the decision. However, the non-
significance of the coefficient may also be related to the limited number of positive 
observations the dummy variable has in the database. Additionally, the stronger the 
economic growth experienced in a specific area (in this case region) previous to the 
signature of a trade agreement, the lower the probability of an MP of that area to 
vote against the treaty. This is line with previous findings in the literature, such as 
Mayda and Rodrik (2005), which found that (for individuals) “relative economic 
status has very strong positive association with pro-trade attitudes” (p.1394).  
Political affiliation and ideology are negatively associated with voting against the 
trade agreement. MPs pertaining to Fortis’ same party, and sharing the “liberal 
ideology” values (or at least supporting a government which had to respect such 
“liberal” mandate), where more likely to support the trade agreement. This holds 
true for government experience. 
  
 122 
 
Table 3.2: Main results 
  
(1) 
NoTrade 
(2) 
NoTrade 
(3) 
Switch 
(4) 
Switch 
Wine 
0.0784*** 
(0.0211) 
 
0.0819** 
(0.0326) 
 
     
Wine_pc  
0.110*** 
(0.0230) 
 
0.112*** 
(0.0337) 
     
Prof_Agric 
0.00646** 
(0.00327) 
0.00533 
(0.00347) 
0.00701 
(0.00616) 
0.00523 
(0.00619) 
     
∆GDPpc 
-0.0724 
(0.0548) 
-0.110** 
(0.0537) 
-0.219*** 
(0.0624) 
-0.244*** 
(0.0587) 
     
Gov_Exp 
-0.00904 
(0.00740) 
-0.00708 
(0.00718) 
-0.0239*** 
(0.00677) 
-0.0220*** 
(0.00709) 
     
     
Pol_Aff 
-0.168*** 
(0.0497) 
-0.169*** 
(0.0498) 
-0.115 
(0.0971) 
-0.113 
(0.0991) 
     
     
Lib_Ideology 
-0.122*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.126*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.0187 
(0.0621) 
-0.0271 
(0.0614) 
     
     
Part_win 
-0.0857 
(0.0979) 
-0.0834 
(0.101) 
-0.0505 
(0.137) 
-0.0474 
(0.140) 
     
N 428 428 240 240 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Probit regressions. Coefficients shown are average marginal effects. All regressions include 
a constant and macro-regional fixed effects (macro-regions are: North-East, North-West, Centre and 
South + Islands) not reported for the sake of simplicity. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
To test the robustness of the results, I run a set of different specifications of the 
model, and a set of placebo tests.72 
In column 1 (Table 3.3), I include the results of the vote on the Fortis II 
government, happened few months later that the trade vote. The main objective is 
to control for the political drivers beyond the trade voted: as sometimes argued in 
the qualitative literature, a relevant issue would have been the objective of tumbling 
the Fortis’ government. In column 2, I use data for 1905 wine production only, 
instead of the 1901-1905 average. In column 3 I alleviate the hypothesis that those 
                                                          
72 In Table 3.3, I only include results for “switch” using total wine production. However, results 
using the other variables specified in any of the four “main” regressions are similar and available 
upon request. 
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MPs that were absent from the vote were indifferent from the final results (i.e. in the 
main regressions, absent MPs are codified as “missing”), and I assume that they 
were against the vote (absent MPs are codified with a “0”). In column 4, I cluster the 
standard errors at regional level, to control for any regional factor that may imply 
heteroscedasticity, even within the “macroregion” (North-east, north-west, centre, 
south and islands), whose dummies are already included in the regressions. In 
column 5, 6 and 7 I aggregate the dependent variable at the provincial level, 
calculating, in the spirit of Curto-Grau et al. (2012), the percentage of MPs that voted 
against within each province (in the case of “switch”, this is still conditional to having 
voted “yes” to the confidence). Respectively, I estimate the regression using OLS, 
fractional probit, and tobit, as the range of possible values for the dependent 
variable is limited between 0 and 1. The main variable of interest, wine production, 
shows a consistent behaviour throughout the different specifications. 
In addition, I run three placebo tests (Table 3.4), using data available at the 
provincial level for other three agricultural products: wheat, rice and corn (Ministry 
of Agriculture, 1908). For any of these, I run both the “disseminated” (i.e. 
constituency level) and the “aggregated” version (i.e. provincial level), using a probit 
and a fractional probit.73 Results show that the production of wheat, rice and corn 
do not explain the MPs vote, no matter the level of aggregation chosen. 
 
 
 
                                                          
73 I also performed further robustness tests, in line with those of Table 3.3. Results are in line with 
those displayed in Table 3.4, and are available upon request. 
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Table 3.3: Robustness tests 
  
(1) 
Fortis 
(ex-post) 
(2) 
Wine1905 
(3) 
Absent MPs 
=0 
(4) 
Cluster s.e. 
(Region) 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
FractProb 
(7) 
Tobit 
Wine 
0.0826*** 
(0.0318) 
 
 
0.0691** 
(0.0322) 
 
0.0819*** 
(0.0280) 
 
0.185*** 
(0.0797) 
0.0936** 
(0.0396) 
 
0.102** 
(0.0423) 
 
        
Wine_1905  
0.0591* 
(0.0312) 
     
        
Prof_Agric 
0.00768 
(0.00590) 
 
0.00642 
(0.00621) 
 
0.00446 
(0.00608) 
 
0.00701 
(0.00491) 
 
0.0873 
(0.251) 
0.00618 
(0.0186) 
 
0.00623 
(0.0133) 
 
        
∆GDPpc 
-0.217*** 
(0.0635) 
 
-0.234*** 
(0.0642) 
 
-0.238*** 
(0.0640) 
 
-0.219*** 
(0.0422) 
 
-0.00406** 
(0.00162) 
 
-0.172*** 
(0.0646) 
 
-0.227*** 
(0.0757) 
 
        
Gov_Exp 
-0.0228*** 
(0.00699) 
 
-0.0239*** 
(0.00668) 
 
-0.0274*** 
(0.00608) 
 
-0.0239*** 
(0.00681) 
 
-0.0173 
(0.0377) 
 
-0.0120 
(0.0174) 
 
-0.00804 
(0.0235) 
 
        
Pol_Aff 
-0.107 
(0.0947) 
 
-0.105 
(0.0984) 
 
-0.0732 
(0.0936) 
 
-0.115 
(0.0825) 
 
-0.0520 
(0.196) 
 
-0.0345 
(0.164) 
 
-0.0467 
(0.194) 
 
        
Lib_Ideology 
-0.00478 
(0.0620) 
 
-0.0228 
(0.0627) 
 
-0.0304 
(0.0619) 
 
-0.0187 
(0.0527) 
 
0.0614 
(0.215) 
 
0.0157 
(0.146) 
 
0.0470 
(0.123) 
 
        
Confidence Fortis 
-0.0578 
(0.0409) 
 
      
        
PartWin 
-0.0496 
(0.135) 
 
-0.0342 
(0.137) 
 
-0.0690 
(0.138) 
 
-0.0505 
(0.114) 
 
-0.00100 
(0.00831) 
 
0.00378 
(0.318) 
 
-0.0420 
(0.305) 
 
        
N 240 240 253 240 63 63 63 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Probit regressions. Coefficients shown are average marginal effects. All regressions include a constant and macro-regional fixed effects (macro-regions are: North-East, 
North-West, Centre and South + Islands) not reported for the sake of simplicity. In OLS, wine is expressed in millions of hectolitres. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results for “Switch”, with total wine production. Results of the other three types of regressions do not change and are available upon request. 
 125 
 
Table 3.4: Further robustness – placebo regressions 
 
  
(1) 
Probit 
Wheat 
(2) 
FractProb 
Wheat 
(3) 
Probit 
Rice 
(4) 
FractProb 
Rice 
(5) 
Probit 
Corn 
(6) 
FractProb 
Corn 
Wheat 
0.009 
(0.044) 
-0.021 
(0.056) 
    
       
Corn   
0.026 
(0.0337) 
-0.005 
(0.046) 
  
       
Rice     
0.0031 
(0.008) 
-0.00097 
(0.007) 
       
ProfAgric 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.0048 
(0.018) 
       
∆GDPpc 
-0.266*** 
(0.066) 
-0.219*** 
(0.073) 
-0.276*** 
(0.064) 
-0.213*** 
(0.064) 
-0.267*** 
(0.063) 
-0.214*** 
(0.067) 
       
Gov_Exp 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.159) 
-0.026*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0095 
(0.017) 
-0.0249*** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.019) 
       
Pol_Aff 
-0.0849 
(0.096) 
0.0077 
(0.159) 
-0.068 
(0.097) 
0.064 
(0.169) 
-0.083 
(0.096) 
0.071 
(0.158) 
       
Lib_Ideology 
-0.038 
(0.064) 
-0.0663 
(0.150) 
-0.039 
(0.062) 
-0.050 
(0.148) 
-0.0396 
(0.062) 
-0.052 
(0.149) 
       
PartWin 
-0.019 
(0.137) 
0.211 
(0.346) 
-0.022 
(0.134) 
0.193 
(0.335) 
-0.0096 
(0.135) 
0.187 
(0.335) 
       
N 240 63 240 63 240 63 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Notes: Probit regressions. Coefficients shown are average marginal effects. All regressions include a constant 
and macro-regional fixed effects (macro-regions are: North-East, North-West, Centre and South + Islands) not 
reported for the sake of simplicity. In OLS, wine is expressed in millions of hectolitres. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results for “Switch”, with total wine production. Results of the 
other three types of regressions do not change and are available upon request. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter revises the determinants of the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-
Italian trade agreement perpetrated by the Italian Parliament. Building on the existing 
literature, I exploit a unique database, manually assembled from a variety of primary 
and secondary sources, to analyse this rare example of roll-call vote on a failed 
attempt to ratify an international trade treaty lowering tariffs, and in particular tariffs 
on wine, in a peripheral country during the first wave of globalization. Aiming at 
shedding some light on the determinants of MPs vote decision for an agreement 
that did not received much attention, but it has been alternatively depicted in the 
literature as the by-product of either the successful lobbying of local interests or 
wider political interests, such as the interests in opposing or supporting the 
government and the President of the Council of Ministers Alessandro Fortis. I show 
the importance of local interests to explain Italian MPs voting behaviours, while 
controlling for other possible elements that may have influenced the vote. 
I follow and adapt Malcolm (2017) and Poelmans et al. (2018), using a probit 
model to analyse MPs’ voting pattern. Proxying local interest with wine production, 
it is not possible to discard that local interest played a role in the rejection of the 
trade agreement, as they are positively associated not only with voting against the 
trade agreement in general, but also with “switching” from voting in favour to the 
confidence to voting against the trade agreement. This means that local interests, 
identified alternatively by wine production and wine production per capita, 
influenced both the general stance on trade and the posture of those MPs that 
supported the government in the first vote.  
This chapter contributes to clarify the debate on the drivers of the rejection of 
the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement perpetrated by the Italian Parliament, 
pointing at the relevant role of local interest, and providing – for the first time – a 
quantitative analysis on the issue. Careful of not expanding the conclusions beyond 
the historical context and the geographical scope of this chapter, the chapter 
highlights that in a period where the protectionist rhetoric was largely successful 
and states where implementing polices to watered down the progress achieved in 
the process of globalization, local interests proved to be able – at least – to influence 
the institutional plans for promoting further economic integration, with long-lasting 
consequences. Further research is deeply needed, including the collection of 
product-level tariff data from primary sources, to provide a wider cross-country 
perspective, and the study of qualitative sources to fully understand the dynamics 
of lobbying activities and lobbyists, and the “sensitivity of Italian decision makers to 
their efforts” (Federico and Tena, 1999). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis analysed the monetary integration and the political economy of 
international trade during the first wave of globalization. 
In Chapter 1, I revise the conventional view that the LMU had no overall effects 
on international trade, confirming the findings of Flandreau’s (2000) pioneering work 
– being the first paper using cliometric techniques on such issues. In addition, 
however, I allow for heterogeneous effects on trade relations between France and 
the rest of the LMU members on one side, and among the rest of LMU members 
on the other side, characterising different periods of “LMU effectiveness” based on 
historical circumstances and evidence, and using an augmented gravity model 
which also take into account political powers. Within such framework, I have shown 
that the LMU was relevant for trade flows under certain conditions. Indeed, if 
analysing the entire period under consideration (1865-1913), estimates show an 
insignificant effect on overall within-LMU trade, a result that mirrors its institutional 
weaknesses. Nevertheless, when considering factors related to the changing 
conditions in the international environment affecting the LMU underlying economic 
foundations (i.e. the limits on silver coinage agreed upon in 1874) and the rules of 
the Union (i.e. the “liquidation clause” of 1885), the data support the hypothesis that 
the LMU had significant trade effects for the period 1865-1874. These effects were 
nonetheless concentrated in the flows between France and the rest of LMU 
members. Moreover, structural break analysis confirmed that only in 1874 (and not 
in 1885) there was a “LMU-wide” structural break, which affected the course of 
trade flows within the Union. These new findings are in line with primary sources 
obtained from archival research, and previous qualitative evidence available in the 
literature. 
In Chapter 2, I revise the evolution of Italian exports since the Unification until 
WWI, with a particular focus on market entry. Building on the existing literature and 
exploiting the recently released Bankit-FTV database, I first construct the intensive 
and extensive margins for Italian exports during the period 1862-1913 and, second,  
show the existence of “spillover” effects influencing the probability of Italian exports 
to enter a foreign market. Those effects are linked to the Italian export and import 
dynamics. The quantitative analysis, based on a logit model, shows robust support 
for what it has been referred to, throughout this chapter, as “export spillovers” and 
“import spillovers”. In the first case, this means that the presence of “similar” 
exported products increases the probability of entry in the destination market, due 
to either the creation of a superior sector-specific knowledge, accumulated by the 
same or a similar firm selling similar products when firms with similar or 
complementary products decide to export as a consequence of the behaviour of 
their peers, or other mechanisms that should be unfolded using firm-level data. In 
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addition, I detect an inverted-U relationship between the presence of similar exports 
in a specific market and the probability of entry in a market. This would prove the 
existence of a threshold, above which the market reaches a 
“saturation”/“congestion” level, possibly due to increasing competition among 
Italian products in the foreign country. In the second case, “import spillovers” also 
affect positively the likelihood of product entry in a market: the greater the increase 
in the imports of a product k at time t-1, the more likely the product was to be 
exported at time t. This positive effects may not only be “indirect” through 
productivity or technology, but “direct” through a reduction in production costs. 
However, if imported products were not used as inputs in the domestic production 
process, but competed with domestic products in the market instead, the effects 
of increased imports on exports may act through a different channel: the firm 
(product) strive for survival may oblige domestic (and less competitive) firms 
(products) to find compatible foreign markets, characterised by lower productivity. 
Finally, import competition may have positive effects through an indirect channel, 
stimulating productivity and innovation as in a model à la Aghion et al. (2005), where 
firms decide to face the increase in foreign competition investing more in innovation, 
increasing productivity and overcoming fixed costs related to export activities, 
therefore opening a wider set of markets, which were previously unaffordable. 
In Chapter 3, I revise the determinants of the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-
Italian trade agreement perpetrated by the Italian Parliament. Building on the existing 
literature, I exploit a unique database, manually assembled from a variety of primary 
and secondary sources, to analyse this rare example of roll-call vote on a failed 
attempt to ratify an international trade treaty lowering tariffs, and in particular tariffs 
on wine, in a peripheral country during the first wave of globalization. Aiming at 
shedding some light on the determinants of MPs vote decision for an agreement 
that did not received much attention, but it has been alternatively depicted in the 
literature as the by-product of either the successful lobbying of local interests or 
wider political interests, such as the interests in opposing or supporting the 
government and the President of the Council of Ministers Alessandro Fortis. I show 
the importance of local interests to explain Italian MPs voting behaviours, while 
controlling for other possible elements that may have influenced the vote. I follow 
and adapt Malcolm (2017) and Poelmans et al. (2018), using a probit model to 
analyse MPs’ voting pattern. Proxying local interest with wine production, it is not 
possible to discard that local interest played a role in the rejection of the trade 
agreement, as they are positively associated not only with voting against the trade 
agreement in general, but also with “switching” from voting in favour to the 
confidence to voting against the trade agreement. This means that local interests, 
identified alternatively by wine production and wine production per capita, 
influenced both the general stance on trade and the posture of those MPs that 
supported the government in the first vote. 
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However, inevitably, this research faced certain limitations. Throughout the 
pages of this thesis, I focused on the effects of a monetary agreement on trade, on 
the course of Italian exports and the determinants of market entry, and on the 
political economy beyond the rejection of an international trade treaty using the 
methods of quantitative analysis. All these, I argue, are fundamental questions to be 
addressed. Nevertheless, to answer these enquiries, I left open others, which may 
be judged equally useful in contributing to a better understanding of the European 
economic history. In particular, while the trade effects of a monetary agreement, 
described in Chapter 1, are certainly important, the mechanisms beyond the 
formation of international agreements, including the diplomatic negotiations are also 
interesting to be understood. How the LMU got to have (or have not) its governing 
institutions and rules? Had special interests of any sorts a role in shaping the final 
outcome? Which special interests supported or opposed the LMU during its 
existence? What was the LMU public perception? In addition, to combine the Italian 
exporting and importing experience, described in Chapter 2, with a detailed 
qualitative analysis of firm-level data would allow to relax some hypothesis and 
gauge with more precision the channels beyond export and import spillovers, 
shedding new light over these issues. Finally, Chapter 3 provides a quantitative 
analysis of the political economy beyond the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian 
trade agreement. Nevertheless, as argued by Federico and Tena (1999), “we still 
know very little about the lobbying, and the sensitivity of Italian decision-makers to 
their efforts”. Therefore, more archival research to understand these issues is still 
deeply needed. 
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